Author: Matt Finer
Protected: MAAP #24X: Implications of upcoming major El Niño event on Amazon fires
Protected: MAAP #246: Illegal gold mining in protected areas in the Juruena River region, Mato Grosso (Brazilian Amazon)
MAAP #244: Amazon Deforestation & Fire Hotspots 2025
Base Map. Deforestation and fire hotspots across the Amazon in 2025. Data: UMD/GLAD, Amazon Conservation/MAAP
Continuing our annual series, we present a detailed look at the major 2025 Amazon forest loss hotspots and trends, based on the annual data recently released by the University of Maryland and featured on Global Forest Watch. As in other reports of the series, we take this global dataset and analyze it specifically for the Amazon.
This dataset, which serves as a consistent source across all nine countries of the Amazon, distinguishes forest loss from fire and non-fire causes. We use the non-fire forest loss as a proxy for human-caused deforestation, although it also includes some natural loss. In addition, we apply a filter to focus just on primary forest loss.
With this context, we are able to identify the primary forest loss hotspots from fire and non-fire (deforestation proxy) causes across the Amazon in 2025 (see Base Map).
The non-fire (proxy for deforestation) hotspots were largely due to agriculture and gold mining across the Amazon. These hotspots were concentrated in the:
- Soy frontiers of southeast Brazil (Area A; see MAAP #161) and southern Bolivia (Area B; MAAP #179),
. - Along major roads in Brazil, such as the Trans-Amazonian Highway (Area C) and BR-364 (Area D). There is also agricultural expansion along an expansive road network in northern Brazil (Area K).
. - Agricultural areas in central Peru (Area E), including lands occupied by Mennonite colonies (MAAP #222),
. - Arc of deforestation in northwest Colombia (Area F) associated with roads, land grabbing (and associated cattle pastures), and coca cultivation (MAAP #224),
. - Gold mining areas in southern and central Peru (Area G; MAAP #233, MAAP #241), northern Ecuador (Area H) (MAAP #230, MAAP #227, MAAP #219), northeast Amazon (Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname – for example, Area I), and Indigenous territories in Brazil (for example, Area J; MAAP #239).
The fire hotspots were concentrated in the soy and cattle frontiers of the southeast Brazilian Amazon and southeast Bolivian Amazon (including the important ecosystem of the Chiquitano dry forests), and also northeast Bolivia. This fire data may be interpreted as forest degradation, in contrast to the more permanent impacts of deforestation.
Amazon Primary Forest Loss, 2002-2025
In 2025, the major story was that fires were down from the record-breaking year of 2024 (Graph 1). Fires were still historically high, however (1.5 million hectares), marking the 3rd-highest since 2002 (behind only the peak fire seasons of 2016 and 2024).
Non-fire forest loss was also down from 2024 (Graph 1). While still just above 1 million hectares, it was the lowest total over the past 10 years and the 5th-lowest since 2002.
Cumulatively, we estimate the non-fire forest loss of 34.8 million hectares of primary forest since 2002, about the size of Germany or the U.S. state of Montana. An additional 12.2 million hectares have been impacted by fires.
Note that Graph 1 is interactive: The reader can click items in the legend (Non-fire and Fire-caused forest loss), and on the circles for each year to visualize the data point.
Amazon Primary Forest Loss, 2025
In 2025, the majority of non-fire primary forest loss occurred in Brazil (55%), followed by Bolivia (20%), Peru (14%), and Colombia (6%) as the clear top four (Graph 2a; Annex 1).
Notably, Brazil had the lowest annual loss on record since 2002, at around 560,475 hectares.
Bolivia‘s non-fire primary forest loss (200,000 ha) was still historically high (4th highest on record), but lower than the previous peak three years of 2022-24.
Peru’s non-fire primary forest loss was the 5th highest on record (147,480 ha), and the highest over the past 5 years.
Colombia’s non-fire primary forest loss (66,310 ha) was the second lowest since the FARC peace agreement in 2016.
The vast majority (97%) of fire-caused primary forest loss occurred in just two countries: Brazil and Bolivia. Peru added 2% (26,580 ha). All three countries’ fire impact was much lower than last year’s record-breaking fire season.
Note that Graph 2a is interactive: The reader can click the bars for each country for non-fire forest loss (purple bars) and fire forest loss (orange bars). To see the data for the countries with less forest loss, click on the “Log” option in the upper right (or see Annex 1, further below).
Amazon Primary Forest Loss Rate, 2025
Standardizing for area, we show that Bolivia has the highest non-fire primary forest loss rate, followed by Peru, Colombia, then Brazil (Graph 2b).
Bolivia also has, by far, the highest fire-caused primary forest loss rate, followed by Brazil, and more distantly, Peru.
Note that Graph 2b is interactive: The reader can click the bars for each country for non-fire forest loss (purple bars) and fire forest loss (orange bars).
Amazon Deforestation 2025
In a novel analysis, we directly estimate Amazonian deforestation for the first time. As noted above, the primary forest loss data described above is a good proxy for deforestation, but also includes loss associated with natural events, such as landslides, windstorms, and meandering rivers.
Using the “WRI Google Drivers of Tree Cover Loss” dataset, we estimate the primary forest loss directly caused by agriculture, mining, and infrastructure. That is, directly estimate human-caused deforestation.
In 2025, we estimate the deforestation of 736,484 hectares across the Amazon (Graph 3). The vast majority (94.6%) of this deforestation came from agriculture (both permanent and shifting). An additional 5.3% came from hard commodities, mostly gold mining. The remaining 0.1% was caused by roads and infrastructure.
Over half (55.2%) of this deforestation occurred in Brazil, followed by Peru (16.8%), Bolivia (13.8%), and Colombia (8.5%).
Peru had the most mining deforestation, followed by Brazil, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela. However, we note that Amazon Mining Watch indicates that Brazil had higher mining deforestation than Peru in 2025.
Note that Graph 3 is interactive: The reader can click on the bars for each country. To see the data for the countries with less forest loss, click on the “Log” option in the upper right
Amazon Deforestation 2025 in Protected Areas & Indigenous Territories
Of the 2025 Amazon deforestation noted above, nearly 132,000 hectares (18%) occurred in protected areas and Indigenous territories (Graph 4). This may be considered a general estimate for illegal deforestation.
Agriculture accounted for 89% of this deforestation, and mining for the remaining 11%.
Brazil had the most deforestation in protected areas and Indigenous territories (33%), followed by Bolivia (25%), Peru (20%), Colombia (10%), Venezuela (6%), and Ecuador (4%).
Specifically for gold mining, Brazil had the most deforestation in protected areas and Indigenous territories, followed by Peru and Venezuela.
Note that Graph 4 is interactive: The reader can click items in the legend (Agriculture and Mining, by designation), and on the bars to visualize the data for each country.
Annex 1
Note that Annex 1 is interactive: The reader can click on the countries in the legend, and on the circles for each year to visualize the data point. To see the data for the countries with less forest loss, click on the “Log” option in the upper right.
Policy Implications
Following the record-breaking fire season of 2024, fire impact in 2025 was still historically high (3rd highest on record) but much reduced from the previous year’s peak. As detailed in MAAP #229, the 2024 fire season was associated with a strong El Niño event, creating extremely dry conditions across the Amazon. In contrast, 2025 was associated with the moister conditions of La Niña. This correlation has major implications for the predicted upcoming super El Niño season and will be the subject of an upcoming report.
Instead of fires, the major story in 2025 was relatively positive: the lowest non-fire primary forest loss over the past 10 years, and the 5th lowest on record.
However, in 2025 an additional 1 million hectares of primary forest was lost, bringing the cumulative total lost to 34.8 million hectares since 2002, the size of Germany or Montana.
As in previous years, the countries with the highest primary forest loss were Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, respectively.
Notably, Brazil had the lowest annual loss on record since 2002, and Colombia was the second lowest since the FARC peace agreement in 2016. In contrast, Bolivia and Peru were both relatively high, but with different trends: Bolivia was lower than the previous peak years, while Peru was the highest over the past 5 years.
Standardizing for area, Bolivia had the highest primary forest loss rate, followed by Peru, Colombia, and then Brazil.
In terms of spatial patterns, non-fire primary forest loss hotspots were detected in all countries. Major agricultural deforestation areas occurred in southeast Brazil, southern Bolivia, central Peru, and northwest Colombia. Major mining areas were detected in southern and central Peru, northern Ecuador, the northeast Amazon (Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname), and Indigenous territories in Brazil.
Finally, in a novel analysis, we directly estimate Amazonian deforestation for the first time using a new dataset from WRI and Google. In 2025, we estimate the deforestation of 736,484 hectares across the Amazon. The vast majority (94.6%) of this deforestation came from agriculture (both permanent and shifting). An additional 5.3% came from hard commodities, mostly gold mining. The remaining 0.1% was caused by roads and infrastructure.
Over half (55.2%) of this deforestation occurred in Brazil, followed by Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Peru had the most mining deforestation, followed by Brazil, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela.
While agriculture accounts for the greatest impact in terms of total number of hectares deforested, much of this impact occurs in expanding deforestation zones and along roads. Key examples include expanding deforestation along the major roads of the eastern and southern Brazilian Amazon, expanding soy deforestation in the southern Bolivian Amazon, expanding deforestation by Mennonite colonies in the central Peruvian Amazon, and the arc of deforestation in the northwest Colombian Amazon.
Gold mining, on the other hand, has the greatest impact in terms of targeting sensitive areas. In contrast to agricultural deforestation following roads, gold mining, particularly illegal gold mining, often targets the most remote and intact areas, such as protected areas and Indigenous territories. Key examples include the southern Peruvian Amazon, northern Ecuadorian Amazon, border between the Colombian and Brazilian Amazon, Indigenous territories of the Brazilian Amazon, and the northeast Amazon (Venezuela, Suriname, and Guyana).
It is important to note that the data presented here may differ from national data presented by governments. This difference may be due to methodology (we focus on impact on primary forests), spatial resolution (30 meters in our case), and Amazon boundaries (we employ a hybrid boundary designed for maximum inclusion of both watershed and biogeography). Due to these potential differences among sources, it is best to focus on the convergence of overall trends and patterns, and not overly focus on the absolute numerical difference.
Methodology
The analysis was based on 30-meter resolution annual forest loss data produced by the University of Maryland and also presented by Global Forest Watch.
This data was complemented with the Global Forest Loss due to fire dataset that is unique in terms of being consistent across the Amazon (in contrast to country specific estimates) and distinguishes forest loss caused directly by fire (note that virtually all Amazon fires are human-caused). The values included were ‘medium’ and ‘high’ confidence levels (code 3-4). This fire data may be interpreted as forest degradation, in contrast to the more permanent impacts of deforestation.
The remaining forest loss serves as a likely close proxy for deforestation, with the only remaining exception being natural events such as landslides, wind storms, and meandering rivers. The values used to estimate this category were ‘low’ certainty of forest loss due to fire (code 2), and forest loss due to other ‘non-fire’ drivers (code 1).
For the baseline, it was defined to establish areas with >30% tree canopy density in 2000. Importantly, we applied a filter to calculate only primary forest loss by intersecting the forest cover loss data with the additional dataset “primary humid tropical forests” as of 2001 (Turubanova et al 2018). For more details on this part of the methodology, see the Technical Blog from Global Forest Watch (Goldman and Weisse 2019).
Our geographic range for the Amazon is a hybrid designed for maximum inclusion: biogeographic boundary (as defined by RAISG) for all countries, except for Bolivia and Peru, where we use the watershed boundary, and Brazil, where we use the Legal Amazon boundary.
Protected areas and Indigenous territory data from RAISG and official sources. In case of an overlap, data was included in the protected areas category. Note that Suriname does not have titled Indigenous territories.
To identify the deforestation hotspots, we conducted a kernel density estimate. This type of analysis calculates the magnitude per unit area of a particular phenomenon, in this case, forest cover loss. We conducted this analysis using the Kernel Density tool from the Spatial Analyst Tool Box of ArcGIS. We used the following parameters:
Search Radius: 15000 layer units (meters)
Kernel Density Function: Quartic kernel function
Cell Size in the map: 50 x 50 meters (0.25 hectares)
Everything else was left to the default setting.
For the Base Map, we used the following concentration percentages: High: 3-14%; Very High: >14%. These percentages correspond to the concentration of forest loss pixels, with a pixel size of 50 x 50 meters (0.25 hectares).
