Author: Matt Finer

MAAP #251: Transboundary illegal gold mining: Brazil (Puruê River) & Colombia (Puré River)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Figure 1. Base map of transboundary mining area Colombia-Brazil. Data: ACA/MAAP

*This transboundary report is in collaboration with the Field Museum of Natural History, as part of a Rapid Biological and Social Inventory of the Alto Rio Japurá e Puruê, coordinated by the Field Museum in partnership with 11 research organizations and Indigenous federations in Brazil.

In a recent report (MAAP #245), we revealed the increasing gold mining deforestation along the Puré River, which flows through the heart of Puré River National Park in the southeastern Colombian Amazon.

Specifically, we reported that this mining deforestation emerged in 2024, escalated in 2025, and impacted over 500 hectares by May 2026.

Here, we highlight that the Puré River crosses into the northwestern Brazilian Amazon and becomes the Puruê River, a tributary of the Japurá River, which eventually flows into the upper Amazon River (see Figure 1 – Base Map).

This remote, but threatened, Puré-Puruê River region is critically important due its extraordinary biodiversity and high carbon stocks, and is home to Indigenous communities, including Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation (specifically, the Yurí and Passé). 

In this report, we present novel data for the gold mining deforestation along the entire Puré (Colombia) – Puruê (Brazil) River region as an important transboundary case study.

In summary, we documented the gold mining deforestation of 7,900 hectares between 2001 and 2026 in the Puré-Puruê River transboundary region. While we first detected mining on the Brazil side as early as 2001, 88% has occurred since 2022, indicating that mining in the area has been recently escalating. The vast majority of the mining (92%) has occurred on the Brazil side (Puruê River), but has recently encroached and increased on the Colombia side (Puré River).

Transboundary Gold Mining Deforestation (Graph)

Figure 2 indicates the gold mining deforestation along the Puruê River in Brazil (orange bars) and the Puré River in Colombia (yellow bars). 

We first detected mining deforestation in 2001 on the Brazil side, which then slowly increased over the next 20 years, reaching a cumulative total of 980 hectares by the end of 2021. 

There was then a major peak in mining deforestation on the Brazil side in 2022 and 2023 (4,130 hectares in just these two years). 

Starting in 2024, the mining deforestation also extended to the Colombia side. While lower than the previous peak years, the combined mining deforestation in both countries was  relatively high from 2024 to June 2026 (2,791 hectares during these three years). 

In total, we estimate the cumulative gold mining deforestation of 7,901 hectares in both countries, as of June 2026. Of this total, 92% (7,307 hectares) has occurred on the Brazil side (Puruê River), and 8% (594 hectares) on the Colombia side (Pure River).

Figure 2. Gold mining deforestation in study area. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Government Operations

In response to the increasing gold mining activity and deforestation, there have been a series of 7 recent government operations targeting illegal mining in both the Puruê and Puré Rivers (see purple lines in Figure 2).

Three of these operations have featured binational coordination between authorities in both countries, and four have been focused on just the Brazil side.

The first record of a binational operation took place in December 2023. While there was no mining deforestation in Colombia yet at this time, there were mining barges on the Puré River. 

There were then two major binational operations in 2025 (May and November), when the mining deforestation was escalating in Colombia. These operations were coordinated among Colombian entities—the Attorney General’s Office (via its Directorate for Specialized Crimes against the Environment), the Colombian Aerospace Force, and the Colombian National Army—and Brazilian entities—the Ministry of Defense, the Brazilian Army, the Federal Police, and ICMBio.

These operations appeared to have short term effectiveness, but then mining quickly returned. For example, following the May 2025 operation, the mining deforestation subsequently declined on the Colombia side in June and July 2025, but then spiked again by November.

Similarly, following the November 2025 operation, the mining deforestation subsequently declined in December 2025 and January 2026 on the Colombia side, but then started to rise again by March.

Transboundary Gold Mining Deforestation (Maps)

Figure 3. Gold mining deforestation in study areas. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Figure 3 illustrates the gold mining deforestation along the Puré-Puruê River in both Colombia and Brazil, respectively.

As noted above, we estimate the total gold mining deforestation of 7,901 hectares as of June 2026, with 92% on the Brazil side (Puruê River).

The initial mining deforestation of 980 hectares over the first 20 years (2001-2021) is indicated in yellow, the peak in 2022 and 2023 (4,130 ha) is indicated in orange, and the most recent period of 2024-June 2026 is in red (2,791 ha).

On the Brazil side, note the mining deforestation on the Puruê River extends from the confluence with the Japurá River all the way to the Colombian border, including up several southern tributaries. The mining extended to the Colombia side (Pure River) in 2024.

Given this vast area, the mining deforestation data is relatively difficult to visualize. To better highlight this data, below we zoom in on four representative areas (two in each country).

 

 

 

 

 

Zooms of gold mining deforestation

In each of the four zooms below, we show the mining deforestation data followed by a before/after panel of satellite imagery. See Boxes 1-4 in Figure 3 for the location of each zoom (two in each country).

Zoom 1: Puruê River (Brazil)

Zoom 2: Puruê River (Brazil)

Zoom 3: Pure River (Colombia)

Zoom 4: Pure River (Colombia)

Policy Implications

Above, we have documented an important case of Amazonian transboundary illegal gold mining in the remote border area between southeast Colombia and northeast Brazil.

On the Brazilian side (Puruê River), the scale and persistence of illegal gold mining point to a problem that can no longer be addressed through intermittent enforcement operations alone. Brazil accounts for the overwhelming majority of the mining-related deforestation documented in the Puré–Puruê corridor (92%; over 7,300 hectares), with impacts extending from the lower Puruê near its confluence with the Japurá to the Colombian border and into tributaries. The recent decline in the rate of new mining deforestation following government operations is important, but the repeated reappearance of mining activity demonstrates the need to complement enforcement with a long-term strategy for territorial protection, governance, and permanent monitoring.

On the Colombia side (Puré River), while the overall gold mining deforestation is less (8%, over 500 hectares), it is more recent and accelerating. In addition, all of the documented gold mining deforestation is taking place within Puré River National Park, a strictly protected area where land use is not designated for mining operations of any kind. Thus, we have documented nearly 600 hectares of illegal gold mining deforestation in the park between 2024 and mid 2026 (MAAP #245). It is worth noting that prior to the emergence of this deforestation, we reported the presence of more than 50 mining dredges along the course of the Puré River within the National Park in 2024 and 2025 (MAAP #228).

A central issue across both countries is the impact of illegal gold mining on Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation. Evidence from the broader Puré–Puruê landscape indicates that isolated peoples may circulate across a transboundary forest landscape rather than according to the administrative boundary between Brazil and Colombia. On the Colombian side, the Yurí and Passé are formally recognized and protected within Puré River National Park; on the Brazilian side, indications of isolated peoples require urgent investigation and precautionary protection by the competent authorities. Until their presence, patterns of movement, and territorial use can be more fully assessed, continued expansion of mining creates major risks of rights violations against Indigenous peoples derived from violent encounter, disease transmission, mercury contamination, displacement, and loss of access to essential territories and resources.

The impacts of mining also extend beyond the areas directly cleared for extraction and include mercury contamination. Mercury used in illegal gold mining enters the Puré-Puruê–Japurá aquatic system and creates risks for downstream populations whose food security, livelihoods, and health depend heavily on fish and other aquatic resources. Mining activity can likewise generate spillover pressures on neighboring protected areas, including the Juami-Japurá Ecological Station, and on Indigenous territories connected to the wider Japurá landscape. The policy response therefore needs to consider the Puruê not simply as a collection of illegal mining sites, but as part of a connected river and forest system in which environmental contamination, biodiversity loss, and territorial insecurity can be transmitted far downstream and beyond the immediate mining frontier.

It is important to note that Colombia instituted a total ban on mercury in 2023, building off an initial ban issued in 2013. This prohibition covers the import and export of mercury to and from the national territory. Despite the ban within Colombia, mercury is still heavily used for illegal gold mining in border zones, such as those examined in this report.

It is also important to note that the mining economy is increasingly intertwined with a broader security challenge. 

The municipalities of Japurá and Maraã, which serve as key logistical bases for people, fuel, equipment, and supplies moving toward mining areas, are seeing a growing presence of organized criminal factions. This convergence between illegal mineral extraction, river transportation networks, and organized crime raises the stakes well beyond environmental enforcement. It calls for sustained coordination among environmental, Indigenous affairs, public-security, and defense institutions, together with their Colombian counterparts. Protecting the Puré–Puruê corridor will ultimately require simultaneously disrupting the logistical and financial networks that sustain illegal mining, protecting downstream and neighboring populations and territories, and establishing durable territorial protections for one of the most remote and vulnerable areas of the Brazil–Colombia border.