Using the “WRI Google Drivers of Tree Cover Loss” dataset, we then estimated human-caused deforestation. The main challenge was analyzing this 1 km resolution dataset in relation to the 30 m resolution annual forest loss dataset described above.
Building upon the annual forest loss by confidence level )—from which fire-related loss was excluded based on confidence levels 3 and 4—a second layer, designated “Forest Loss Non-Fire” (confidence levels 1 and 2), was generated; onto this layer, the cumulative “Drivers” layer (2001–2025) was overlaid to analyze which underlying causes were associated with the recorded loss.
The result was an artificial scale 30 m resolution; it should be noted here that the spatial correlation is not exact. Since Driver’s original data has a resolution of 1 km—which encompasses multiple 30-meter pixels—this value has been replicated (downscaled). Through layer merging, a layer was obtained containing forest loss pixel values accompanied by a confidence level and an assigned driver—meaning the probable primary cause of the loss has been identified.
To estimate human-caused deforestation, we focused on just four of the drivers: agriculture (both permanent and shifting), hard commodities, and roads & infrastructure. In other words, we did not include Natural forest loss, Wildfires, or Logging.
Acknowledgements
We thank colleagues from the following organizations for helpful comments on the report: Conservación Amazónica – ACEAA in Bolivia, Conservación Amazónica – ACCA in Peru, and Fundación EcoCiencia in Ecuador.
This work was supported by Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).
Citation
Finer M, Ariñez A, Bodin B, Santana A (2026) Amazon Deforestation & Fire Hotspots 2025. MAAP: 244.
MAAP #243: Gold Mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon: Southern Sector – Zamora Chinchipe Province
Base Map 1. Mining deforestation in Ecuador. Data: AMW, Amazon Conservation/MAAP, RAISG
This is the fourth in a series of reports detailing the expansion of gold mining deforestation in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
In previous reports, we analysed mining activity in the northern (MAAP #227), central (MAAP #230), and southern (MAAP #238) sectors of the country, respectively (see Base Map 1).
Here, our analysis continues the study of the southern sector, focusing on mining deforestation in the Zamora Chinchipe province.
Zamora Chinchipe, located in the southernmost tip of the Ecuadorian Amazon, is one of the country’s most ecologically significant regions due to its location within the transitional zone between the Andean mountain range and the Amazonian lowlands. Due to its high biodiversity and important ecosystems, the province is home to several priority conservation areas—including Podocarpus National Park, Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve, Maycú Nature Reserve, and Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest (see Base Map 2)—which collectively form a key ecological connectivity corridor for emblematic species such as the jaguar and spectacled bear (Jewel, 2020).
This area, however, faces growing threats associated with the expansion of extractive activities. For example, MAAP #167 first reported mining deforestation in the Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest.
Given its high potential for mineral extraction, Zamora Chinchipe has become a province of strategic national interest. According to reporting by Mongabay, gold mining has emerged as one of its primary economic drivers, operating at multiple scales ranging from large-scale industrial projects to small-scale activities. The impacts associated with this activity include deforestation and mercury contamination.
Since 2023, Earth Genome, in collaboration with Amazon Conservation and the Pulitzer Center, has been developing an online geospatial viewer known as Amazon Mining Watch (see MAAP #226). This virtual tool automates the analysis of satellite imagery using machine learning to identify areas of gold mining deforestation across the Amazon annually since 2018. It now also features quarterly updates, representing a breakthrough that will enable the systematic, near-real-time detection of gold mining deforestation across the region.
Base Map 1 presents the location of recent mining deforestation across the Ecuadorian Amazon, based on the latest data from Amazon Mining Watch
Dynamics of Mining Activity in Zamora Chinchipe
Base Graph.Data: MapBiomas, EcoCiencia.
The Base Graph illustrates the cumulative mining deforestation in the Zamora Chinchipe province between 1995 and 2024.
Mining impacted just 5 hectares in our 1995 baseline, before gradually reaching 1,000 hectares in 2009-2010.
Starting around 2016, we documented a notable spike in annual mining activity, reaching 2,000 hectares in 2017, then 3,000 hectares in 2019, 5,o00 hectares in 2021, and ultimately reaching a total of 6,802 hectares by 2024.
This is equivalent to 16,808 acres.
Case Studies
We conducted satellite monitoring to identify and quantify the impacts of gold mining deforestation across four case studies in Zamora Chinchipe, analyzing the dynamics of how the mining footprint expanded during the 2021–2025 period (see Base Map 2).
These cases encompass four key conservation areas, including two national protected areas (Podocarpus National Park and Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve), one protective forest (Upper Nangaritza River Basin Protective Forest), and one private conservation area (Maycú Nature Reserve).
They also include two of the province’s strategic river systems: the Nunpatakaime and Nangaritza rivers.
In total, across the four case studies, we recorded 195 hectares impacted by mining activity during the 2021–2025 period.
Base Map 2. Satellite Monitoring Area in Zamora Chinchipe. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP, EcoCiencia, Planet.
Case 1: Nangaritza River
Graph 1. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP; EcoCiencia
The case study is situated on the banks of the Nangaritza River, specifically in the village of Las Orquídeas, located in the northwestern sector of the Maycu Nature Reserve.
The impact of mining expansion is one of the primary environmental threats in this area.
We identified a total of 78 hectares affected by mining activity between 2021 and 2025, with a spike starting in 2024 (Graph 1).
Figure 1. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet
Figure 1 indicates that, of the total area affected by mining (78 ha), only 5 hectares are located within mining concessions.
Moreover, 21.2 hectares are located inside the Maycú Natural Reserve.
As indicated in Base Map 2, this area is located around the southern tip of the reserve.
Panel 1 shows the notable mining expansion between July 2021 (left panel) and December 2025 (right panel) along the Nangaritza River.
Panel 1. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet
Case 2: Numpatakaime River
Graph 2. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP, EcoCiencia
This case study is situated along the banks of the Nunpatakaime River, located within the Upper Nangaritza River Basin Protective Forest—a conservation area that safeguards extensive tracts of humid tropical forest characterized by their high biodiversity and excellent state of conservation.
Graph 2 indicates the rapid mining expansion between 2024 (7 hectares) and 2025 (60 hectares).
,
Figure 2. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet
Figure 2 shows that of the total mining area (60 ha), only 5 hectares are located within mining concessions.
Moreover, 44 hectares of mining deforestation are located within the Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest.
As indicated in Base Map 2, this case study is located in the eastern part of the protective forest.
Panel 2 shows the rapid expansion of mining activity between September 2024 (left) and December 2025 (right).
Panel 2. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet
Case 3: Podocarpus National Park
Graph 3. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia
This case study is situated along the banks of the Loyola River, located in the high-mountain zone of Podocarpus National Park.
Graph 3 indicates that, with a baseline of 12 hectares in 2023, the mining impact jumped to 28 hectares in 2024 and then 44 hectares in 2025.
Figure 3. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia, Planet
Mining activity is taking place within Podocarpus National Park (Figure 3), where the exploitation of mineral resources is prohibited by law.
As indicated in Base Map 2, this area is within the core of the national park.
Panel 3 shows the mining expansion in the national park between September 2023 (left panel) and April 2025 (right panel). The panel contrasts the loss of forest cover, as well as the impact on the Loyola River.
Panel 3. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet
Case 4: Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve
Graph 4. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia
This case is situated within the buffer zone of the Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve, a core zone of high ecological significance in southern Ecuador.
This protected area plays a strategic role as a biodiversity corridor connecting Podocarpus National Park, the Maycú Nature Reserve, and the Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest (see Base Map 2).
Graph 4 indicates an increase from a baseline mining impact of 4 hectares in 2024 to 13 hectares in 2025.
Figure 4. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia, Planet
Figure 4 illustrates that most of the detected mining activity (12 hectares) is being conducted outside the areas authorised mining areas.
Notably, we also detected the initial invasion (1.59 hectares) of Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve.
Panel 4 illustrates the expansion of mining activity between September 2023 (left panel) and December 2025 (right panel).
Panel 4. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet
Figure 4 Zoom . Datos: EcoCiencia
Additionally, we obtained a more detailed view from aerial photographs captured by a drone in April 2026.
\With this enhanced imagery, we identified key minging features such as sediment ponds, removal of vegetation cover, eroded soils, and the presence of abandoned camps, among other impacts associated with mining activity (see Figure 4 Zoom).
Public Policy Recommendations
1. Standardisation of the mining cycle (and closing new mining fronts)
Photo 1. Mining activity. Source: EcoCiencia
The cases analysed in Zamora Chinchipe reveal a recurring operational pattern characterised by the opening of mining fronts, their temporary abandonment, a shift toward new areas of exploitation, and a subsequent return to previously impacted zones. This dynamic—common in small-scale and medium-scale mining—generates cumulative environmental impacts and liabilities, and hinders effective oversight by the competent authority.
The Ecuadorian legal framework establishes clear obligations regarding the planning, execution, and closure of mining activities. The ‘Organic Law for the Strengthening of the Strategic Mining and Energy Sectors’ stipulates that all mining activity must be carried out in accordance with approved technical and environmental plans—including environmental management and closure plans—starting from the initial phases of the project (Arts. 4, 7, and 9). Complementarily, the Organic Environmental Code (COA) enshrines the principles of prevention, progressive control, and comprehensive reparation for environmental damage, even when activities are conducted on an intermittent basis (Arts. 9, 171, and 291).
However, in practice, environmental management instruments are often applied in a fragmented manner, evaluating each mining front as an isolated event and without considering the logic of abandonment and return.
In this context, it is recommended to establish standardised and mandatory technical protocols that comprehensively regulate the phases of opening, temporary suspension, abandonment, and reactivation of mining fronts. These protocols should apply regardless of the scale of the activity and serve as a complement to the respective sanctioning processes.
Additionally, it is recommended to condition the authorisation for opening new mining fronts upon the technical and verifiable compliance with progressive closure and remediation processes at previously worked fronts. This measure would serve to prevent the creation of environmental liabilities, reduce incentives for informal abandonment, and align mining practices with current legal obligations.
2. Incorporation of real-time monitoring technologies (early warning system)
Photo 2. Podocarpus National Park—threatened protected area in need of early warning system. Source: EcoCiencia
While the ‘Organic Law for the Strengthening of the Strategic Mining and Energy Sectors’ empowers the State to exercise permanent control and oversight over mining activities (Arts. 3, 4, and 9), in vast and difficult-to-access territories—such as Zamora Chinchipe—traditional control mechanisms prove insufficient to monitor the cycles of abandonment and return.
In this regard, it is recommended that technological monitoring tools—such as georeferencing systems, satellite imagery, and digital reporting platforms—be mandatorily incorporated as part of the mining management and control instruments of the regulatory and oversight body. These tools would enable the identification of periodic changes in land use, the opening of new mining fronts, and the reactivation of previously disturbed areas.
The adoption of these systems would strengthen the preventive approach to environmental control, facilitate decision-making based on technical evidence, and contribute to compliance with the control obligations established in the Organic Law for the Strengthening of the Strategic Mining and Energy Sectors, the Organic Law for the Strengthening of Protected Areas, and the COA.
3. Integration of technical oversight with local governments
The discontinuous nature of mining activity in Zamora Chinchipe necessitates a control model that moves beyond centralised oversight and relies on territorial actors. The Constitution of the Republic recognizes the right to citizen participation in public management (Art. 95)—a principle further elaborated in Ecuadorian environmental regulations.
Within this framework, it is recommended to coordinate the actions of decentralised autonomous governments with local territorial surveillance mechanisms. Such coordination would facilitate the early detection of unauthorized activities, enhance transparency throughout the mining cycle, and ensure that the return to previously impacted areas is carried out under appropriate technical and environmental conditions.
The integration of these actors would contribute to territorializing mining policy, reducing oversight gaps, and strengthening coherence between mining planning and environmental management in the province.
4. Inclusion of technological tools in judicial proceedings
The Organic Law for the Strengthening of Protected Areas (LOFAP) provides for the intervention of the National Police and the Armed Forces to protect protected areas where criminal groups are present, with the aim of neutralizing the threat and restoring conditions of normalcy. Within this framework, it stipulates that oversight in protected areas that are difficult to access—such as Podocarpus National Park and the Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve—shall be carried out through surveillance technology.
Accordingly, its Regulations (RLOFAP) establish that, in these areas, territorial control shall be strengthened through the use of technological tools—such as drones, remote sensors, georeferencing systems, camera traps, or other mechanisms—that ensure continuous and effective monitoring, subject to prior authorization from the competent authority.