In conclusion, as illegal Amazonian gold mining continues to expand along the remote Colombia-Brazil border, our findings indicate that binational law enforcement operations appear effective in the short term, yet illegal gold mining inevitably returns relatively quickly (within months). The challenge lies in implementing long-term strategies in a remote, binational region that is also impacted by organized crime and home to vulnerable isolated and uncontacted Indigenous groups. The overall challenge, therefore, lies in strengthening sustained efforts to build a mining prevention strategy, while also continuing to develop operational response capabilities and coordinate binational actions across the border region.

Coordinated government actions are key given that supplies, dredges, and mining infrastructure are provided by business operators from municipalities in Brazil—specifically Japurá (the urban center closest to this area), Maraã, and Jutaí. Furthermore, the river routes used to transport supplies and machinery also serve to move the gold extracted in these zones—from the Puré-Puruê river corridor, across the Japurá and Tefé rivers, and finally to the city of Manaus.

Finally, we note that Colombia has activated protection mechanisms (established in 2018) for the Puré River National Park in response to risk reports. More recently, the Ministry of the Interior issued an Early Warning (#1635) in August 2026, mandating a coordinated institutional response among the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Foreign Affairs; however, follow‑up has so far been limited to administrative coordination and inter‑agency meetings, without new operational deployments on the ground. Satellite monitoring continues to show incursions, with dozens of mining rafts and hundreds of hectares deforested inside protected areas. Although the system aims to guarantee the territorial integrity and isolation of the Yurí and Passé peoples through health contingency protocols, collaboration with neighboring indigenous groups, and coordination with local governments—while also relying on binational security operations with Brazil—the problem remains unresolved.

Overall, the appropriate legal tools are in place, yet the capacity to resolve the current situation hinges on the national government allocating funding and demonstrating the political will to implement measures on the ground, moving beyond legal formalities to an operational presence that effectively dismantles the illegal mining infrastructure along the border.

Acknowledgments

We thank the Field Museum of Natural History for its important contributions (co-designing and co-writing) to this report.

MAAP #250: Amazon Tipping Point – Where Are We? (2026 Update)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Figure 1. Amazon primary forest loss. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP, UMD.

It is often reported that the largest rainforest in the world, the Amazon, is rapidly approaching a tipping point.

Generally defined, this tipping point is where parts of the rainforest will convert into drier ecosystems due to disrupted precipitation patterns caused by increasing deforestation.

The Amazon uniquely generates much of its own rainfall by recycling water from its source in the east (Atlantic Ocean) all the way west to the Andes Mountains and beyond, in a phenomenon known as flying rivers (see MAAP #232 and the follow-up white paper). Thus, high deforestation in the eastern Amazon may lead to downwind impacts (reduced precipitation) in the western Amazon. Importantly, these flying rivers follow different pathways during the wet season (northern route) vs. the dry season (southern route), implying that the tipping point is not a uniform event across the Amazon biome, as some areas are more vulnerable to atmospheric moisture (flying rivers) disruptions than others.

The scientific literature indicates this tipping point could be triggered at around 25% Amazon forest loss, in conjunction with climate change impacts (see References).

In a previous report published in 2022 (MAAP #164), we reconstructed the likely extent of the original Amazon biome forest prior to European colonization, and then estimated accumulated total Amazon forest loss (through 2021). Based on this analysis, we estimated that 13.2% of the original Amazon biome primary forests were lost to deforestation and fires.

Here, for our 250th report, we update this estimate by incorporating forest loss data through 2025. From 2022 to 2025 we found an additional forest loss of 13 million hectares, including the record-breaking year of 2024 for fires. Our updated estimate is that 15% of the original Amazon biome primary forest has been lost, mostly due to deforestation and fires (Figure 1).

In addition, breaking the results by seasonal moisture flow routes (see Figure 3 below), we find that moisture flows during the dry and transition seasons are most affected and disrupted (9.1% and 8.6% forest loss, respectively). This finding is critical because during the critical dry and transition seasons, the role of forest-driven moisture recycling is especially important to maintain rainforests in the southwest Amazon. In contrast, we find that the wet season moisture flow is more intact, with just 3.2% total forest loss.

Original Amazon Forest

As first presented in MAAP #164, we merged several datasets to estimate the extent of the original Amazon forest (Figure 2). We define this original forest as the extent of the Amazon forest before European colonization (and thus may include changes from pre-European indigenous populations). Note that we use a broader biogeographical definition of the Amazon that covers nine countries (Amazon biome) rather than the strict Amazon watershed (see Methodology).

The map has just three classes: Original Amazon forest, Original non-forest (such as natural savannah), and Water. 

We found that the original Amazon primary forest covered 647.6 million hectares (equivalent to 1.6 billion acres).

Of this total, 61.4% occurred within the current border of Brazil, followed by Peru (12%), Colombia (7%), Venezuela (6%), and Bolivia (5%). The remaining four countries (Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana) make up the final 8%.

Figure 2. Original Amazon biome forest. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP. Source MAAP#164.

Amazon Forest Loss

In MAAP #164, we reported the historical accumulated Amazon primary forest loss, as of the end of 2021. We documented the total loss of 85.5 million hectares, or 13.2% of the original Amazon.

For this report, we updated the data as of the end of 2025. This data is broken down into three time periods:

By 2000, we estimate that the original Amazon forest had lost 36 million hectares (MAAP #164).

The 2001-2021 estimate of primary forest cover loss was reduced from 49.5 million to 48 million hectares due to adjustments in the forest loss methodology used by the University of Maryland (UMD). It is important to highlight that this finding includes forest loss from both fire (7.3M ha) and non-fire (40.7M ha) causes, and does not include forest gain/regeneration.

A novel 2022-2025 estimate was generated based on the most recent UMD data, adding 13.04 million hectares, including the record-breaking year of 2024 that was mainly driven by forest fires following the strong El Niño event of 2023 (see MAAP #229 and #248). Similarly, this includes forest loss from both fire (5.43M ha) and non-fire (7.61M ha) causes. This total loss over just four years is the equivalent size of the US state of Louisiana.

Combining these three periods gives an updated total of 97.06 million hectares lost (equivalent to 240 million acres). This includes forest loss from both fire (12.78 M ha) and deforestation (84.28 M ha) causes.

The largest loss occurred in Brazil (79.4%), followed by Bolivia (6.2%),  Peru (5.8%), Colombia (4.5%), Venezuela (1.7%), Guyana (0.8%), Ecuador (0.7%), Suriname (0.6%), and French Guiana (0.2%).

Taking this updated forest loss total of 97.06 million hectares in relation to the original 647.6 million hectares gives our key finding of 15% of the original Amazon forest lost, mostly due to deforestation and fire (Figure 1). This estimate also includes natural causes such as landslides and windstorms.  

Figure 3 further illustrates the results broken down by seasonal moisture flow routes (as presented in MAAP #232). We found the transition season moisture flow is most threatened and impacted (9.1% total forest loss), followed by the dry season moisture flow (8.6%).

This finding is important because during the critical dry and transition seasons, the role of flying rivers to carry moisture to water-stressed forest in the southwest Amazon is especially important. In other words, extensive deforestation in the eastern and central parts of these pathways could negatively impact the downwind western part, which means that the tipping point event is not a single and homogenous one across the Amazon biome and there will be geographical areas that will be impacted sooner and harder.

In contrast, we find that the wet season moisture flow is more intact, with just 3.2% total forest loss.

Figure 3. Amazon forest loss in flying rivers pathways. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Methodology

At the core of this work, we generated two major estimates: original Amazon forest and total historical Amazon forest loss.

For both of these estimates, we used the biogeographical boundary of the Amazon (as determined by RAISG 2020), which encompasses nine countries. Thus, we used a broader definition of the Amazon (Amazon biome) rather than the strict Amazon watershed, which omits part of the northeastern Amazon biome.

As presented in MAAP #164, for original Amazon forest, we defined three major classes: Forest, Non-Forest, and Water. This analysis was based on data from MapBiomas Brazil (collection 2 from 1990) with some additional modifications. As noted above, we define this original forest as the extent of the Amazon forest before European colonization (and thus may include changes from pre-European indigenous populations).

Original Forest was made up of these MapBiomas categories: Forest Formation, Mangrove, Flooded Forest, Mosaic of Agriculture and Pasture. Non-Forest was made up of these MapBiomas categories: Savanna Formation, Natural Non-Forest Flood Formation, Grassland, and Other non-Forest Formations. Water was made up of these MapBiomas categories: River, Lake, Ocean and Glacier. 