Based on this regulatory framework, the incorporation of technological components into judicial processes is recommended, such that these mechanisms form an integral part of proceedings in both administrative and criminal spheres.
A highly valuable technological component included in this list of technological tools is satellite monitoring reports. Therefore, it is recommended that they be integrated into judicial proceedings and administrative procedures, serving as elements of conviction, evidence, and proof. To this end, it is important to promote any regulatory initiative that emphasizes the importance of employing technology in environmental oversight and the prevention of illicit activities.
Acknowledgments
This report is part of a series focused on the Ecuadorian Amazon, produced through a strategic collaboration between the organizations Fundación EcoCiencia and Amazon Conservation, with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).
MAAP #242 Illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory (northern Brazilian Amazon)
Photo 1. Gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory. Photo credit: Lucas Silva/Platô/ISA
Yanomami Indigenous Territory, located in the northern Brazilian Amazon (along the border with Venezuela), is one of the territories most impacted by gold mining in the Amazon (MAAP #226).
This report details the results of geospatial monitoring of illegal gold mining activity in Yanomami Indigenous Territory, based on data collected up to December 2025. This territory is located in the northern Brazilian Amazon, along the border with Venezuela.
This monitoring effort, based on the analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery and data from collaborative monitoring carried out by the Yanomami and Ye’kwana communities, takes place in a context of operational transition in the territory, marked by the current government’s efforts to remove illegal occupants and the persistence of certain mining hotspots (see Note 1 below).
In recent years, this territory has faced an escalation of illegal mining that peaked in 2022, resulting in an unprecedented humanitarian and health crisis. Current data produced by the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental (see below for details) reveals that the total area impacted by mining reached 5,564 hectares in 2025.
However, time series analysis demonstrates a critical inflection point: after the peak in 2022, the annual increase in newly impacted mining areas showed major and successive decreases in the years 2023 through 2025. Comparatively, while the accumulated area up to 2023 represents the vast majority of the impact (around 5,500 ha), there has been a documented increase of 129 hectares in 2024 and 2025 (83.95 ha and 45.2 ha, respectively).
This recent slowdown in the rate of mining expansion is a direct result of the command and control operations initiated by the Brazilian government in 2023, shortly after the official recognition of the public health emergency (see Note 2). The data, however, also serves as a warning: although the mining expansion has slowed, the continued detection in both 2024 and 2025 confirms that mining activity has not been completely eradicated.
Monthly monitoring indicates that illegal mining continues to exert pressure on the territory, miners are adapting to enforcement operations and maintain mining nodes of resistance that require continuity and improvement of territorial protection and monitoring strategies.
Analysis of illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory
Methodology
Photo 2. Gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory. Photo credit: Lucas Silva/Platô/ISA
The data presented in this report is based on monitoring led by the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental (ISA). This analysis is carried out monthly based on the visual interpretation of satellite images from Planet (monthly mosaics) and the European Space Agency’s Sentinel 2. Mining impact polygons were then generated by incorporating: 1) recent mining deforestation, 2) active mining areas with bare soil, 3) recently abandoned areas with initial vegetation growth (grasses covering gravel pits), and 4) tailings ponds.
Every month, the impacted regions are revisited to refine the mapping and check for possible misinterpretations. The analysis takes into account not only the spectral response of the objects but also the context. Therefore, all mapping is carried out considering the location of the communities and their cultivated areas, among other information about the Yanomami territory such as airstrips and health posts, which ensures differentiation between the removal of forest cover for traditional agricultural management and deforestation associated with mineral or other types of exploitation.
The systematic remote monitoring of Yanomami Indigenous Territory began in 2018, experimenting with different methodologies. Beginning in 2020, the refinement of impacted areas began using Planet mosaics (3 m spatial resolution). For this reason, 2020 is used as the initial year of detailed analysis.
In the Notes section, we also compare this ISA-led monitoring data with information obtained from Amazon Mining Watch.
In addition to remote monitoring, since 2023 a collaborative monitoring tool has been implemented to record events that pose risks to communities and people in the Yanomami Indigenous Territory. The ‘Wãnori’ Alert System receives and qualifies reports, aiming to strengthen communication between indigenous communities, their organizations, and the Public Authorities. Through a free application (ODK Collect), an alert monitor can report an adverse health event, environmental or territorial threat, using an offline form composed of geographic coordinates and a description of the problem in audio and/or photo. The system uses the form/application as its primary tool for receiving complaints, but it continues to receive information from other sources, such as WhatsApp messages, letters, and radio broadcasts, incorporating this information into a single flow. All alerts are compiled into weekly bulletins and sent to Brazilian authorities.
Results
By December 2025, the total area impacted by illegal mining in the Yanomami Indigenous Territory was mapped at 5,564 hectares (see Note 3 for comparison with Amazon Mining Watch). As seen in Graph 1 (with 2020 baseline at 400 ha), the annual mining impact increased in 2021 (just over 1,000 ha) and peaked in 2022 (nearly 1,800 ha), followed by major decreases in 2023 (330 ha), 2024 (84 ha), and 2025 (45 ha), respectively. This reduction was a result of the intervention of the Brazilian government, which initiated a process of removing illegal miners from the territory in 2023, after recognizing the humanitarian crisis caused by illegal mining among the Yanomami and Ye’kwana peoples.
Graph 1 – Annual increase in the area affected by illegal mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory.
The monitoring documented 45 hectares (across 121 polygons) of new mining deforestation within Yanomami Indigenous Territory in 2025. The vast majority (90%) of the polygons were small mining expansions of less than 1 hectare. This recent mining impact was mostly distributed across six areas: 1) Ericó; 2) Cabeceira do Aracaju; 3) Hokomawaë; 4) Parima-Parafuri; 5) Surucucus/Feijão Queimado; 6) Couto Magalhães (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory, highlighting areas with highest impact in 2025.
The two largest polygons (almost 4 hectares) were identified in Parima (Area 5) and Surucucus, near the Feijão Queimado airstrip (Area 6).
Figure 2 – Comparison of images from January 2025 and November 2025 near the Feijão Queimado airstrip. New deforestation is noticeable in the upper part of image 2.
Figure 3 – Comparison between January 2025 and November 2025 in the Parima region.
The distribution of the new mining areas also indicates a trend towards fragmentation of activity, in contrast to the previous concentration around airstrips (such as Capixaba, Jeremias, Malária, Mucuim). With the exception of the Couto Magalhães river region (Area 6 in Figure 1), where the opening of new areas near old scars continued (Figure 4), the other centers of greater concentration, such as Alto Catrimani, Médio Uraricoera and Homoxi, appear to be relatively neutralized.
Figure 4. – Mapping of illegal mining in the Couto Magalhães River (Papiu and Kayanau regions)
In addition to decentralization, there is also a shift in activity to areas closer to the border with Venezuela (possible leakage or spillover effect), as is the case with the mapped areas in Parafuri-Parima, Hokomawë, and Cabeceira do Aracaçá (Areas 2-4 in Figure 1). It is known that part of this phenomenon is explained by the possibility of “circumventing” inspection by using logistical hubs located in Venezuelan territory, such as the airstrips in Dicão and Simada Ocho.
In 2025, the Yanomami Indigenous Territory’s alert system recorded at least five alerts regarding the movement of clandestine aircraft in the Auaris region. In most cases, the aircraft flew in the direction of Hokomawë, towards the Gaúcho Animal airstrip, located at the mouth of the Auaris River, or towards the airstrip located at the headwaters of the Aracaçá River (supposedly the Gongo airstrip). See Figure 5, which zooms in on Area 2 of Figure 1.
Figure 5 – Mapping of illegal mining at the headwaters of the Aracaçá River, near the Gongo airstrip and the border with Venezuela.
With respect to the ‘Wãnori’ Alert System, in 2025, it recorded a total of 66 territorial alerts, of which the vast majority (83%) were invasion alerts (Graph 2), which include information on the movement of clandestine aircraft, boats, barges, and other vehicles. There were also records of attacks and the entry of firearms. Cases of missing persons were resolved, without being actually associated with violence in the illegal mining areas.
Graph 2 – Territorial alerts in 2025 by alert type
Figure 6 illustrates the spatial distribution of the alerts, again highlighting the concentration in the north of the territory, near the border with Venezuela.
Figure 6 – Heat map of territorial alerts for 2024 and 2025
The area with the highest number of alerts, Apiaú (Chart 3), was also among the regions that registered airspace intrusion alerts (see Annex 1 for photo evidence), possibly associated with illegal mining on the Couto Magalhães River.
Alto Catrimani also had airspace alerts. In this case, the connection between this activity and illegal mining in the headwaters of the Orinoco River, in Venezuelan territory, is notable; this is one of the areas with the highest levels of illegal mining activity in recent years.
Other areas with airspace intrusion alerts include Auaris and Xitei (see Annex 2 for photo evidence). It should also be noted that, even though the Taboca airstrip is located in Venezuela, it supports the remaining fragments of illegal mining in the Alto Catrimani and Xitei regions, such as the mining operation located near the Pixahanapi community .It is worth noting that in the case of the Xitei mining operation (see Annex 3 for community alert), the warnings reinforce the residents’ concern regarding the entry of ammunition and firearms brought by the miners with the aim of recruiting young people and threatening leaders who oppose mineral exploration in the region. Since 2021, Xitei has been marked by violent conflicts associated with mining, and 2025 was no different. In 2025 alone, it is estimated that at least five people died due to these conflicts.
Graph 3 – Territorial alerts in 2025 by region
In addition to airspace violations, the alert system also recorded many instances of illegal incursions along the rivers of Yanomami Indigenous Territory, namel the Uraricoera, Catrimani, Apiaú, and Ajarani. In some cases, the river traffic was associated with the operation of barges and dredges, in others simply for the transport of cassiterite, or the entry of supplies to replenish the camps.
The Lower Catrimani region has reported the most instances of river invasion. From April to December 2025, nine alerts were issued regarding the presence of barges, dredges, and suspicious boats (Figure 7).
Figure 7 – Boat with supplies for illegal mining in the Lower Catrimani region and a mining dredge operating near the Yanomami community in the same region.
From Apiaú, reports have emerged of an alleged trail for ATVs that would serve to supply the mining operations located upstream and bypass the site where the new National Indigenous Foundation (Funai) base is being installed. The trail would connect existing secondary roads outside the territory and reach the Ingarana stream, a tributary of the Apiaú River (Figure 8).
Figure 8 – Map of the Apiaú region showing the location of the alleged portage.
Finally, another noteworthy region is Ericó, an area accessible via the Uraricaá River, where significant signs of deforestation associated with mining were observed in 2025. During the period from 2018 to 2022, there were records of dredges operating on the Uraricaá River; however, there were no clear signs of land-based mining in the region. With the intensification of operations in other parts of the territory, however, there appears to have been a spillover into this basin, which, being further from the main areas of surveillance, ended up becoming vulnerable. See Figure 9, which zooms in on Area 1 of Figure 1.
Figure 9 – Mapping of illegal mining in the Uraricaá River
Annex
Annex 1. Aircraft registration in service of the mining operation in Apiaú
Annex 2.Illegal mining plane registered in Xitei
Annex 3. Video sent to the Alert System, which records the presence of illegal miners operating at night, near the Pixahanapi community, Xitei.
Policy Implications & Recommendations
Analysis of the 2025 data indicates a significant inflection point in the dynamics of illegal mining. Although the total impacted area amounts to 5,564 hectares, there has been a substantial and successive decrease in the annual expansion of newly degraded areas since the peak in 2022. In 2025, only 45.2 hectares of new areas were recorded, distributed across 121 polygons, most of which are less than 1 hectare.
However, miners’ ability to adapt to the government operations is observed, by adopting some fragmentation and decentralization strategies, moving to areas closer to the border with Venezuela to utilize logistical distribution hubs outside the limits of inspection. Furthermore, the persistence of some extremely resilient mining nodes is noted, as is the case with the mining in the Couto Magalhães River.
With this in mind, to consolidate the results of land clearing operations and address the reentry of criminal activity within the territory, the following actions are recommended:
- All enforcement agencies should maintain operations to combat illegal mining in the remaining areas, with the complete destruction of machinery used in mineral extraction and the application of the respective administrative sanctions;
- To ensure continuous remote monitoring of Yanomami territory as well as rapid responses to new alerts from security forces;
- To guarantee the maintenance of the physical structures and the minimum staff for the continuous operation of the existing Protection Posts (Ajarani, Xexena, Walopali, Serra da Estrutura and Pakilapi);
- Finalize the construction of the Apiaú and Kayanau Protection Posts;
- Install new Protection Posts on strategic rivers that serve as routes for illegal mining, specifically on the Uraricaá and Catrimani rivers;
- Implement more efficient river barriers on the Uraricoera, Mucajaí, Uraricaá, and Catrimani rivers.