We then made a number of modifications with manual edits based on data from the University of Maryland, INPE (Terrabrasilis), ArcGis satellite images, Planet mosaics, Google Earth Engine Landsat images from 1984-1990, and official government data for several countries (Ministry of the Environment of Ecuador (MAE) and Peru (GeoBosques/MINAM), Forest and Carbon Monitoring System/IDEAM of Colombia, National Institute for Space Research of Brazil (INPE/Terrabrasilis), General Directorate of Forest Management and Development of Bolivia (DGGDF), and the National Service of Protected Areas of Bolivia (SERNAP). As an example of a major modification, deforested areas and historic dam reservoirs were changed to Original Forest based on an analysis of the oldest available satellite image for the area (1984-1990). We also corrected some misclassifications, such as forest patches in clearly non-forest areas were changed to Non-Forest (and vice versa) and mountain forest areas found as water were changed to Forest. Also, agriculture and urban areas in likely savannah areas were changed to Non-Forest. Additional Water data from MapBiomas based on 1985 was incorporated. Overall, our focus was defining Original Forest as best as possible; data confusions between Non-Forest and Water categories were not worked on as thoroughly. 

For original Amazon forest,For total historical Amazon forest loss, we used data from the University of Maryland. Specifically, we first used their data layer ‘Tree Cover 2000″ (>30% canopy density) to estimate historical (pre-2000) forest loss.

We then used the Global Forest Change (GFC) and Global forest loss due to fire datasets developed by the University of Maryland (UMD) for the period 2001–2025. We then derived annual forest loss from the loss year layer of GFC. Subsequently, we separated fire-related from non-fire-related forest loss using the annual Global forest loss due to fire dataset. Areas classified with medium to high certainty of fire attribution (codes 3 and 4) were considered fire-related forest loss, whereas codes 1 and 2 were used to identify non-fire-related forest loss, representing areas of forest loss attributed to other drivers. This classification was applied to minimize potential overestimation of fire-related forest loss. All data processing and analyses were conducted using Google Colaboratory.

It is important to note that for the more modern post-2000 era (2001-25), data is available for forest loss due to both fire and non-fire causes. This data represents our best estimate or proxy for primary forest loss.  Non-fire loss can be considered more permanent, such as deforestation, while fire loss may be considered more as degradation. The results above combine both types of data to be consistent with the original results presented in MAAP #164.

It is also important to note that our estimates do not include forest gain/regeneration.

Finally, we estimate the amount of primary forest loss in the major seasonal moisture flow pathways (wet, dry, and transition seasons), as presented in  MAAP #232.

References

Sampaio, G., Nobre, C., Costa, M. H., Satyamurty, P., Soares‐Filho, B. S., & Cardoso, M. (2007). Regional climate change over eastern Amazonia caused by pasture and soybean cropland expansion. Geophysical Research Letters, 34(17).

Hansen, M. C. et. al. (2013) High-Resolution Global Maps of 21st-Century Forest Cover Change. Science 342.

Nobre et al. (2016) Land-use and climate change risks in the Amazon and the need of a novel sustainable development paradigm. PNAS, 113 (39).

Turubanova S., Potapov P., Tyukavina, A., and Hansen M. (2018) Ongoing primary forest loss in Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Indonesia. Environmental Research Letters.

Lovejoy, T. E., & Nobre, C. (2018). Amazon Tipping Point. Science Advances, 4(2).

Lovejoy, T. E., & Nobre, C. (2019). Amazon tipping point: Last chance for action. Science Advances, 5 (12).

Bullock et. al. (2019) Satellite-based estimates reveal widespread forest degradation in the Amazon. Glob Change Biol., 26.

Amigo, I. (2020) The Amazon’s fragile future. Nature, 578.

Killeen (2021) A Perfect Storm in the Amazon Wilderness

Berenguer E. et. al. (2021) Ch 19. Drivers and ecological impacts of deforestation and forest degradation. In: Nobre C, Encalada et al. (Eds). Amazon Assessment Report 2021. United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, New York, USA. Available from https://www.theamazonwewant.org/spa-reports

Hirota M et. al (2021) Science Panel for the Amazon, Ch 24. Resilience of the Amazon Forest to Global Changes: Assessing the Risk of Tipping Points. In: Nobre C, Encalada et al. (Eds). Amazon Assessment Report 2021. United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, New York, USA. Available from https://www.theamazonwewant.org/spa-reports/

Wunderling et al (2022) Recurrent droughts increase risk of cascading tipping events by outpacing adaptive capacities in the Amazon rainforest. PNAS 119 (32) e2120777119.

Acknowlegments

This work was supported by NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).

Citation

Finer M, Mamani N, Ariñez A, Castillo H (2026) Amazon Tipping Point – Where Are We? (2026 Update).

MAAP #249: Gold Mining Deforestation in the Ecuadorian Amazon: Napo Province (Southern Zone)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Image 1. Mining activity along the banks of the Anzu River, Napo, Ecuador. Source: EcoCiencia 2026.

In a previous report (MAAP #230, published in July 2025), we presented an initial assessment of gold mining deforestation in the southern part of Napo province, located in the central region of the Ecuadorian Amazon near the city of Tena.

This analysis was particularly relevant given that Napo had emerged as one of the Ecuadorian Amazonian provinces most impacted by escalating gold mining deforestation and contamination, threatening its primary Amazon forests, important watersheds, and key conservation areas (Image 1). 

That report concluded that gold mining expanded rapidly between 2017 and 2024, affecting 1,741 hectares across four zones, with 19% of that area located outside of mining concessions.

In response to this situation, the Ecuadorian government temporarily suspended mining activities in Napo province in early February 2026, aiming to curb illegal extraction, mitigate its environmental impacts, and protect Amazonian water sources. By mid-February, however, local community members were reporting the resumption of mining activities despite the suspension in effect. These operations reportedly took place primarily at night, highlighting the challenges involved in ensuring effective control and compliance with the measures adopted by the authorities.

Here, we update the analysis by incorporating the most recent satellite imagery through 2025 and the first half of 2026.

In summary, based on an updated analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery, we reveal the gold mining deforestation of  2,321 hectares across 5 active mining zones in the southern Napo province between 2017 and early 2026. Of this total, 580 hectares of new mining impact happened in the most recent time period of 2025 to early 2026. In fact, we added the fifth mining zone (Río Napo-Sindy) not in our previous reporting as it just emerged in 2025.

Below, in a series of case studies, we examine each of the 5 major mining zones with a collection of maps and images, including new drone imagery to show the mining impacts in very high resolution.

Gold mining deforestation in Napo province (southern zone)

Graph 1. Mining activity (2014–2024), southern Napo. Data: MapBiomas Ecuador-EcoCiencia.

To evaluate recent trends of gold mining deforestation in the southern part of Napo province, we first analyzed annual data available from 2014–2024 (MapBiomas Ecuador).

The results demonstrate a sustained increase in mining activity in the two municipalities covering this area (Tena and Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola).

Specifically, we found that mining deforestation showed a marked acceleration starting in 2018, exceeding 1,600 hectares by 2024 (Graph 1)—an area more than nine times larger than that recorded at the beginning of the analysis (190 hectares in 2014).

 

 

 

 

 

Satellite monitoring update

To add to the annual (2014-2024) data noted above, we analyzed recent high-resolution satellite imagery (Planet) across the 5 major areas of gold mining deforestation in the southern section of Napo province (see Base Map). It is worth noting that the fifth area (Río Napo-Sindy) was not in our previous reporting as it just emerged in 2025.

We first reported that between 2017 and 2024, gold mining deforestation impacted 1,741 hectares (MAAP #230). Updating the data for 2025 and the first quarter of 2026, we added 580 hectares of new mining impact. Thus, for the full satellite monitoring period of January 2017 to March 2026, we estimate the total gold mining deforestation of 2,321 hectares in this region of southern Napo province.

Base Map. Satellite monitoring area in Napo. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP; EcoCiencia; Planet.

Case 1: Jatunyacu​  River

The study area is located along the Jatunyacu River—one of the headwaters of the Napo River and a zone of intense mining activity within Napo Province. Between January 2017 and January 2024, the identified mining expansion affected 502 hectares (Map 1, yellow). This update shows that the trend has continued, with a cumulative deforested area of ​​561 hectares recorded by the first quarter of 2026. The recent increase of 59 hectares is indicated on the map by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026). Of the total recorded, approximately 2% corresponds to mining activity carried out outside the boundaries of the current mining cadastre (indicated in purple).

Map 1. Satellite monitoring, Case 1: Jatunyacu River. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.
Map 1A. Mining activity identified via drone flights. Data: EcoCiencia; Planet.

Located within this area is the Yutzupino sector near Tena, considered an emblematic case of illegal mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon due to the scale of the identified operations and the recurring enforcement interventions by the authorities (MAAP #151).

Given the important relevance of this area, we incorporated drone imagery (obtained in July 2026) into the analysis, allowing for a more detailed observation of the mining impacts.