- To promote regular State enforcement agencies’ patrols on the Uraricoera, Mucajaí, Ajarani, Apiaú, Uraricaá, Catrimani, Parima and Couto Magalhães rivers.
- Enhanced airspace control and strict enforcement of the Brazilian Aeronautical Code.
- Disabling all clandestine airstrips and seized aircraft within Yanomami territory (Integrated Territory of Yanomami).
- To promote regular inspection actions on highways, gas stations, airports, and ports located around Yanomami territory.
- Support from the federal government for the implementation of the Indigenous Surveillance Plan, integrating information from the communities’ Alert System with state action;
- Implement a strict sanitary and territorial protection cordon around the territory of the isolated groups, led by the Indigenous Peoples’ National Foundation (FUNAI) and the Health District (Distrito Sanitário) with support from the National Forces;
- The FUNAI or the Government House (Casa de Governo) should lead the development of a plan to encourage voluntary disarmament in sensitive regions.
- The Brazilian government should foster spaces for governance and dialogue, with members of the government, indigenous associations, and technical partners from civil society, to monitor the implementation of territorial protection actions.
- The Brazilian government should develop, translate, and distribute regular newsletters to communities about territorial protection actions and their progress.
- The national government should coordinate with the Venezuelan government joint actions to combat the logistical “hubs” located just across the border, which serve as refuge for illegal miners and escape routes.
Notes
1. Operational transition refers to the changes in the model, regularity, and intensity of enforcement actions taken following the change in government. https://g1.globo.com/rr/roraima/noticia/2024/02/29/casa-de-governo-com-foco-na-crise-yanomami-e-instalada-em-rr-com-orcamento-de-r-1-bilhao.ghtml
2. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2023/decreto/D11405.htm
3. For comparison, Amazon Mining Watch has detected 2,470 hectares in Yanomami Indigenous Territory between 2018 and 2025. This data also shows a peak in 2022 (increase of 850 ha), followed by declines in 2023 (250 ha) and 2024 (80 ha). AMW did not detect any new mining in 2025. Importantly, the overall detected spatial patterns are similar, with both monitoring systems highlighting the concentration in the northern part of the territory.
4. Protection bases are control points managed by Funai that provide support for operations by other enforcement agencies, such as Ibama and the Federal Police.
5. The River Barriers function as control points and nautical blockades managed by Funai, with support from Ibama and the Federal Police, to prevent logistical access by wildcat miners and intruders to the rivers of the Yanomami Indigenous Territory.
6. This should involve regulatory agencies alongside environmental enforcement and command-and-control bodies, such as the National Civil Aviation Agency – ANAC (for airfield inspections), the National Petroleum Agency – ANP (for fuel station inspections), and the National Land Transport Agency – ANTT (for road and highway inspections).
Acknowledgments
This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and regional partners, with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. In this case, we thank our partner Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) for leading this report
MAAP #241: Rapid Expansion of Illegal Gold Mining in Tambopata National Reserve (Southern Peruvian Amazon)
Image 1. Recent expansion of illegal gold mining in Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Gold mining has been a notorious driver of deforestation in the southern Peruvian Amazon for several decades. This mining-related deforestation reached crisis levels in the mid-2010s, particularly affecting Tambopata National Reserve and its buffer zone (see MAAP #96 from January 2019). This situation led to the major government operation known as “Operation Mercury” in February 2019, and a subsequent initiative known as the “Restoration Plan” in 2021.
After a period of reduced mining activity due to Operation Mercury and the Restoration Plan, illegal gold mining has resumed an alarming expansion within Tambopata National Reserve, primarily during the second half of 2025 and early 2026 (see Graph 1 below).
During this recent period (2025–26), we find that a total area of 500 hectares was deforested due to illegal mining in the northern part of the Reserve along the Malinowski River, which forms part of its northern boundary (see Base Map below).
Analyzing very high-resolution satellite imagery (Planet’s SkySat, 0.5m), we detected a total of 183 mining structures (such as heavy equipment and excavators) and 67 mining camps across five mining zones within the northern part of Tambopata National Reserve, as of February 2026.
Based on this finding, we estimate that around 1,000 people are currently involved in illegal mining activities in the Reserve, using a conversion factor derived from the machinery and camps detected within the mining zones (ACCA, 2022).
In response to this situation, the Peruvian government has initiated several actions in early 2026 (January – March) to address the expanding invasion of illegal mining within Tambopata National Reserve. Through coordination between police and military institutions, these interventions have resulted in the seizure and destruction of machinery, equipment, and encampments used in illegal mining activities within the Reserve (Joint Command of the Armed Forces, 2026).
Below, we present:
- Annual mining deforestation trends in Tambopata National Reserve (2016–2025);
. - Four case studies featuring satellite imagery to illustrate the most recent mining expansion within the Reserve.
. - 5 pillars of public policy regarding illegal mining in Tambopata National Reserve, including enforcement operations and state limitations; legislative setbacks and threats; and the 2026 political election.
Annual Mining Deforestation in Tambopata National Reserve
Graph 1 shows annual mining deforestation within Tambopata National Reserve for the period 2016–2025. The main ecosystems affected by this mining activity were the Alluvial Floodplain Forest and Non-Floodplain Terrace Forest.
Graph 1. Mining Deforestation in Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACA, ACCA, BCRP, CINCIA, MapBiomas Perú.
During this period, three key events stand out:
First, Operation Mercury—a multisectoral intervention against illegal mining in critical zones of the Madre de Dios region, carried out in early 2019—resulted in a major reduction that same year compared to 2016 and 2017, when higher levels of mining expansion were recorded. During 2017 and 2018, a series of operations and interdictions were launched in the region that helped combat the advance of illegal mining (AIDER, 2021). Coupled with these actions, the success of Operation Mercury led to a substantial reduction in mining expansion within the Tambopata National Reserve and its buffer zone (MAAP #104, MAAP #121).
Second, the “Restoration Plan“—a series of military interventions conducted in 2021 in critical illegal mining zones within the southern Peruvian Amazon—also resulted in a major decrease in mining deforestation that same year, compared to the previous year. In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, difficulties arose regarding the execution of operations and patrols within Tambopata National Reserve and its buffer zone, leading to a reduction in police and military presence in key sectors (AIDER, 2021; DAR, 2023; Vadillo, 2022). Consequently, instances of illegal miners re-entering Tambopata were recorded (Romo, 2020). In response, the renewed military operations successfully combated the expansion of illegal mining activity in the Madre de Dios region, including Tambopata.
Thirdly, during 2025-early 2026, we recorded an alarming gold mining deforestation expansion (500 hectares), surpassing the figures registered during the critical years of 2016 and 2017 that led up to Operation Mercury. This sudden increase was likely driven by the exponential rise in the international price of gold (see red line in Graph 1). Thus, it is likely that the sustained rise in gold prices has influenced the expansion of illegal mining in recent years by boosting the expected profitability derived from the trade of extracted ore.
Base Map & Case Studies
The Base Map displays the recent expansion of 500 hectares deforested by illegal mining within Tambopata National Reserve during the second half of 2025 (431 hectares) and early 2026 (69 hectares through February). Mining activity is concentrated in the northwestern part of the Reserve, in areas adjacent to the Malinowski River. Furthermore, it has been identified that this illegal activity is taking place in the vicinity of several of the Reserve’s surveillance posts. Insets A–D indicate the location of the four case studies.
Base Map. Illegal Gold Mining Activity in the Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACA, ACCA, CINCIA, MapBiomas Perú.
Case Study A. Sector Isla Córdoba
In this area, located in the northwest corner of Tambopata National Reserve (see Box A in the Base Map), we recorded 106 hectares of mining deforestation between January 2025 and January 2026 (Figure A1). Note that this mining zone is situated near the Reserve’s Otorongo surveillance and control post (see Base Map).
Figure A1. Mining deforestation in the Isla Córdoba sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Figure A2 shows that a large portion of this deforestation (80%) occurred between July and December 2025 (indicated in orange) and continued to expand until early 2026 (red). This sector has recorded mining activity in previous years (blue), primarily between 2017 and 2018. As part of the actions undertaken during Operation Mercury in 2019, military operations were carried out to intervene in the mining zones located within this sector, achieving a reduction in the expansion of illegal mining during this period (Salazar, 2024).
Figure A2. Mining deforestation in the Isla Córdoba sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
The presence of gold mining infrastructure has expanded into the various pools located in this sector, with a total of 53 dredges and 20 mining camps recorded in February 2026 (Figure A3).
Figure A3. Mining infrastructure in the Isla Córdoba sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Case Study B. Sector A4
In this area, also located in the northwest corner of Tambopata National Reserve (see Box B on the Base Map), we recorded 101 hectares of mining deforestation between February 2025 and February 2026 (Figure B1).
Figure B1. Mining deforestation in Sector A4 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Figure B2 shows that, in early 2025, we detected the expansion of the first mining zones in this sector into the interior of Tambopata National Reserve (indicated yellow). Subsequently, between July and December 2025, an increase of 83 hectares of mining activity was recorded (orange), representing 82% of the total recorded. This increase in mining activity continued until early 2026 (red), expanding further into the interior of the Reserve.
Figure B2. Data: ACCA, Planet
In this sector, we recorded 68 mining structures located within pits, as well as the presence of 33 mining camps, in February 2026 (Figure B3). The number of structures identified in this zone was higher compared to the other sectors analyzed.
Figure B3. Mining infrastructure in Sector A4 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Caso Study C. Sector A7
In this area, located in the northern part of Tambopata National Reserve (see Box C on the Base Map), we recorded 25 hectares of mining deforestation between February 2025 and February 2026 along the Malinowski River (Figure C1). This new mining zone is situated near the Azul surveillance and control post (see Base Map).
Figure C1. Mining deforestation in Sector A7 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Figure C2 shows that mining began in the second half of 2025 (indicated in orange), marked by the presence of a mining pit adjacent to the Malinowski River, and subsequently expanded over the following months. In 2026 (red), we recorded an increase of 17 hectares, representing 68% of total deforestation. No mining infrastructure was recorded in this sector due to the lack of available very high-resolution satellite imagery for 2026.
Figure C2. Mining deforestation in Sector A7 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Case Study D. Sector Isla Correntada
In this area, located in the northeast of Tambopata National Reserve (see inset D on the Base Map), we recorded 111 hectares of mining deforestation between January 2025 and January 2026 (Figure D1). This mining zone is situated near the Yarinal surveillance and control post (see Base Map).
Figure D1. Mining deforestation in the Isla Correntada sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Figure D2 shows that mining began expanding slightly during the January–June 2025 period (indicated in yellow). Subsequently, an advancement of mining activity was detected starting in July 2025. The expansion of mining was greatest during the July–December 2025 period, during which a total of 85 hectares of deforestation were recorded (orange), representing 76% of the total. As of 2026, mining continues to expand in various zones within the Isla Correntada sector (red).
Figure D2. Mining deforestation in the Isla Correntada sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
A total of 11 mining structures have been identified within various mining pits, and three mining camps have also been located in this sector. Figure D3 depicts various mining structures engaged in gold extraction near the Malinowski River, as well as the presence of a mining camp.
Figure D3. Mining infrastructure in the Isla Correntada sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.
Public Policies Addressing Illegal Mining in the Tambopata National Reserve
The satellite imagery analysis presented in this report documents the advancement of illegal mining deforestation within Tambopata National Reserve during the 2025–2026 period. To contextualize these findings, this section examines the Peruvian State’s public policy framework during the same period, identifying the institutional, regulatory, and political factors that directly or indirectly influence the dynamics observed within the reserve.
The analysis is organized around five key themes:
- The State’s Response: Operations and Interdiction;
- Structural Limitations of the State Response;
- Legislative Setbacks Favoring Illegal Mining;
- Legislative Threats to Protected Natural Areas;
- 2026 Political and Electoral Context.
Taken together, the regulatory and institutional landscape of the 2025–2026 period reflects a structural tension between the control measures deployed by the Executive Branch and a regressive legislative trend that has weakened mechanisms for prevention, oversight, and enforcement. This contradiction constitutes one of the primary explanatory factors behind the expansion of illegal mining documented in the analyzed satellite imagery. Each of these key areas is discussed in detail below.