Map 1A shows the drone imagery of the Yutzupino area, revealing the mining deforestation, alteration of the soil and watercourses, and the formation of mining pools.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 2: ​Anzu​ River

This case is located along the Anzu River (another headwater of the Napo River) and its tributaries. Satellite monitoring previously documented that, between January 2017 and January 2024, mining expansion in the analyzed area affected 635 hectares (Map 2, yellow). This update shows that the cumulative deforested area reached 806 hectares by the first quarter of 2026. The recent increase of 171 hectares is indicated by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026) on the map. In addition, we identified that 13% of the total area affected by mining corresponds to activity carried out outside the mining cadastre (indicated in purple).

Map 2. Satellite monitoring Case 2: Anzu River. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Drone imagery from July 2026 reveals additional impacts associated with mining activity, including deforestation, sedimentation ponds, eroded soils, as well as mining camps and machinery (Image 2B).

Image 2B. Mining activity identified via drone flights. Data: EcoCiencia;

We also identified the construction of berms (raised barriers) intended to control soil erosion during extraction activities. These structures, however, can also divert natural river channels. Image 2C clearly shows the location of these structures and the proximity of mining activities to the riverbanks, which could directly impact the river. The image also provides a more detailed view of the forest loss, sedimentation ponds, and soil erosion.

Image 2C. 3D aerial photograph obtained via drone. Data: EcoCiencia.

This area also has cultural importance due to the presence of a petroglyph (prehistoric carving) registered in the Ecuadorian Cultural Heritage Information System. Local monitoring has revealed interventions in the vicinity of the petroglyph—including rock removal and modification of the surrounding area—apparently linked to mining activities (Image 2D). Although no direct damage to the carving was observed, given that it is an archaeological asset protected by national legislation, any direct or indirect impact resulting from extractive activities could constitute a violation of heritage protection regulations.

Image 2D. Location and surrounding impacts on the petroglyph in the Anzu River. Data: EcoCiencia; Planet.

Case 3: Huambuno River

Along the Huambuno River, a northern tributary of the Napo River, we documented the mining deforestation of 492 hectares between May 2017 and January 2024 (Map 3, yellow). The updated analysis shows that the mining deforestation reached 674 hectares by the first quarter of 2026. This recent increase of 182 hectares is indicated by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026) on the map. In addition, we determined that nearly a quarter (23%) of total mining activity has occurred outside the official mining cadastre (shown in purple).

Map 3. Satellite monitoring Case 3: Huambuno. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Case 4: ​Puní-Cotona-Arajuno​ Rivers

In this network of southern tributaries to the Napo River, we documented the mining deforestation of 112 hectares between May 2017 and January 2024 (Map 4, yellow). The updated data reveals that this impact has risen to 234 hectares by early 2026. This recent increase of 122 hectares is indicated on the map by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026). Importantly, we found that nearly all (99%) of the mining deforestation has occurred outside areas covered by mining concessions in the official registry (indicated in purple).

Map 4. Satellite monitoring Case 4: Puní-Cotona-Arajuno. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Case 5: Napo River – Sindy Zone

The important new case represents a mining area that mostly emerged and escalated in 2025. It is located along a stretch of the upper Napo River (just downstream of the Jatunyacu and Anzu headwaters), near the communities of Sindy and San Carlos. The initial mining deforestation of 6 hectares was first detected in the Sindy River tributary in 2023 and 2024 (Map 5, yellow). In 2025, the activity shifted to the banks of the mainstem Napo River, impacting 47 hectares by early 2026 (orange and red on the map). Importantly, the vast majority (94%) of this mining deforestation has occurred outside the zones listed in the mining registry (indicated in purple). Both small-scale and larger-scale operations (with specialized machinery and industrial sorting plants) have been identified in this area.

Map 5: Satellite monitoring – Case 5: Napo-Sindy River. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Image 5b shows the rapid increase in mining deforestation between January 2025 (left panel) and March 2026 (right panel) in this area.

Image 5B: Mining deforestation along Napo River, Ecuador. Data: Planet, EcoCiencia.

Image 5C shows drone imagery obtained in July 2026. Notable impacts include deforestation, sedimentation ponds, soil erosion, and the use of heavy machinery.

Image 5C. Drone imagery over Sindy zone. Data: EcoCiencia.

Public policy recommendations for the Napo River basin

1. Implement an inter-institutional monitoring and compliance system

We recommended implementing an inter-institutional monitoring and compliance system for the Napo River basin that integrates remote monitoring via satellite imagery and drones, strategic enforcement operations, community-based surveillance mechanisms, and a public tracking framework for the measures adopted. This policy would strengthen effective compliance with the suspension ordered in February 2026, prevent the resumption of unauthorized extractive activities, and ensure the protection of water resources and associated ecosystems. and early warning systems. We also call for early warning systems that enable the timely detection of new invasions within protected areas and Indigenous territories

2. Establishment of a river buffer protection zone

The proximity of mining activities to rivers and streams is a primary driver of degradation for Amazonian aquatic ecosystems, resulting from deforestation, alteration of watercourses, increased erosion and sedimentation, and mercury contamination. Given that the suspension order of February 2026 acknowledges river impacts from mining, it is essential to strengthen water resource protection measures through proactive land-use management.

In this context, we recommended that the Ministry of Environment and Energy—in coordination with the National Water Authority and the relevant mining sector entities—delineate and enforce a mining exclusion zone at least 100 meters wide along each bank of rivers, streams, and other surface water bodies within the Amazonian Territorial Circumscription, in accordance with the water protection criteria established by national legislation. Note that MAAP #191 previoulsy called for riparian protection zones that extend at least 500 meters on each side of the river.

Furthermore, we recommend that this protection zone be incorporated into processes for land-use planning, granting of mining authorizations, and oversight of extractive activities, complemented by geospatial monitoring mechanisms, periodic inspections, and early warning systems.

3. Implement a system for the traceability and control of machinery used in mining activities

The persistence of illegal mining activities in the Napo River basin highlights the need to strengthen control mechanisms regarding the machinery used for mineral extraction and processing. The movement and operation of excavators, sorting machines, dredges, pumps, and other equipment serve as a key indicator of the expansion of mining activities and their potential impact on aquatic ecosystems.

We recommend the establishment of a mining machinery traceability system for the Amazon region, coordinated by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Mining Regulation and Control Agency (ARCOM), decentralized autonomous governments, and competent oversight bodies.

4. Strengthening Cultural Heritage Management 

We recommend strengthening the protection, monitoring, and conservation of petroglyphs and other archaeological heritage assets located in areas where extractive activities take place, through early risk identification, the demarcation and signage of protection zones, inter-institutional coordination, and the implementation of preventive measures to ensure the integrity of these sites and their cultural settings.

This recommendation includes the mandatory inclusion of heritage protection criteria in the processes for the regularization, control, and monitoring of mining activities, as well as the implementation of periodic inspections, awareness-raising programs for mining operators, and coordination mechanisms among environmental, mining, and cultural heritage authorities.

This recommendation is based on Ecuador’s Constitution (Articles 379 and 380), which recognizes archaeological assets as part of the nation’s cultural heritage and establishes the State’s obligation to guarantee their identification, protection, conservation, and safeguarding. Any adverse impact on these assets must be sanctioned in accordance with the law.

Additionally, this recommendation is grounded in the Organic Law on Culture, which regulates the protection and conservation of heritage assets, and in the Comprehensive Organic Penal Code (Article 239), which penalizes the forgery, substitution, or adulteration of cultural heritage assets—including alterations affecting the nature or original engravings of archaeological elements such as petroglyphs.

5. Additional recommendations from the previous report

In addition to the above new recommendations, we also summarize the proposals made in the previous report focused on the southern zone of Napo province (MAAP #230), all of which are still valid. See the full report (specifically, the “Recommendations for public policy” at the end) for a detailed description and legal basis for these recommendations.

  • Strengthen the investigation and oversight processes of mining activities taking place outside of mining concessions.
  • Apply administrative sanctions to the mining concessionaires who fail to report illicit activities within their authorized area.
  • Strictly apply criminal sanctions to those who carry out mining extraction activities outside authorized areas, as established by Ecuador’s Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code.
  • Define mining exclusion zones at least 100 meters wide along each bank of rivers and their tributaries—as established by the Regulations to the Law on Water Resources, Uses, and Water Utilization of Ecuador.
  • Establish an environmental reclassification requiring an environmental licensing process—including an environmental impact study and a public participation process—for the opening of new roads.
  • Request that Decentralized Autonomous Governments include water protection zones and mandatory ecological easements within their Development and Land-Use Planning Plans and Land Use and Management Plans.
  • Establish a binding protection system and management categories for rivers with exceptional natural and cultural values, based on the implementation of water protection zones with a participatory management plan.

Acknowledgments

We thank the Ecuadorian Rivers Institute  for its contributions to this report.

This report is part of a series focused on the Ecuadorian Amazon, resulting from a strategic collaboration between the organizations EcoCiencia Foundation (Fundación EcoCiencia) and Amazon Conservation, with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation.

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MAAP #248: Implications of upcoming major El Niño event on Amazon fires

Posted on by Matt Finer
Figure 1. El Niño 2023. Data: Google Gemini

In our annual series on forest loss trends in the Amazon (MAAP #244 & MAAP #229), we observed that the two most recent intense fire seasons, 2016 and 2024, immediately followed major El Niño events. 

For example, extreme drought conditions created by a strong El Niño in late 2023 created extreme drought conditions the following year, enabling widespread fires across the Amazon in 2024. In contrast, the reduced fires of 2025 were associated with the moister conditions of La Niña.

For background, the definition of El Niño is based on warm sea surface temperature in a specific zone of the Pacific Ocean several hundred kilometers off the coast of South America (Figure 1).

Specifically, a Sea Surface Temperature Anomaly (SSTA) above 0.5 degrees Celsius in the El Niño 3.4 Zone is classified as an El Niño event (See Methods section for details). Anomalies above 1 degree C are a moderate event, and above 2 degrees C, a very strong event.

We took this SSTA data annually from 2002 to 2025 for the 3-month period of October-November-December, which typically correlates with peak temperature anomalies.

We then analyzed this data in relation to the following year’s fire-caused primary forest loss (data from the University of Maryland). We focused the analysis on years with at least a weak El Niño (SSTA > 0.5).

Results

Figure 2. El Niño and Amazon Fires. Data: UMD, NOAA

Filtering the dataset for El Niño years (SSTA > 0.5 degrees C) isolates 8 specific historical events (2002, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2018, and 2023). 

Of these events:

Four were Weak El Niño (SSTA 0.5- 0.9): 2004, 2006, 2014, and 2018;

Two were Moderate (SSTA 1.0 – 1.4): 2002, 2009;

One was Strong (SSTA 1.5 to 1.9): 2023;

And one was Very Strong (SSTA ≥ 2.0): 2015.

To analyze the delayed (lagged) impact, the SSTA from each year (Year t) is paired directly with the Fire Primary Forest Loss Area from the following year (Year t+1). 

See Figure 2 for the visual correlation between El Niño events (blue) and primary forest loss from fires (red).

Note the initial observation that prompted this study: the major peak in fires in 2016 following the Very Strong El Niño of 2015, followed by the record-breaking fire season in 2024 following the Strong El Niño of 2023.

Despite a limited sample size (only 8 El Niño events since 2000) and limited statistical power, the analysis reveals a clear, strong positive relationship between the strength of El Niño events (that is, magnitude of the sea surface temperature anomaly) and the severity of the following fire season. 

The strength of this relationship approaches the traditional margin of statistical significance (probability value under  0.05), with a probability value of 0.08 (see the Annex for details).

Thus, the data do indicate a potential escalating relationship between El Niño and Amazon fires.

Most notably, the two highest sea surface temperature anomalies —2015 (+2.34) and 2023 (+1.49)—directly preceded the two largest fire seasons, 2016 (1.76 million hectares) and 2024 (2.79 million hectares), respectively.

Low-tier warm anomalies (like +0.52 or +0.73) correspond to lagged fire sizes under 160,000 hectares.

Discussion

As detailed above, the available data indicates a strong positive correlation between the severity of El Niño events and the intensity of the Amazon fire season the following year.

This correlation is anchored by two key events that prompted this analysis in the first place: the peak fire season in 2016 following the Very Strong El Niño of 2015; and the record-breaking fire season in 2024 (see MAAP #229) following the Strong El Niño of 2023.

There is currently an urgency regarding these findings due to the predicted Very Strong El Niño event (that is, SSTA > 2 degrees C) in late 2026 and implications for the 2027 fire season. Some predictions have the SSTA as the highest on record, even approaching 3 degrees C by November to December 2026. 

The current SSTA (for May-June-July 2026) is +0.98 degrees C (Weak to Moderate El Niño), rapidly coming out of last year’s La Niña phase, and warming fast.

Thus, the best recent analogue is the Very Strong El Niño of 2015, and the subsequent burning of nearly 1.8 million hectares of primary Amazon forest the following year in 2016. The most recent analogue is 2023 (see Figure 1), and the subsequent record-breaking fire season of 2024.

We also raise the possibility that the impact on fires carries over to a second year following a major El Niño – this could account for the severe fire seasons of 2017 (1 million hectares) and 2025 (1.5 million hectares).

The weaker El Niño years show a consistent directional pattern but without the same magnitude response.

We also note a major structural break in the data: in general, fires are much greater starting in 2016 (average fire area pre-2016: ~150k ha; Post-2016: ~1.0M ha). This time frame slightly precedes, overlaps, and then continues after the President Bolsonaro administration (2019-2023), which weakened illegal deforestation enforcement policies. Thus, there may be a new modern elevated baseline of fire activity in the Brazilian Amazon.

Since El Niño typically peaks in November to December, which corresponds to the onset of the wet (monsoon) season, the mechanism for this correlation may be shutting down the convection engine driving the rainy season. The disruption of the wet season moisture flow could extend the dry and transition seasons, reducing precipitation, creating drier conditions, and preventing the soil from recovering its moisture, setting up the Amazon for an intense fire season.

It is worth noting that another recent study found that the years with the largest burned areas in the Peruvian Amazon between 2013 and 2024 coincide with the occurrence of El Niño events and drought conditions (Reference 10).

How ready are Amazonian countries for the upcoming 2027 El Niño fire season?

Experience of 2024

The 2023 El Niño and subsequent 2024 fire season exposed the depth of the preparedness gap across the Amazon basin. The responses that emerged were largely reactive, deployed well into a crisis that monitoring systems had anticipated months earlier. Brazil, Peru, and especially Bolivia were most affected among the Amazonian countries, and this review of institutional preparedness focuses on these three countries. Drier conditions created by El Niño, however, created an increased fire risk across the entire biome, affecting all countries.

Brazil mounted the most substantial national response, though it arrived belatedly. By August 2024 — almost three months since the wildfires started — a state of emergency was decreed in 45 municipalities and 48 Brazilian cities were put on high alert (Reference 1). In the end, fires directly impacted 1.9 million hectares, the highest on record (MAAP #229).

Peru also declared a national emergency during the 2024 crisis, unlocking emergency coordination powers and international assistance. In the end, however, fires impacted 47,574 hectares, more than double the previous high (MAAP #229).

Bolivia also had its worst fire season on record in 2024, as fires directly impacted  779,960 hectares, far surpassing the previous record (MAAP #229). The main cause of deforestation and subsequent fires was likely agrarian speculation. Two supreme decrees in 2024 granted zero tariffs and tax incentives to agribusiness, which triggered a surge in demand for land for monocultures of soy, sugarcane, and seed oils. This expansion was supported by existing regulations that expedite the clearing of up to 20 hectares.  The government declared a national emergency and later a national disaster, but the response was hampered by weak enforcement: Bolivia’s fines for illegal forest burning (under $20/hectare) are roughly 2% of Brazil’s, and tensions between national and local government further slowed emergency coordination. To contain the disaster, the government declared an Ecological Environmental Pause, which suspended burning permits and placed the burned public lands under quarantine for five years. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ special rapporteur documented how tensions between national and local governments hindered emergency responses, while policies aimed at aggressively expanding industrial agriculture had dried out large areas of the country, leaving ecosystems vulnerable to fire.

Changes implemented in 2025

Fire impact was much lower in 2025 relative to 2024 (1.5 million vs 2.8 million hectares of primary forest burned, respectively) (MAAP #244). Several Amazonian countries implemented stronger fire management policies in response to the 2024 fire season. The reduced burnt area, however, cannot be solely attributed to better institutional preparedness, as climate conditions were also more favorable, with La Niña bringing relief through higher humidity levels across the biome. 

In February 2025, Brazil’s Environment Minister Marina Silva decreed a pre-emptive environmental emergency ahead of the fire season, giving authorities extra powers and resources to contain wildfires before they spread. The federal government committed to hiring an additional 250 federal firefighters and allocated 45 million reais to bolster state-level fire brigades across six Amazonian states (Reference 3). Other structural measures followed: Brazil’s Supreme Court ordered the federal government and all Amazon and Pantanal states to draw up emergency fire management plans, while the Ministry of Environment announced “governance offices” in 70 Amazon municipalities — supported by FUNBIO and UNDP — to provide vehicles, boats, drones, and training for fire prevention (Reference 4). The Prevfogo program, managed by IBAMA, was expanded as a platform integrating satellite-based detection with ground response. These combined efforts contributed to a measurable decline in fire activity in 2025 compared with the previous year (MAAP #244).