1. State Response: Operations and Interdiction
In response to the encroachment of illegal mining within Tambopata National Reserve, the Peruvian State implemented a series of operational and regulatory control measures during the 2025–2026 period. The most persistent exceptional measure in the region is the state of emergency in Madre de Dios, in effect uninterruptedly since April 7, 2023, when it was declared by Supreme Decree No. 046-2023-PCM. This declaration encompasses the districts of Tambopata, Inambari, Las Piedras, and Laberinto—all located within the Tambopata province—as well as the districts of Madre de Dios and Huepetuhe in the Manu province. The measure mandated that the Peruvian National Police (PNP) assume control of internal order, supported by the Armed Forces, with the specific aim of combating illegal mining, illegal logging, and illicit drug trafficking within the region.
Building upon this declaration, land- and river-based interdiction operations were carried out within the Reserve. The National Service of Natural Protected Areas (SERNANP)—in coordination with the National Police of Peru (PNP), the General Directorate of Captaincies and Coast Guards of Peru (DICAPI), and the Specialized Environmental Prosecutor’s Office (FEMA)—activated, through the Second Amazon Protection Brigade, a dynamic control strategy featuring continuous patrols at critical points within the reserve, with particular emphasis on the Otorongo, Azul, Yarinal, and Malinowski sectors—the latter serving as a key hub for both riverine and land-based control along the reserve’s northern boundary.
The scope of these interventions, carried out between January and March 2026, was considerable in terms of the equipment seized or destroyed by authorities, including mining rafts, engines, motors, pumps, generators, fuel, and motorcycles. In addition, 340 mining camps were dismantled. Nevertheless, satellite monitoring indicates that these actions failed to reverse the expansion of mining activity in the targeted sectors (see Figure A2).
Parallel to these actions in the field, the Executive sought to strengthen the legal framework for prosecuting crime. On January 20, 2026, it promulgated Legislative Decree No. 1695, which amends the Penal Code to stiffen penalties against illegal mining, establishing prison sentences of five to eight years for those who engage in mining activities without authorization or outside the formalization process, and six to nine years for those who traffic in chemical inputs, machinery, or minerals of illicit origin (Presidency of the Republic of Peru, 2026).
Furthermore, the regulation expressly incorporates illegal mining into the scope of the Law Against Organized Crime (Law No. 30077), thereby enabling the use of special investigative tools for the prosecution of these networks. Additionally, on February 5, 2026, a new extension of the state of emergency was ordered for an additional 60 days by means of Supreme Decree No. 017-2026-PCM, the validity of which was extended until April 6, 2026. However, the effectiveness of these measures—both operational and regulatory—encountered concrete limitations, which are analyzed in the following section.
2. Structural Limitations of the State Response
Despite the operational deployment described in the previous section, the State’s response faced limitations that reduced its effectiveness and that explain, in part, the continued advance of illegal mining documented in satellite imagery. The most critical limitation was budgetary in nature: the special units of the Peruvian Navy, which maintained a permanent presence at control and surveillance posts along the Malinowski River (the natural boundary between the Reserve and its buffer zone), were withdrawn during 2025 due to a lack of funding. This interrupted interdiction operations in one of the most active entry corridors for illegal mining into the interior of the reserve—a fact consistent with the data presented in the Base Map (Chumpitaz, 2025).
This absence of a continuous field presence resulted in a response capacity that was reactive rather than preventive. Although the High Commissioner for the Fight Against Illegal Mining, Rodolfo García Esquerre, noted that the budget allocated to this struggle was increased for 2026, specialists warned that such an increase would prove insufficient as long as current regulations continue to foster conditions of impunity for illegal operators (Chumpitaz, 2025). Along similar lines, the Illegal Mining Observatory (OMI) pointed out that judges, prosecutors, and government attorneys face budgetary constraints and a shortage of specialized personnel, thereby jeopardizing the effective enforcement of Legislative Decree No. 1695, approved in January 2026 (Pizarro, 2026).
The result of these limitations is a structural gap between the State’s operational response and the scale of the problem. The fact that the Madre de Dios region has been under a continuous state of emergency since April 2023—with consecutive extensions every 60 days—attests to the chronic nature of the phenomenon and the inadequacy of the measures adopted to reverse it in a sustained manner: interdiction operations succeed in dismantling specific equipment and camps, but they fail to prevent the reconstitution of criminal networks or the steady advance of the mining frontier deeper into the reserve. This gap cannot be explained solely by budgetary constraints or limitations in institutional capacity, but also by a series of legislative setbacks that—as analyzed in the following section—have worked at cross-purposes with the control efforts deployed in the field.
3. Legislative Setbacks Favoring Illegal Mining
As noted in the previous section, the limitations of the state response cannot be explained solely by operational or budgetary constraints, but also by a series of legislative amendments approved during the 2025–2026 period that have weakened the mechanisms for preventing, overseeing, and sanctioning illegal mining. These regulations—approved concurrently with interdiction operations—create a contradictory regulatory framework that reduces the effectiveness of control actions deployed in the field.
The most significant setback was the fifth extension of the Mining Formalization Registry (REINFO), approved by the Congressional Plenary in December 2025 and enacted by the Executive Branch via Law No. 32537 on December 26 of the same year. Through this measure, the deadline for the mining formalization process was extended until the end of 2026, with the possibility of an earlier closure should the MAPE Law and its implementing regulations enter into force prior to that date. It is worth noting that this marks the fifth consecutive extension of a mechanism originally conceived as transitional; previous extensions occurred in 2019, 2024, June 2025, and December 2025 (Zevallos Morón, 2026). Isabel Calle (2025) pointed out that, with this extension, the country remains trapped in a system that has failed to drive effective formalization and has, on the contrary, created incentives for non-compliance with the law, thereby exacerbating environmental degradation in regions such as Madre de Dios.
Compounding this setback are additional amendments that have weakened the legal tools available for combating illegal mining. Congress repealed the First Final Complementary Provision of Legislative Decree No. 1607, which had amended Law No. 30077 on Organized Crime, thereby curtailing the National Police’s (PNP) authority to take action regarding the illegal possession of explosives—particularly in cases involving miners suspended from the REINFO registry. This measure drew harsh criticism from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which warned that its implementation could facilitate illicit activities linked to informal mining (Tuesta, 2024).
Taken together, these legislative setbacks create a scenario in which interdiction operations and the stricter penalties introduced by Legislative Decree No. 1695 operate within a regulatory framework that simultaneously broadens the scope of tolerance toward informal mining. Furthermore, this landscape is compounded by legislative initiatives that pose a direct threat to the region’s Natural Protected Areas, as discussed in the following section.
4. Legislative Threats to Protected Natural Areas
Added to the landscape of legislative setbacks described in the previous section are parliamentary initiatives during this same period that pose a direct threat to the legal protection framework for Protected Areas in the Madre de Dios region, including ecosystems adjacent to Tambopata National Reserve. Unlike the regulations analyzed previously, these initiatives do not merely weaken existing oversight mechanisms regarding illegal mining; rather, they aim to alter the legal protection status of spaces that currently constitute the final institutional barrier against the expansion of extractive activities in the region.
The first of these initiatives is Bill No. 1822/2024-CR, introduced on July 2, 2025, by Congressman Jorge Luis Flores Ancachi (Acción Popular). The proposal seeks to amend nine articles of the Protected Natural Areas Law (Law No. 26834), thereby opening the door to hydrocarbon extraction activities in spaces that currently enjoy the highest level of legal protection—such as national parks, as well as national and historical sanctuaries—and granting the Ministry of Energy and Mines greater authority over the management of these areas. Vanessa Cueto warned that, should this amendment be approved, protected areas would ultimately become mere “paper parks,” left exposed to the impacts of high-intensity extractive activities. Among the areas directly affected are Bahuaja Sonene and Manu National Parks, both of which border the Tambopata National Reserve (Sierra Praeli, 2023). Along similar lines, on March 20, 2026, Congressman Eduardo Salhuana introduced Bill No. 14288/2025-CR, which would declare the development of the Madre de Dios gas basin to be a matter of national interest and strategic priority. The bill would—on an exceptional basis—authorize gas exploration and exploitation activities within “indirect-use” Protected Natural Areas (ANPs), including the Manu and Bahuaja Sonene National Parks, as well as the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve. Critics have argued that the approval of this bill would constitute a regulatory regression of the highest order, given that both the Manu National Park and the Bahuaja Sonene National Park are indirect-use ANPs which, under current legislation, expressly prohibit the extraction of natural resources within their boundaries (SPDA, 2026).
During the same period, Bill No. 3377—originally introduced in October 2022 by the same congressman—was reactivated. This bill proposes to authorize the granting of mining concessions over areas that have reverted to State control due to non-compliance with obligations, inactivity, or other grounds for termination or annulment. If approved, this proposal would lift the current restrictions on the granting of new mining concessions in Madre de Dios (Salazar Vega, 2026).
These bills—although still in the legislative debate stage at the time this report was finalized—reflect a trend toward subordinating the region’s environmental protection to extractive interests. This is occurring within a context where pressure on Tambopata National Reserve has already reached critical levels, according to the satellite data analyzed. This scenario is further exacerbated by political and social factors, which are examined in the following section.
5. Violence Against Environmental Defenders and the 2026 Political-Electoral Context
The scenario of legislative pressure and institutional weakness described in the preceding sections unfolds within a social and political context that further exacerbates the situation of Tambopata National Reserve. Two factors stand out in this regard: the violence perpetrated against those who defend the territory, and the absence of a robust environmental agenda within the framework of the 2026 national electoral process.
As an example regarding violence against environmental defenders, on July 26, 2025, Hipólito Quispe Huamán—an environmental defender for Tambopata National Reserve—was murdered while traveling toward his home along the Interoceanic Highway in Madre de Dios. His death adds to the more than 30 killings of environmental defenders and Indigenous leaders recorded in Peru since 2020, solidifying a pattern of violence that functions as a deterrent against those who monitor and denounce illegal activities within the reserve (Sierra Praeli, 2025).
Compounding this factor is the political-electoral context of 2026. The national electoral process—which entails the renewal of both the Executive and Legislative branches—is unfolding against a backdrop of political instability and the progressive weakening of environmental policies. Although Peru’s natural capital underpins approximately 20% of the GDP and 65% of national agriculture, the environment does not occupy a central place in the candidates’ proposals, according to experts consulted by various organizations (Guardia Brown, 2026). This absence of structural political will implies that the substantive decisions necessary to halt the advance of illegal mining in the Reserve—such as the approval of an effective MAPE Law, the definitive closure of the REINFO, or the budgetary strengthening of SERNANP—are unlikely to be addressed in the short term, thereby prolonging the window of vulnerability documented in this report.
6. Public Policy Conclusion
An analysis of the Peruvian State’s public policy framework during the 2025–2026 period reveals a scenario of profound institutional contradiction. On one hand, the Executive branch implemented concrete response measures to address the mining crisis in Tambopata National Reserve, including declaring a state of emergency in the province of Tambopata, conducting land- and river-based interdiction operations, and strengthening the penal framework through Legislative Decree No. 1695. On the other hand, these actions operate upon a normative and institutional foundation that has simultaneously been undermined by regressive legislative decisions, structural budgetary constraints, parliamentary initiatives threatening the legal status of the region’s natural Protected Areas, and a climate of violence against environmental defenders that diminishes territorial surveillance capacity.
This contradiction is not merely circumstantial but structural: it reflects the absence of a comprehensive and sustained policy for the protection of the Reserve—one that coherently integrates the available operational, normative, budgetary, and institutional instruments. One indication of this is that, given the magnitude of the problem, SERNANP is promoting the establishment of a unified command to combat illegal mining, recognizing that the PNP’s capacity for territorial control has been overwhelmed by the scale of the phenomenon and that a more comprehensive intervention by the Armed Forces is required.
In this regard, the findings from the satellite analysis presented in this report cannot be interpreted solely as the result of the activities of criminal networks, but also as the territorial manifestation of an environmental governance framework that, during the period under review, failed to halt the encroachment of illegal mining or reverse the deforestation trend in one of the country’s most critical protected natural areas. The contrast with the results of Operation Mercury in 2019 and Plan Restoration in 2021—both associated with measurable reductions in deforestation documented in Graph 1—suggests that the effectiveness of the State does not depend on the absence of tools, but rather on the coordination, coherence, and sustainability with which these are deployed.