In Peru, in response to the 2024 events, the Ministry of Environment proposed a Forest Fire Prevention and Control Law to establish regional firefighting brigades and prohibit land-use change in areas affected by wildfires, though recent amendments to the Forest Law (Law No. 31973) may undermine this approach (Reference 5). Seven of Peru’s 24 regions have published forest fire prevention and risk reduction plans, and a Multisectoral Plan for Wildfire Response 2025–2027 is currently being developed, drawing on risk assessments that classify nearly 20% of national territory as high or very high fire risk.

In Bolivia, the legislative trajectory since 2024 has moved in the opposite direction. Agribusiness lobbies have pressured to roll back burning fines, and a land reform that would have accelerated deforestation in Santa Cruz and Beni, the departments that burned most severely in 2024, was enacted in the first half of 2026, and then repealed in the face of social protests (Reference 6). The country has been navigating its worst economic and political crisis in decades, and institutional preparedness for the 2027 fire season could be severely challenged under these conditions. 

In terms of regional cooperation, the most significant recent development is the Operational Understanding for Preparedness and Response, approved by ACTO member countries in early 2026. This non-binding regional cooperation framework establishes mechanisms for coordinating mutual assistance among Amazonian countries when the magnitude of forest fires requires a joint response, facilitating the articulation of national capacities, exchange of operational information, and technical support during fire-related emergencies. Concurrent with its adoption, member countries agreed to establish the Forest Fire Response Committee (CRIF), a regional body tasked with developing technical instruments, operational procedures, and coordination mechanisms to improve preparedness and joint response (Reference 7).

In conclusion, the reduction in burnt area observed across the three countries in 2025 occurred under favorable climate conditions, which, as our analysis shows, are unlikely to be seen in 2027. The true test of institutional preparedness will come under El Niño-driven stress. The regional architecture, meanwhile, can only perform as well as its weakest national link. Under a degraded political landscape and without policy improvements since 2024, Bolivia could become the epicenter of the 2027 fire season.

Outlook for 2026 – 2027

From the FAO’s El Niño Fire Readiness checklist (Reference 8), there are five major components of readiness for next year’s 2027 fire season.

First is “Fire Awareness”, which includes understanding historical trends that distinguish an average season from an anomaly season, and what drives major fires (such as fuel load from recently deforested areas) that could be incorporated into Risk Reduction strategies.

As noted above, annual MAAP reports (MAAP #229, MAAP #244) provide historical trends for the Amazon regarding fire impact to primary forests. These reports allow for the identification of intense, or anomalous, fire seasons (such as 2024).

In terms of what drives major fires, previous MAAP reports have revealed the tight link between deforestation and fires in the Amazon (MAAP #189). That is, most major fires are burning recently deforested areas, and then may escape into surrounding forests, especially with extended dry conditions such as 2016 and 2024. For example, over 70% of major fires in the Brazilian Amazon burn recently deforested areas  (MAAP #189). There is also a strong link between deforestation and fire in the Bolivian Amazon, where deforestation also often precedes fires, which may then escape into surrounding forests or savannahs.

Thus, one of the key strategies to minimize major fires in 2027 is to minimize new deforestation in 2026.

Second is the establishment of “Fire Danger Rating and Early Warning” systems and the provision of this information to stakeholders.

As the El Niño intensifies throughout 2026, this could include the monitoring of moisture or drought conditions and issuing respective warnings.

Third is “Fire Preparedness,” and includes guidance for prevention, detection, and suppression of fires based on the above rating and warning system.

In terms of prevention, fire-free agricultural practices could be promoted in 2026 and more strictly enforced in 2027, coordinating closely with local rural unions and cooperatives (Reference 9). Local community initiatives represent a critical component of this preparedness, serving as tangible examples of prevention, detection, and suppression mechanisms.

For instance, the Territorial Strengthening Actions implemented across the Amazon basin demonstrate this integrated approach: communities in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador are actively developing local capacities for fire detection, sustainable management (safe fire use) and early response, while promoting alternative practices to slash-and-burn agriculture. 

This community-based approach is further strengthened by broader regional efforts, such as the CoRAmazonia program. This initiative promotes an Integrated Fire Management strategy that integrates technical, scientific, and traditional indigenous knowledge. Through platforms like ExpoMIF and the Amazon Network for Integrated Fire Management (RAMIF), the program highlights the crucial role of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities in fire governance, emphasizing the importance of community brigades, territorial monitoring, and the rescue of affected wildlife.

Fourth is “Pre-fire Season Activities,” which highlights whether agencies are adequately engaging stakeholders and setting up national agreements.

Fifth is “Fire Detection, Communication, and Dispatching,” which forms the real-time fire Response procedures and mechanisms.

In terms of detection, real-time fire monitoring should be integrated into national response protocols and field-level coordination.

For communication and dispatching, there could be the establishment of contingency plans to extinguish forest fires rapidly before they spread, focusing heavily on fires starting in recently deforested areas and expanding towards protected areas or Indigenous territories.

In Peru specifically (Reference 10), the most critical districts are concentrated in the Ucayali, Madre de Dios, and Huánuco regions. Regarding public budget allocation, there are gaps in the prevention of and response to forest fires, resulting in limited operational capabilities and significant disparities in the allocation and execution of public resources for disaster risk management. Overall, there is the need to strengthen systems for monitoring, early warning, planning, and institutional response regarding forest fires, prioritizing areas with the greatest historical vulnerability.

Methods

The analysis combined two primary data sources: 1) Relative Oceanic Niño Index (RONI) based on sea surface temperature anomaly (SSTA) and 2) annual primary forest loss from fires.

RONI, the standard used by NOAA for classifying El Niño (warm) and La Niña (cool) events in the eastern tropical Pacific, is the running 3-month average sea surface temperature (SST) for the Niño 3.4 region, minus the overall average tropical 3-month sea surface temperature anomaly (SSTA). For this study, we used the 3-month period of October-December for each year. 

Events are defined as 5 consecutive overlapping 3-month periods at or above the +0.5 anomaly for warm (El Niño) events and at or below the -0.5 anomaly for cool (La Niña) events.  The threshold is further broken down into Weak (with a 0.5 to 0.9 SST anomaly), Moderate (1.0 to 1.4), Strong (1.5 to 1.9), and Very Strong (≥ 2.0) events. 

In addition to warm SSTA in the Pacific Ocean, Amazon drought conditions may also be influenced by warm SSTA in the North Tropical Atlantic Ocean (Reference 10), but our study did not account for this.

The fire analysis was based on 30-meter resolution annual forest loss data produced by the University of Maryland and also presented by Global Forest Watch. This Global Forest Loss due to fire dataset is unique in terms of being consistent across the Amazon (in contrast to country-specific estimates) and distinguishes forest loss caused directly by fire (note that virtually all Amazon fires are human-caused). The values included were ‘medium’ and ‘high’ confidence levels (code 3-4).

For the baseline, it was defined to establish areas with >30% tree canopy density in 2000. Importantly, we applied a filter to calculate only primary forest loss by intersecting the forest cover loss data with the additional dataset “primary humid tropical forests” as of 2001 (Turubanova et al 2018). For more details on this part of the methodology, see the Technical Blog from Global Forest Watch (Goldman and Weisse 2019).

The analysis was supported and reviewed by AI: Gemini and Claude

Annex

Because we have a constrained subset (N = 8), the statistical power is limited, but a clear, strong positive pattern is evident across several major metrics.

The Pearson Linear Correlation indicates a strong positive linear relationship between the magnitude of the warm anomaly and the next year’s fire area (r = +0.6146), approaching the traditional margin of statistical significance (p-value = 0.1049). This correlation is even stronger when we take the natural log of the fire area to account for natural fire activity  (p-value = 0.0827).

Spearman Rank Correlation reaffirms that higher SSTA values rank alongside worse fire outcomes in the succeeding year ( +0.5476; p-value= 0.1600).

  • Log-Transformed Pearson Correlation (r log): +0.6474
  • Wildfire spread typically behaves exponentially rather than linearly. When we take the natural log of the fire area (ln{Fire}_t+1) to correct for this, the correlation strengthens to nearly +0.65, approaching the traditional margin of statistical significance (p < 0.10).

References

1. Lancet Regional Health – Americas / PMC. (2025). The 2024 South America ablaze: Health impacts and policy imperatives for protecting population health in an era of wildfires

2. IACHR (2025) REDESCA publishes report on wildfires in Bolivia and calls for urgent action to address impacts on human rights and ecosystems

3. Mongabay (2025). Brazil declares environmental emergency ahead of 2025 fire season.

4. Muggah, R., & Szabo, I. / Mongabay. (2025). Brazil is speeding-up forest fire prevention to avoid dangerous tipping points in the Amazon. 

5. Lancet Regional Health – Americas / PMC. (2025). The 2024 South America ablaze. (See footnote 3.) Peru-specific governance section

6. Copa Pabón, M. V. (2026, May 15). Indigenous protest forces repeal of land privatization law in Bolivia.

7. ACTO. (2026, February–March). ACTO member countries approve Operational Understanding for Preparedness and Response to Forest Fires in the Amazon Region.