Methodology
The identification of gold mining deforestation in Tambopata National Reserve utilized historical mining deforestation data in the Madre de Dios region, generated by the Center for Amazonian Scientific Innovation (CINCIA) for the years 1984–2019, by MapBiomas Perú for 2020, and by Amazon Conservation (ACA) for the period from January 2021 to March 2024.
Next, the LandTrendR algorithm was used to identify forest loss in monthly Planet NICFI mosaics for the period April 2024 – July 2025. For the period August 2025 – February 2026, mining deforestation (identified using the monthly Planet NICFI mosaics at 4.7 m spatial resolution) was monitored to record the expansion of mining-related deforestation within the Reserve.
The identification of mining infrastructure and camps was based on the visual interpretation of very-high-resolution satellite imagery (Skysat from Planet) obtained (tasked) for the mining zones identified within Tambopata National Reserve.
References
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Acknowledgments
We express our gratitude to the Sub-directorate of Strategic Information and Research on Protected Natural Areas and the Sub-directorate of Supervision, Surveillance, and Control of the National Service of Protected Natural Areas by the State (SERNANP) for their contributions and comments on this report.
This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Peruvian Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and Conservación Amazónica – Peru (ACCA), with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
Pacsi R, Novoa S, La Torre S, Balbuena H, Finer M, Santana A, Castillo H. (2026). Rapid Expansion of Illegal Gold Mining in Tambopata National Reserve (Southern Peruvian Amazon). MAAP:241.
MAAP #240: Expansion of illegal gold mining in the Xingu Basin of the Brazilian Amazon (part 2. Protected Areas)
Base Map. Mining sites in the Xingu Socio-environmental Diversity Corridor. Data: ACA/MAAP, ISA.
We present the second of a two-part series on illegal gold mining deforestation in the Xingu River Basin, located in the eastern Brazilian Amazon (states of Pará and Mato Grosso). The current report examines mining in protected areas of the Xingu, while Part 1 focused on Indigenous territories (see MAAP #239)
The Xingu Basin is the site of the largest historical concentration of gold mining deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (see MAAP #235). At the heart of this basin is the Xingu Socio-environmental Diversity Corridor, which is one of the largest continuous blocks (over 26 million hectares) of designated forests on the planet, connecting 24 Indigenous territories and 9 protected areas (see Base Map). Despite the official land designations, the area remains threatened, especially by the expansion of illegal gold mining driven by record high gold prices.
To address this challenge, the Xingu+ Network (Rede Xingu+) was created, a political alliance formed by a coalition of organizations representing the area. This network monitors deforestation and other pressures in the Xingu Corridor monthly, using the radar-based SiRAD X system.
In 2025, the Xingu+ Network partnered with Amazon Conservation, facilitating access to high-resolution optical images (from Planet), allowing for validation of alerts and identification of drivers. This collaboration also incorporates the online public dashboard Amazon Mining Watch.
Both systems, SiRAD X and Amazon Mining Watch, have detected a major expansion of gold mining deforestation since 2018 in the Corridor, including continued illegal activity during 2025. Throughout the report, we present data for both systems, noting their slight differences due to varying methodologies (Note 1), but the overall patterns of both datasets are consistent.
Between 2018 and 2024, the Sirad X monitoring system recorded the loss of around 11,500 hectares of forest within the Indigenous territories and protected areas of the Xingu Corridor (Amazon Mining Watch estimates around 16,000 ha), plus 400 hectares in 2025 (January – September), similar to the estimate of Amazon Mining Watch.
Both monitoring systems have detected recent mining deforestation in 6 protected areas in the Xingu Corridor (Note 2), in addition to the 5 Indigenous territories reported in part 1.
In Part 1, we detailed the recent gold mining deforestation in three of these Indigenous territories (Kuruaya, Baú, and Kayapó).
Here, in part 2, we focus on the recent gold mining deforestation in three of these protected areas (Altamira National Forest, Terra do Meio Ecological Station, and Nascentes da Serra do Cachimbo Biological Reserve) in the Xingu Corridor, including the presentation of a series of high-resolution images.
The Base Map indicates the focal areas of this series, with Points A-C covered in the first report (Indigenous territories), and Points D-F in the current second report (protected areas).
Mining in Protected Areas
Altamira National Forest
The Altamira National Forest (located in Pará state) is experiencing expanding illegal mining in three locations with notable increases in 2025. In just the first eight months of 2025, the area affected by illegal mining in the Altamira National Forest has already exceeded the total environmental damage recorded for the entire year of 2024, highlighting the urgent need for enforcement operations in the area.
Mining began in its northwestern and western sections between 2016 and 2018 and expanded 832 hectares by September 2025. Figure D1 shows recent mining deforestation in the western section, between October 2024 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel). Although there are mining exploration applications for these sections, mining is not permitted in the area’s Management Plan or in its creation decree (Decree No. 2483, 1998). See Note 3 for comparison with AMW.
Figure D1 Data: Planet, NICFI
The mining in the southeastern section began in 2024 and expanded to a cumulative total of 36 hectares by October 2025, according to the Xingu+ Network monitoring. Gold mining in the southeastern section accounted for 45.7% of the area deforested by mining operations in 2025 within the National Forest, with the peak of its expansion occurring in June. Figure D2 shows recent mining deforestation in this section, between September 2024 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel).
Figure D2 Data: Planet, NICFI
Terra do Meio Ecological Station
The Terra do Meio Ecological Station has emerged as a new mining front. First identified in September 2024, the mining rapidly expanded to a cumulative total of 30 hectares by the end of 2025, according to the Xingu+ Network monitoring (see Note 4 for comparison with AMW). Figure E shows this expansion between December 2024 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel).
Although the Terra do Meio Ecological Station faces other illegal activities, such as deforestation, the presence of illegal mining operations within its boundaries is particularly concerning. This case not only demonstrates how far the offenders have encroached on a strictly protected area, but also highlights their high level of operational capacities. This combination increases the risk that the activity will spread, causing environmental degradation in other parts of the protected area.
Figure E. Data: Planet, NICFI
Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve
The Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve is strategically located along the BR-163 highway in Pará. It is a strictly protected conservation area established by Decree No. – May 20, 2005, and is located between the municipalities of Altamira and Novo Progresso, in the Tapajós-Xingu interfluve, and adjacent to the Menkragnoti and Panará Indigenous Lands on its eastern boundary.
Illegal mining in the Biological Reserve began to expand, primarily starting in January 2025. At that time, the mining site—which had previously covered an area of two hectares—was the subject of a complaint filed in Official Letter No. 01/2025 by Rede Xingu+. In June, illegal mining in the Biological Reserve was reported again via Official Letter No. 15/2025, following an expansion of 18 ha, and in July, via Official Letter No. 18/2025, following a further expansion of 6.82 ha, totaling 26.82 ha.
Two mining sites are located in the northeastern region of the Rebio, opened in November 2024 and March 2025, and another site in the eastern region, opened in June 2025. It is worth noting that the site in the eastern region was also the subject of a complaint in Official Letter No. 18/2025, as it is located on and causing pollution in a tributary of the Pitxatxá River, a river that borders the Menkragnoti Indigenous Territory and where six indigenous villages of the Kayapó people are located.
Illegal mining began in December 2024, expanding to a cumulative total of 19 hectares as of September 2025 across several locations in the protected area, according to the Xingu+ Network monitoring (see Note 5 for comparison with AMW).
Even after enforcement operations, gold mining activity continues to expand within the Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve. Figures 1 and 2 show the rapid mining-deforestation expansion up to November 2025, and Figure 3 shows the construction of a landing strip between July and August, providing access to the gold mines in the eastern region.
Figure F1 shows recent mining deforestation in the northeast part of the Biological Reserve, between December 2024 (left panel) and November 2025 (right panel).
Figure F1 Data: Planet, NICFI
Figure F2 shows recent mining deforestation in the eastern part of the Biological Reserve, between June 2025 (left panel) and November 2025 (right panel).
Figure F2 Data: Planet, NICFI
Figure F3 shows a new landing strip (opened in August 2025) in the eastern part of the Biological Reserve, between June 2025 (left panel) and November 2025 (right panel).
Figure F3 Data: Planet, NICFI
Conclusion and Recommendations
Based on the information presented above (and the previous MAAP #239), it is clear that illegal mining in the Xingu basin is not an isolated activity. It has spread to both Indigenous territories and protected areas, with illegal activity advancing into new territories, indicating the existence of a support network that provides the operational capacity and infrastructure necessary for the activity. Illegal mining poses a direct threat to protected areas by both deforestation and the contamination of rivers through the use of mercury, which affect sensitive ecosystems and the populations that depend on these resources.
Below, we propose a number of recommendations to Brazilian authorities with regards to: (i) the design of enforcement actions; (ii) monitoring and restoration (iii) traceability of gold supply chains.
(i) The design of enforcement actions;
Isolated enforcement actions have not been sufficient to guarantee the long-term protection of Protected Areas. Therefore, it is essential to establish a strategy coordinated with other agencies to dismantle the logistical structure that operates and fuels illegal mining. Alongside this, the structuring of preventive measures is fundamental.
- Establish permanent advanced bases (operated by government agencies such as ICMBio) in the most critical protected aeass, ensuring a constant presence to break the cycle of miners returning after eviction operations.
- Focus on disabling airstrips and seizing heavy machinery (hydraulic excavators) within protected areas, coordinating with National Civil Aviation agency (ANAC) and National Oil, Petroleum and Biofuel Agency (ANP) to block clandestine airfields and fuel stations in the areas surrounding protected lands.
- Strengthen oversight in the surroundings of protected areas to prevent legalized mining in nearby areas from serving as a front for illegal extraction within the boundaries of protected areas. This process would include the National Mining Agency (ANM), with oversight from other agencies.
(ii) Monitoring and restoration
Strengthening surveillance and environmental recovery is essential to discourage the return of illegal miners.
- Support management councils and associations of riverine and traditional populations in implementing surveillance protocols, recognizing the role of these communities in maintaining the integrity of sustainable-use protected areas.
- Implement Degraded Area Recovery Plans (PRADs) focused on the revegetation of riparian forests and the containment of siltation caused by mining sediments.In federal areas, it would be ICMBio; in state conservation units, the Institute for Forest and Biodiversity Development of the State of Pará (IDEFLOR-Bio).
(iii) Traceability of gold supply chains.
Implement a data-cross-referencing system that automatically blocks the issuance of Electronic Fiscal Invoices (NF-e) for minerals whose declared origin overlaps with Protected Area polygons. Improve legislation regarding documentation of sourcing area in traceability mechanisms, making it more difficult to “launder” minerals illegally extracted from Protected Areas.
Notes
1. Methodology of monitoring systems
For Sirad X monitoring, radar images from the Sentinel-1 satellite are used, which are processed by a series of algorithms on the Google Earth Engine (GEE) platform, along with optical images from the Landsat-9 satellite (OLI-2 sensor) and Sentinel-2 satellite (MSI sensor). A team of analysts examines the monitored area, visually searching for anomalies in the produced images. Each deforestation polygon is evaluated based on its proximity to other areas of degradation and the history of the region, and, if necessary, people familiar with the location are contacted to confirm the deforestation. Field knowledge is fundamental for data validation.
For Amazon Mining Watch, the mine detector is an artificial neural network, which we train to discriminate mines from other terrain by feeding it hand-labeled examples of mines and other key features as they appear in Sentinel-2 satellite imagery. The network operates on square patches of data extracted from the Sentinel-2 L1C data product. Each pixel in the patch captures the light reflected from Earth’s surface in twelve bands of visible and infrared light. We average (median composite) the Sentinel data across a period of many months to reduce the presence of clouds, cloud shadow, and other transitory effects. During run time, the network assesses each patch for signs of recent mining activity, and then the region of interest is shifted by half a patch width for the network to make a subsequent assessment. This process proceeds across the entire region of interest.
2-5. Comparisons with Amazon Mining Watch
2. Altamira National Forest, Terra do Meio Ecological Station, Iriri State Forest, Riozinho do Anfrísio Extractive Reserve, Nascentes da Serra do Cachimbo Biological Reserve, and Rio Iriri Extractive Reserve.
3. As a comparison, Amazon Mining Watch indicates the total mining deforestation of 620 hectares in Altamira National Forest between 2018 and 2025.
4. As a comparison, Amazon Mining Watch indicates the total mining deforestation of 3 hectares in Terra do Meio Ecological between 2018 and 2025.
5. As a comparison, Amazon Mining Watch indicates the total mining deforestation of 51 hectares in Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve between 2018 and 2025.
Acknowledgments
This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and regional partners, with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. In this case, we thank our partner Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) for leading this report.
MAAP #239: Expansion of illegal gold mining in the Xingu Basin of the Brazilian Amazon (part 1. Indigenous Territories)
Base Map. Mining sites in the Xingu Diversity Corridor. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP, ISA.
Illegal mining continues to expand in the Brazilian Amazon, likely driven by rising gold prices. As of the end of 2025, the accumulated area of mining activity in the Brazilian Amazon is estimated to be 223,000 hectares, according to Amazon Mining Watch (see MAAP #197, MAAP #226, and MAAP #235 for additional context).
Notably, the largest concentration of gold mining deforestation is in the Xingu River Basin, which extends over 51 million hectares in the eastern Brazilian Amazon (states of Pará and Mato Grosso).
At the heart of this territory is the Xingu Socio-environmental Diversity Corridor, which is one of the largest continuous blocks (over 26 million hectares) of designated forests on the planet, connecting 24 Indigenous territories and 9 protected areas (see Base Map). Despite the official land designations, the area remains threatened due to the continual expansion of illegal gold mining, agriculture, logging, roads, and human-caused forest fires.
The corridor is home to 26 Indigenous groups, who have historically acted as guardians against the advance of the deforestation frontier. To address these challenges, the Xingu+ Network (Rede Xingu+) was created, a political alliance formed by 53 organisations (43 Indigenous, 5 riverine, and 5 civil society partners) representing the inhabitants of the Corridor. The origin of this alliance dates back to the resistance movements against the damming of the Xingu River in 1989, and, after decades of collaboration, the Network was formalised in 2013.
The Xingu+ Network monitors deforestation and other pressures in the Xingu Corridor monthly, using the radar-based SiRAD X (Xingu Remote Deforestation Alert System). The system also relies on a local network of partners who carry out on-site territorial surveillance activities.
In 2025, the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) partnered with Amazon Conservation, facilitating access to high-resolution optical images (from Planet), allowing for validation of alerts and identification of drivers. This collaboration also incorporates the online public dashboard known as Amazon Mining Watch, a partnership between Amazon Conservation, Earth Genome and the Pulitzer Center.
Both systems, SiRAD X and Amazon Mining Watch, have detected a major expansion of gold mining deforestation since 2018 in the Corridor, including continued illegal activity in the most recent time period of 2025. Throughout the report, we present data for both systems, noting their slight differences due to varying methodologies (Note 1), but the overall patterns of both datasets are consistent.
Between 2018 and 2024, the Sirad X monitoring system recorded the loss of around 11,500 hectares of forest within the Indigenous territories and protected areas of the Xingu Corridor (Amazon Mining Watch estimates around 16,000 ha), plus 400 hectares in 2025 (January – September), similar to the estimate of Amazon Mining Watch.
Overall, this mining deforestation currently impacts 5 Indigenous territories (Kayapó, Baú, Kuruaya, Trincheira Bacajá, and Apyterewa) and 5 protected areas (Altamira National Forest, Iriri State Forest, Riozinho do Anfrísio Extractive Reserve, Nascentes da Serra do Cachimbo Biological Reserve, and Rio Iriri Extractive Reserve) in the Xingu Corridor.
We present a two-part series on this illegal gold mining deforestation in the Xingu Corridor. Part 1, detailed below, focuses on the Indigenous territories, while the upcoming Part 2 will focus on the protected areas.
In this Part 1, we detail the recent gold mining deforestation in 3 Indigenous territories (Kuruaya, Baú, and Kayapó), including the presentation of a series of high-resolution images.
The Base Map indicates the focal areas of this series, with Points A-C covered in this report (Indigenous territories), and the remaining Points D-F in the second report (protected areas).
Mining in Indigenous Territories
Kuruaya Indigenous Territory
The Kuruaya Indigenous Territory (state of Pará, municipality of Altamira) has experienced gold mining activity since the early 1980s, on the Curuá River, where the villages of the Kuruaya are located. The most intense recent mining has occurred on a tributary of the Curuá River, known as the Madalena.
Since 2023, the Xingu+ Network monitoring has recorded the expansion of illegal gold mining along the Madalena. That year, a formal complaint was filed (via Official Letter 42/2023-Rede Xingu+), which reported the loss of around 3 hectares due to gold mining. In 2024, the activity intensified with the deforestation of another 13.4 hectares, and from January to July 2025, the Madalena mining operation had already expanded by another 17.8 hectares, for a cumulative total of 34.2 hectares.
Figures A1 and A2 show the expansion of the illegal gold mining along the Madalena between 2024 (left panels) and 2025 (right panels). This mining is expanding primarily towards the confluence of the Madalena with the Curuá River. In addition, the activity has spread to new, smaller areas in the surrounding region.
Figure A1. Mining in Kuruaya Indigenous Territory. Data: Planet/NICFI
Figure A2. Mining in Kuruaya Indigenous Territory. Data: Planet/NICFI
Amazon Mining Watch results for Kuruaya Indigenous Territory.
Amazon Mining Watch indicates the cumulative mining deforestation of 33 hectares in Kuruaya Indigenous Territory, including 4 hectares in 2025 (click here to see on AMW).
This mining is taking place within an active gold concession registered in the SIGMINE digital cadaster. Per the Brazilian Constitution, however, this type of concession (“lavra garimpeira” or exploitation permit for artisanal mining) is irregular within Indigenous territories (Note 2).
Baú Indigenous Territory
The Baú Indigenous Territory (state of Pará, municipality of Altamira) is inhabited by the Mebengôkre (Kayapó) Mekrãgnoti and isolated Purô peoples across its vast 1.5 million hectares. Illegal mining has impacted this territory since at least 2019, and has been the scene of several armed conflicts between miners and Indigenous members.
In the first half of 2025, active illegal mining sites were detected in several parts of the territory, most notably in the central mining site of Pista Velha. Pista Velha is an old mining site, but it was in 2019 that its reactivation became the scene of several armed conflicts between Indigenous peoples and gold miners, putting the lives of the Kayapó at risk. Efforts to reclaim this gold mine are ongoing and have been reported on numerous times by Rede Xingu+. In July 2025, an overflight confirmed the presence of mining activity in Pista Velha (see photo).
Overflight photo: Pista Velha mining site (Baú Indigenous Territory) on July 19, 2025. Photo: Xingu+ Network.
Figure B illustrates the gold mining expansion at Pista Velha between 2024 (left panel) and 2025 (right panel).
Figure B. Mining in Baú Indigenous Territory. Data: Planet/NICFI
Amazon Mining Watch results for Bau Indigenous Territory.
Amazon Mining Watch indicates the cumulative mining deforestation of 110 hectares in Bau Indigenous Territory, including 10 hectares in 2025 (click here to see on AMW.
Kayapó Indigenous Territory
The Kayapó Indigenous Territory (state of Pará, across four municipalities) has a long history of illegal mining dating back to the 1960s, and is the territory with the largest area deforested by illegal mining in the Brazilian Amazon.
Government operations to remove illegal miners from the Kayapó Indigenous Territory began in May 2025, in compliance with a Supreme Federal Court ruling (ADP 709), which aims not only to protect Indigenous peoples but also to contain the advance of illegal mining.
The first phase of these operations appears effective, as less than 2 hectares of new mining was detected in June 2025 by SIRAD-X monitoring. However, data from October indicates a small increase in mining in the territory, with an increase of 15 hectares.
Figures C1 and C2 show the recent advance of illegal mining in two locations of Kayapó Indigenous Territory between 2024 (left panels) and 2025 (right panels).
Figure C1. Mining in Kayapó Indigenous Territory. Data: Planet/NICFI
Figure C2. Mining in Kayapó Indigenous Territory. Data: Planet/NICFI
Amazon Mining Watch indicates the cumulative mining deforestation of 7,940 hectares in Kayapo Indigenous Territory, including 140 hectares in 2025 (click here to see on AMW). But much of this increase was detected in the first half of the year, indicating it might be a remnant of the 2024 expansion. Thus, much of that recently detected mining activity by Amazon Mining Watch likely happened in late 2024/early 2025 before the government intervention in May, consistent with the SiRAD X results stated above.
Amazon Mining Watch results for Kayapo Indigenous Territory.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Based on the information presented above, it is clear that illegal mining in the Xingu basin is not an isolated activity. It has spread to both Indigenous territories and protected areas, indicating the existence of a support network that provides the operational capacity and infrastructure necessary for the activity. This expansion brings with it a series of serious risks to the region and its communities.
Illegal mining poses a direct threat to the territorial integrity and well-being of riparian and indigenous communities. The main consequences are the degradation of native areas and the contamination of rivers through the use of mercury. In addition to environmental damage, the expansion of illegal activity increases the risk of socio-environmental conflicts between miners and traditional communities, who seek to protect their territories and way of life.
Below, we propose a number of recommendations to Brazilian authorities with regards to: (i) the design of enforcement actions; (ii) community-based monitoring and restoration (iii) traceability of gold supply chains.
(i) Enforcement actions:
To ensure the long-term protection of indigenous territories from illegal mining, it is crucial to move beyond immediate removal operations and establish a sustainable, preventative framework. While the Brazilian government has initiated removal efforts in response to recent judicial orders, there is a notable absence of a long-term strategy to prevent the recurrence of these invasions. Effective and lasting solutions call for the involvement of various regulatory agencies and strategic interventions that extend beyond the geographical boundaries of the indigenous lands themselves. Therefore, the following policy actions are recommended:
- Establish a permanent, multi-agency task force led by the President’s Chief of Staff (Casa Civil) to develop and implement a comprehensive, five-year strategic plan. This plan should focus on dismantling the external economic and logistical networks that sustain illegal mining, thereby preventing the return of invaders post-removal. The unique convening power of the Casa Civil is essential for orchestrating the necessary collaboration across different government ministries and agencies, ensuring a unified and effective national effort.
- Promote integrated enforcement actions in the areas surrounding the territories to achieve the logistical strangulation of illegal operations. This should involve regulatory agencies alongside environmental enforcement and command-and-control bodies, such as the National Civil Aviation Agency – ANAC (for airfield inspections), the National Petroleum Agency – ANP (for fuel station inspections), and the National Land Transport Agency – ANTT (for road and highway inspections).
- Strengthen agencies responsible for enforcement (IBAMA, ICMBio, and FUNAI) to ensure they have the capacity to operate regularly within the territories highlighted, by meeting their budgetary and personnel requirements.
- Promote the implementation of long-term Protection Plans, guaranteeing a budget for the maintenance of regular enforcement and crime repression actions.
(ii) Community-based monitoring and restoration:
The promotion and strengthening of indigenous surveillance group initiatives for territory monitoring and restoration can complement government-led efforts. An additional benefit of these actions is that they represent sustainable economic alternatives within the territories and thus reduce the vulnerability of youth to recruitment by illegal groups. To this effect, the following actions could be undertaken:
- Support the construction and maintenance of “Surveillance Centers” at strategic points (river confluences, TI boundaries), managed by the communities to ensure the physical occupation of remote areas, that produce relevant information for more effective State action.
- Develop and implement Payment for Environmental Services (PES) schemes for community agents, recognizing territorial surveillance as essential work for biome conservation.
- Strengthen governance actions within the territories by supporting meetings, assemblies, and forums, and promoting the development of management tools such as Territorial and Environmental Management Plans (PGTAs) and Consultation Protocols.
- Promote and finance environmental recovery and decontamination/remediation actions in the most affected areas, in addition to continuous monitoring of mercury levels in the population.
(iii) Traceability of the gold supply chain:
The Brazilian government has already taken some steps to improve the regulation of the gold supply chain and requires the formal registration of the main actors involved in the ASM gold supply chain (such as miners, traders, and exporters). In 2023, it implemented the Electronic Fiscal Invoice for Gold (NF-e ouro), a mandatory document that verifies and records the origin of the mineral.
Nevertheless, additional measures are still necessary to continue to improve gold traceability mechanisms and implement better legislation for the control of mineral production and trade, such as the creation of a digital public portal containing mining titles, licenses, embargoes, and monitored areas, allowing buyers to verify the mining site linked to the Gold NF-e. This would significantly improve traceability for companies and purchasers importing gold from Brazil, thereby promoting a more transparent supply chain.