8. FAO El Niño Fire Readiness checklist (2024) As presented in the Global Fire Management Hub and informed by its Integrated Fire Management Voluntary Guidelines

9. Brown F, et al (2026). Alert related to the coming severe dry period, heat waves, fires, smoke and climate in the Madre de Dios-Peru, Acre-Brazil, Pando-Bolivia (MAP) Region – 30 April 2026. Foster Brown

10. ACCA (2026) El Niño y los incendios forestales en la Amazonía peruana, ¿qué podemos esperar para la temporada 2026-2027?

Citation

Finer M, Bodin B (2026) Implications of upcoming major El Niño event on Amazon fires. MAAP: 248.

Acknowledgements

We thank colleagues from the following organizations for helpful comments on the report: Conservación Amazónica – ACEAA in Bolivia and Conservación Amazónica – ACCA in Peru.

This work was supported by Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).

MAAP #247: River gold mining expansion in the northern Peruvian Amazon (Loreto region)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Base Map. Gold mining activity in Loreto, Peru. Data: ACCA, FAP, FEMA, FZS, GGF, IBC, SERNANP.

Gold mining has been expanding in recent years across various regions of the Peruvian Amazon.

Previous reports (for example, see MAAP #241) have shown the rapid expansion of gold mining deforestation in the southern Peruvian Amazon, particularly in the Madre de Dios region. 

Our reporting has also indicated that gold mining continues to expand into other Amazonian regions (see MAAP #233), notably the Loreto region in the northern Peruvian Amazon (see Base Map).

Loreto is one of the Amazonian regions most affected by river-based mining activity. Mining dredges are a direct source of river contamination due to the substances used in the gold extraction process, most notably mercury.

During our active monitoring period from 2017 to 2026, we have detected or otherwise documented over 1,500 mining dredges in the Amazonian rivers of the Loreto region (based on our detections from very-high-resolution satellite imagery and reports from other institutions, see Annex for details).

In fact, we have identified a major increase in the number of recorded mining dredges during the most recent 2025 to 2026 period, including expansion to new rivers across Loreto.

Over just these past two years (2025–2026), we have identified over 700 mining dredges in the rivers of Loreto, representing nearly half (46%) of the total going back to 2017.

Furthermore, we have now documented the presence of mining dredges in 13 rivers in Loreto: Atacuari, Chambira, Cotuhe, Curaray, Marañón, Mazan, Nanay, Napo, Patayacu, Pintuyacu, Putumayo, Tigre, and Yaguas. Of these, the rivers most affected by dredge-based mining activity are the Nanay, Marañón, Tigre, and Mazán.

Below, we present four case studies (see Base Map, Insets A–D) that illustrate the current gold mining situation in the Amazonian rivers of the Loreto region. These case studies document mining activity during the years 2025–2026 and feature high-resolution satellite imagery.

Case Studies

A. Putumayo River

Illegal gold mining activity has spread across various sections of the Putumayo River, which forms part of the Peru-Colombia border in the Loreto region. Between 2020 and 2026, we recorded a total of 29 mining dredges along the Putumayo River. Of these records, 58% (17 dredges) date from 2025–2026 (Figure A), highlighting the increase in illegal gold mining activity in recent years.

Figure A. Mining dredges located on the Putumayo River. Data: ACCA, Planet.

B. Tigre River

We have recorded illegal gold mining in various sections of the Tigre River, an Amazonian river spanning over 550 km across the Loreto region. Between 2021 and 2026, a total of 73 mining dredges were recorded along the Tigre River, making it the river with the third-highest number of historical dredge records in the region. In recent years (2025–2026), 67 mining dredges were recorded along the Tigre River, representing 91% of the total records for this river.

This situation demonstrates a major increase in illegal mining activity on the Tigre River, which has included gold extraction near the riverbanks (Figure B1), as well as the presence of mining dredges near populated areas (Figure B2).

Figure B1. Mining dredges located on the Tigre River. Data: ACCA, Google Earth.
Figure B2. Mining dredges located near a settlement on the Tigre River. Data: ACCA, Google Earth.

C. Nanay River

Gold mining activity on the Nanay River has expanded since 2021—when we first recorded gold mining dredges—a trend described in previous reports (see MAAP #187). The Nanay River is the Amazonian river most impacted by illegal mining in the Loreto region, as it accounts for the highest number of historical records of mining dredges. Between 2021 and 2026, a total of 1,076 mining dredges were recorded along various sections of the river.

During the 2025–2026 period, we documented the presence of 421 mining dredges on the Nanay River, demonstrating a steady increase in this mining activity compared to previous years (301 records in 2024, 221 records in 2023). Furthermore, mining dredges have been recorded in new sections of the Nanay River, highlighting the expansion of this mining activity and its impact along the river (Figure C1).

Figure C1. Record of mining dredges on the Nanay River for the years 2021–2026. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Furthermore, gold mining has begun to directly impact ecosystems adjacent to the Nanay River, with mining activity concentrated in areas comprising palm swamps, low-hill forests, and seasonally flooded alluvial forests. Between 2025 and 2026, we identified mining deforestation along the banks of the Nanay River (Figure C2).

Figure C2. Loss of forest cover due to mining dredging activity in the Nanay River. Data: ACCA, Plane

D. Marañón River

Illegal gold mining activity has continued to expand along the Marañón River, particularly in the Manseriche District of Datem del Marañón Province (Figure D1). In this area, gold mining operations have expanded into various zones adjacent to the river. That is, we have identified gold mining deforestation (associated with the construction of mining pits and infrastructure) along with the presence of mining dredges in the Marañón River, which represents a major escalation in terms of impact.

Figure D1. Gold mining activity on the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, FEMA, Planet.

As of June 2026, we identified 241 mining concessions in the Manseriche district according to the mining cadastre of the relevant Peruvian mining agency (INGEMMET); these include concessions that are titled (122), pending (115), extinguished (2), and other (2). As shown in Figure D1, these concessions are distributed along the Marañón River and in areas adjacent to it, reflecting an increase in mining concession applications in recent years.

On the other hand, we identified only 9 registrations in the Comprehensive Mining Formalization Registry (REINFO) for the Manseriche district. Upon verifying the mining rights associated with these nine registrations, only three are linked to mining concessions located within the district, while the other six involve mining rights that do not exist in the INGEMMET mining cadastre. Furthermore, mining activity has been recorded for only one concession associated with a REINFO registration (Golden Rose 4 mining concession).

Graph 1. Mining-related deforestation (Manseriche) and gold price (through June 2026). Data: ACCA, BCRP.

Graph 1 shows annual gold mining deforestation in the Manseriche district for the 2020–2026 period (up to June 2026).

During this period, note that annual mining deforestation has steadily increased from 2020 to 2024, coinciding with the rise of international gold prices.

Starting in 2025, we documented a major increase in mining deforestation, with more than 600 hectares impacted that year.

This rise in mining deforestation correlates with the rise in the international price of gold in 2025.

Likewise, a high number of mining concession applications were identified for the Manseriche district for that same year, with 109 new concessions recorded across various sectors of the district.

By 2026, cumulative gold mining deforestation in the Manseriche district of Loreto reached ​​868 hectares (Graph 1).

Between 2025 and 2026, we identified new mining deforestation in various sectors of the district, totaling 493 hectares during this two-year period (54% of the cumulative total back to 2020). Figure D2 shows the expansion of mining areas in one sector of the district, where forest loss has been recorded along the banks of the Marañón River.

Figure D2. Mining deforestation in the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, Planet

The gold mining deforestation has occurred in areas adjacent to the Marañón River (within a zone extending up to 6 km from the river) where we have identified mining pits and infrastructure (such as camps and dredges). Figure D3 illustrates mining sites located both on land and along the banks of the Marañón River, showing sediment accumulation in mining pits resulting from gold extraction using dredges.

Figure D3. Mining-related deforestation in areas adjacent to the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, Planet.

At the same time, the presence of illegal gold mining dredges has expanded along the Marañón River between 2022 and 2025. We identified 187 mining dredges on the river and in adjacent mining pools. By 2025, we recorded 108 mining dredges across various sectors of the Marañón River, representing 57% of the cumulative count. In certain sectors, we have observed sediment accumulation near the mining dredges, providing evidence of their extraction activities within the Marañón River (Figure D4).

Figure D4. Mining dredges identified on the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Public policies addressing the expansion of illegal mining in Loreto:
Progress, limitations, and challenges

The findings of this report demonstrate that illegal gold mining continues to expand in the Loreto region—particularly along the Nanay, Marañón, Tigre, and Putumayo Rivers and other Amazonian tributaries—despite the explicit ban on dredges and similar equipment for mining in bodies of water (established by Legislative Decree No. 1100, which regulates the interdiction of illegal mining). Consequently, the expansion of this activity is not due to a regulatory gap, but rather the Peruvian government’s difficulties in effectively enforcing an existing prohibition.