*Notes
1. Methodology of monitoring systems
For Sirad X monitoring, radar images from the Sentinel-1 satellite are used, which are processed by a series of algorithms on the Google Earth Engine (GEE) platform, along with optical images from the Landsat-9 satellite (OLI-2 sensor) and Sentinel-2 satellite (MSI sensor). A team of analysts examines the monitored area, visually searching for anomalies in the produced images. Each deforestation polygon is evaluated based on its proximity to other areas of degradation and the history of the region, and, if necessary, people familiar with the location are contacted to confirm the deforestation. Field knowledge is fundamental for data validation.
For Amazon Mining Watch, the mine detector is an artificial neural network, which we train to discriminate mines from other terrain by feeding it hand-labeled examples of mines and other key features as they appear in Sentinel-2 satellite imagery. The network operates on square patches of data extracted from the Sentinel-2 L1C data product. Each pixel in the patch captures the light reflected from Earth’s surface in twelve bands of visible and infrared light. We average (median composite) the Sentinel data across a period of many months to reduce the presence of clouds, cloud shadow, and other transitory effects.During run time, the network assesses each patch for signs of recent mining activity, and then the region of interest is shifted by half a patch width for the network to make a subsequent assessment. This process proceeds across the entire region of interest.
2. Mining on Indigenous lands.
Per the Brazilian Constitution, the concession of “lavra garimpeira” or exploitation permit for artisanal mining is irregular within indigenous territories. (Molina, Luísa Pontes, 2023. Terra rasgada: como avança o garimpo na Amazônia brasileira. Instituto Socioambiental).
In this specific case, the concession, awarded in 1981, predates the approval of the Indigenous Territory Kuruaya in 2001. Following the approval, the concession holder (the firm Brasinor) also submitted a number of concessions for exploration within the territory, which appear to have been rejected. However, a protocol related to the previously active concession was approved by the National Mining Agency on January 30, 2026. The legality of this act, as well as of the concession itself, should be investigated.
A well-established principle in Brazilian law is that Indigenous land rights are effective prior to their formal recognition, thus the fact that the concession predates the approval of the territory is immaterial. If the ANM authorization is found irregular, the constitutional interdiction of mining within indigenous territories should prevail, and the concession be rescinded. A decision from federal courts in 2019 determined that the National Mining Agency must negate any request for exploration or exploitation within indigenous territories, even prior to their approval.
Acknowledgments
This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and regional partners, with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. In this case, we thank our partner Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) for leading this report.
MAAP #238: Gold Mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Southern Sector – Morona Santiago Province
Base Map 1. Mining Deforestation in Ecuador. Data: AMW, Amazon Conservation/MAAP, RAISG
This is the third in a series of reports documenting the expansion of gold mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
Previous reports (MAAP #227 and MAAP #230) analyzed the progress of this activity in the northern and central parts of the country, respectively, with a focus on the provinces of Sucumbíos and Napo.
This new report focuses on mining deforestation in the southern Ecuadorian Amazon, in the province of Morona Santiago.
Since 2023, Amazon Conservation, in collaboration with Earth Genome and the Pulitzer Center, has been developing an online geoviewer known as Amazon Mining Watch (MAAP #226). This virtual tool automates the analysis of satellite imagery using machine learning to identify areas affected by mining throughout the Amazon since 2018, and now features quarterly updates for the systematic detection of new gold mining fronts in real time.
Base Map 1 shows the locations of recent confirmed mining-related deforestation using detections from the latest quarterly update of Amazon Mining Watch across the Ecuadorian Amazon, in relation to the cumulative mining impact area (2018-2024). It can be seen that several Indigenous territories converge in the analysis area (purple circles).
Morona Santiago, the second largest province in Ecuador, is one of the country’s main conservation areas and the ancestral home of the Shuar and Achuar Indigenous nationalities. However, it is currently facing a growing threat due to the expansion of gold mining.
Case Studies
Base Map 2. Satellite monitoring area in Morona Santiago. Data: ACA/MAAP; EcoCiencia; Planet
Cases 1 and 2 focus on mining activities within Shuar Arutam territory (Note 1), in southern Morona Santiago (see Base Map 2).
This territory faces increasing pressure from the expansion of the agricultural frontier, selective logging, and especially mining.
Over half (55%) of the territory is under concession for the extraction of metals such as gold, silver, and copper.
Case 3 focuses on mining in the north of the province; here, illicit mining has been identified within several Shuar territories (Samikim, Kankaiman, KainKaim, Yukuapais, and Pañiashña).
We conducted satellite monitoring aimed at quantifying the impact of illegal gold mining in these three case studies during the period 2020-2025.
Mining Activity in Morona Santiago (2020-2024)
Figure 1. Mining activity in Morona Santiago. Data: MapBiomas; EcoCiencia.
Graph 1 shows the cumulative mining deforestation in the Morona Santiago province between 2020 and 2024.
In 2020, mining impacted around 420 hectares as our baseline. In the subsequent years, we documented a rapid increase, reaching a total of 856 hectares (2,115 acres) by 2024.
This represents a doubling of the affected area in just four years.
Case 1. Santiago River
Case 1. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet
This case is located along the Santiago River (see Case 1 in Base Map 2), between the Shuar Santiak, Mayaik, and Nunkui associations in the territory of the Shuar Arutam (see Note 2)
This river is among the most threatened areas in the territory, especially due to the expansion of mining.
In this area, we detected the mining deforestation of 197 hectares (486 acres) between January 2020 and October 2025.
Of this total, we estimate that 20% (41 hectares; 101 acres) is likely illegal, occurring outside areas authorized for mining activity
We selected two focal areas, both with recent mining impacts, along the Santiago River (see Areas A and B in Case 1).
Panel 1 illustrates the situation in Area A, comparing mining deforestation (as well as the expansion of access roads and the impact on the river) between August 2020 (left panel) and October 2025 (right panel). Of this total forest loss, we confirmed that 12 hectares (30 acres) were located outside of authorized concessions and therefore likely illegal.
In the Annex, Panel 2 shows an example of the territorial monitoring carried out by the Shuar Arutam using drones.
Panel 1 (Area A). Data: EcoCiencia, Planet
Panel 3 illustrates the situation in Area B, comparing mining deforestation (and impact to the river) between August 2020 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel). Of this total forest loss, we confirmed that 9 hectares (22 acres) were located outside of authorized concessions and therefore likely illegal.
In the Annex, Panel 4 shows an example of the territorial monitoring carried out by the Shuar Arutam using drones.
Panel 3 (Area B). Data: EcoCiencia, Planet
Case 2. Nayap
Case 2. Data: Ecociencia
This case is located along the Zamora River (see Case 2 in Base Map 2), on the western edge of the Churuwia association, near the Shuar Arutam community of Nayap. This territory is traditionally inhabited by Shuar communities.
In this area, we detected the mining deforestation of 164 hectares (405 acres) between January 2020 and October 2025.
Of this total, we estimate that 20% (31 hectares; 76 acres) is likely illegal, occurring outside areas authorized for mining activity
Panel 5 illustrates the situation in Case 2, comparing mining deforestation (and impact to the river) between January 2020 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel).
Panel 5. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet
Case 3. Taisha
This case is located in the northern part of Morona Santiago (see Case 3 in Base Map 2), within the Shuar Indigenous territories of Samikim, Kankaiman, Kainkaim, Yukuapais, and Pañiashña.
In this area, we detected the mining deforestation of 100 hectares (247 acres) between October 2024 and October 2025 (see Case 3).
Case 3. Data: ACA/MAAP; EcoCiencia, Planet
Panel 6 illustrates the situation in Case 3, comparing mining deforestation (and road expansion) between October 2024 (left panel) and October 2025 (right panel). The opening of these roads facilitates direct access for machinery, personnel, and supplies to previously inaccessible areas, increasing connectivity and accelerating the occupation of the territory.
Panel 6. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet
Policy recommendations
1. Strengthening Indigenous governance
Fundación EcoCiencia.
The cases analyzed show that, while Ecuadorian law broadly recognizes the right to citizen participation and the collective rights of indigenous peoples and nationalities in environmental and mining decisions, its implementation faces significant challenges. The legal framework distinguishes between environmental consultation as a diffuse right and prior, free, and informed consultation as a collective right, regulated by the Mining Law, the Organic Environmental Code, the Organic Law on Citizen Participation, and recent secondary legislation. However, the historical absence of a specific law and the gaps in the practical application of these mechanisms have generated tensions and questions regarding the quality of intercultural dialogue, effective access to information, and the real influence of communities in decision-making.
While the Escazú Agreement strengthens the Ecuadorian state’s obligations regarding environmental participation, access to information, and environmental justice, the cases reviewed show that these standards do not always translate into substantive processes that strengthen indigenous territorial governance. In particular, prior consultation is often conducted in isolation from permanent community-based monitoring and oversight mechanisms, which limits communities’ ability to continuously monitor extractive activities affecting their territories.
In this context, to strengthen indigenous governance, it is recommended to formally recognize indigenous monitors as legitimate actors within environmental monitoring and control processes, coordinating their work with existing institutional mechanisms. Additionally, it is proposed to implement a permanent satellite monitoring system integrated with community observation systems, allowing for the early detection of road construction and other illegal activities, and contributing to the realization of the principles of effective participation and intercultural dialogue.
2. Biocultural territorial planning
Fundación EcoCiencia.
The Constitution of Ecuador recognises interculturalism and plurinationality (articles 1 and 250), as well as the legal systems of indigenous peoples; similarly, the Escazú Agreement (article 7) promotes inclusive participation with intercultural approaches.
Within this framework, it is recommended to adopt a biocultural territorial planning approach that integrates indigenous life plans and governance systems as binding instruments in public decision-making.
No mining project can be approved without first being integrated into these local instruments, which are developed through community assemblies.
3. Controlling road expansion in Indigenous territories
Fundación EcoCiencia.
The development of a road in the Ecuadorian Amazon involves a series of fundamental environmental requirements, established in the national regulations in force as of 2025, to guarantee the protection of the environment, biodiversity, and the rights of local and indigenous communities.
These requirements are regulated primarily by the Organic Environmental Code (COA) and its Regulations (issued through Executive Decree 752 and subsequent amendments), the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Ecuador regarding environmental rights and the rights of Nature; and international human rights treaties such as the Escazú Agreement (in force in Ecuador since 2021).
We recommend requiring a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for all road projects in areas of high ecological sensitivity, especially in indigenous territories and protected areas.
The construction of roads without an environmental impact assessment and without applying the precautionary principle should be considered illegal and subject to reversal, prioritizing ecological restoration processes with the participation of local communities.
Notes
(1) Located in the Cordillera del Cóndor, between the Zamora and Yaupi rivers, the Shuar Arutam community is part of the Abiseo–Cóndor–Kutukú bio-corridor, an ecological bridge that connects the Tropical Andes biodiversity hotspot with one of the largest continuous wilderness areas of the Amazon rainforest. This mountain range protects areas of high biological importance, safeguards water sources, and harbors habitats of endemic species. Furthermore, it constitutes the ancestral territory of the Shuar people, where sacred sites preserve their spiritual and collective memory.
(2) The Santiago River flows through the Abiseo–Cóndor–Kutukú bio-corridor, one of the main biodiversity hotspots in the Ecuadorian Amazon (CARE et al., 2012), characterized by highly diverse ecosystems and the presence of numerous terrestrial and aquatic species (Schulenberg & Awbrey, 1997). Recent research even suggests that the river’s unique environmental conditions may be promoting speciation processes in fish due to its natural isolation (Provenzano & Barriga, 2018). In addition to mining, threats include hydroelectric projects, deforestation, overfishing, and the introduction of invasive species, which generate increasing pressures that degrade its ecosystems and severely affect native species.
Annex
Panels 2 and 4 highlight the territorial monitoring carried out by the Shuar Arutam using drones.
Panel 2 shows the expansion of mining deforestation between May (top panel) and November (bottom panel) of 2025.
Panel 2 (Area A). Data: Fundación EcoCiencia.
Panel 4 shows the expansion of mining impact between March (top panel) and November (bottom panel) of 2025, including more extensive excavation fronts and a greater accumulation of sediment.
Panel 4 (Area B). Data: Fundación EcoCiencia.
Citation
Villa J, García C, Barriga J, Finer M, Josse C, Aguilar C (2025). Minería en la Amazonía Ecuatoriana Sector Sur – Provincia de Morona Santiago. MAAP: 238.
Acknowledgments
We thank the Shuar Arutam for their contributions to this report.
This report is part of a series focused on the Ecuadorian Amazon through a strategic collaboration between the organizations EcoCiencia Foundation and Amazon Conservation, with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation.