In alignment with the national regulatory framework, the Regional Government of Loreto (GOREL) has, for over two decades, promoted a set of regulations aimed at conserving Amazonian ecosystems, protecting water resources, and preventing activities incompatible with these objectives, such as illegal mining. In this context, it has approved various ordinances designed to strengthen the management and protection of the department’s river basins. Notable among these is a Regional Ordinance (Number 001-2025-GRL-CR), which reaffirms the importance of conserving and protecting priority river basin headwaters to ensure access to water for meeting the population’s basic needs and to promote the sustainability of regional ecosystems. These measures reflect a sustained regional policy aimed at protecting Amazonian rivers and recognizing their strategic importance for water security, biodiversity conservation, and the well-being of local communities.

The existence of this regulatory framework, however, has not been sufficient to curb the expansion of illegal mining in Loreto. In recent years, this activity has spread beyond specific hotspots to progressively encompass new Amazonian rivers and basins, driven by a combination of structural factors. Key among these are the limited state presence, the difficulty of exercising control over a territory defined by an extensive river network, the operations of criminal organizations, and the high profitability of gold. Compounding this situation are poverty, limited public investment, and a lack of sustainable economic alternatives for Amazonian populations; for them, illegal mining often represents the sole source of income—or one that is far more lucrative than traditional productive activities.

As a recent study points out (Shadow Gold: The Expansion of Illegal Mining and Its Effects on the Nanay River Basin, with a Focus on Women), this activity not only causes severe environmental impacts but also transforms local economies, strengthens illicit economies, and weakens territorial governance.

Peruvian Government response

The State’s response to the spread of illegal mining in Loreto has focused primarily on interdiction actions, joint operations, the destruction of dredges, and prosecutorial investigations aimed at reducing the operational capacity of organizations engaged in this activity.

Within this context, the competent authorities have carried out various operations in the main affected areas. One of the most recent cases involves interventions on the Tigre River, where authorities destroyed dredges after confirming a significant increase in extraction activity.

Our satellite monitoring, however, reveals that illegal mining quickly reappears in areas where interventions have taken place, demonstrating that while interdiction efforts are a necessary control tool, their effects tend to be temporary unless complemented by additional strategies aimed at dismantling the criminal networks, financial flows, and supply chains that sustain this illicit economy.

In addition to enforcement actions, the State has adopted preventive measures to curb the expansion of illegal mining in areas of high environmental importance. In the Nanay River basin, for instance, the acceptance of new applications and the granting of mining concessions were suspended (Note 1), and states of emergency were declared due to the contamination of the primary water supply source for the city of Iquitos. These measures represent significant progress; however, their effectiveness depends on continuous oversight and a sustained institutional presence in the area.

In terms of national policy, Supreme Decree No. 003-2025-IN—which approves the National Strategy for the Reduction and Interdiction of Illegal Mining through 2030—recognizes the need to strengthen intelligence, inter-agency coordination, and the prosecution of criminal economies linked to illegal mining, while promoting an approach that goes beyond interdiction actions.

Limitations of the state response

Despite the advances noted above, the state’s response continues to face major structural limitations. First, Loreto presents immense logistical challenges due to its vast territory and the dispersed nature of its river network. Many of the affected areas are accessible only by river—often requiring hours or even days of travel—which drives up operational costs and makes it difficult for authorities to maintain a permanent presence.

This geographical complexity takes on a critical transnational dimension in border basins such as the Putumayo or the Tigre. The vulnerability of the borders with Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador enables criminal organizations to operate with cross-border mobility—transporting illicit inputs like mercury or crossing international boundaries to evade interdiction efforts by Peruvian law enforcement—thereby highlighting the inadequacy of approaches limited solely to the local or national level.

Secondly, the institutional response remains predominantly reactive. Although interdiction efforts temporarily reduce the infrastructure used for illegal mining, there has been less progress in investigating financing chains, gold marketing, money laundering, and the supply of fuel, mercury, and machinery—factors that facilitate the rapid resumption of this activity.

Furthermore, weaknesses persist in the coordination among the entities responsible for control, oversight, and criminal prosecution. Limited coordination regarding information sharing, joint planning, and the monitoring of interventions—involving the National Government, Regional Governments, the Specialized Environmental Prosecutor’s Offices (FEMA), and the Directorate of Captaincies and Coast Guard (DICAPI)—reduces the effectiveness of the state’s response to highly adaptable organizations.

Another important limitation concerns inconsistencies in the granting and administration of mining rights in the region. Despite the ban on alluvial mining using dredges in water bodies, mining concessions have been identified in Loreto with boundaries that encompass rivers, streams, or other bodies of water, as well as concessions granted in areas where the expansion of illegal mining has been documented. While a mining concession does not in itself authorize the commencement of extraction activities—nor does its granting imply approval of environmental instruments or other necessary permits—this situation reveals weaknesses in land-use planning and in the coordination between the entities responsible for managing mining rights and those charged with protecting the environment and water resources. This creates conflicts regarding land management, increases pressure on sensitive ecosystems, and hinders efforts to prevent and control illegal mining.

Compounding this situation are the protracted nature of mining formalization processes and the repeated extensions of the Comprehensive Mining Formalization Registry (REINFO). In the Amazonian context, REINFO has created significant distortions; illegal operators frequently exploit it fraudulently as a “shield of impunity” to temporarily halt prosecutorial and interdiction actions, thereby subverting the purpose of a registry designed for small-scale and artisanal mining and using it instead to mask alluvial mining in water bodies—an activity that is strictly prohibited without exception.

Local responses

Given these limitations in the central government’s response, the coordination of local stakeholders emerges as a fundamental component in the fight against illegal mining. In Loreto, mechanisms for technical and social coordination—such as the Good Governance Platform for the Nanay River’s Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme and the Technical Group Against Illegal Mining—have been strengthened; these initiatives foster genuine collaboration among public entities, Indigenous organizations, civil society, and international cooperation partners.

Within this network, Indigenous organizations and local communities also play a fundamental role through community-based surveillance, territorial monitoring, and the issuance of early warnings regarding the spread of illegal mining. These initiatives complement state actions and demonstrate that strengthening territorial governance is an essential component for improving the effectiveness of public policies addressing illegal mining.

Those carrying out these monitoring activities, however, face a situation of particular vulnerability. In various river basins in Loreto—particularly the Nanay and Putumayo—leaders, community monitors (Note 2), and even park rangers have been subjected to threats and intimidation as a result of their efforts to report the spread of illegal mining and protect water resources. This situation demonstrates that the state’s response must not only strengthen oversight and interdiction capabilities but also guarantee adequate protection for those who contribute to defending the territory and ensuring compliance with environmental regulations. The persistence of these risks undermines territorial governance and limits community participation in the prevention and control of illegal mining.

Conclusions

The evidence presented above confirms that the expansion of illegal mining in Loreto is not due to the absence of a regulatory framework, but rather to limitations in effectively implementing existing public policies. Although the State has strengthened interdiction efforts and developed regulatory instruments to protect Amazonian river basins, these measures remain insufficient against criminal organizations possessing a high capacity for logistical, financial, and cross-border adaptation.

Consequently, a more effective response requires moving beyond the reactive and short-term approach to river-based controls. These actions must be complemented by strengthening financial and criminal intelligence targeting money laundering networks, strictly monitoring irregularities in formalization registries, effectively protecting human rights defenders, coordinating bilaterally in border areas, and designing viable, sustainable socioeconomic alternatives for local populations. Only through a comprehensive, decentralized approach—combining prevention, strategic criminal prosecution, territorial development, and the strengthening of community governance—will it be possible to sustainably curb and reduce the expansion of illegal mining in the Peruvian Amazon.

Methodology

The identification of mining dredges was based on the visual interpretation of very-high-resolution satellite imagery available on the Planet, Maxar, and Google Earth Pro platforms for Amazonian rivers in the Loreto region. Additionally, confidential reports and direct communications from various institutions regarding the presence of mining dredges in Amazonian rivers were incorporated. This information enabled the recording of mining dredges in new areas and the prioritization of monitoring—using very-high-resolution satellite imagery—in strategic sectors of the Loreto region.

The identification of deforestation caused by gold mining was based on the visual interpretation of high- and very-high-resolution satellite imagery available on the Planet, Maxar, and Google Earth Pro platforms for the Loreto region. Following this identification, deforestation was monitored using Planet NICFI monthly mosaics (4.7 m spatial resolution) to track the expansion of mining-related deforestation and identify new affected areas within the Loreto region.

Notes

1. Supreme Decree Nº022-2024-EM, Extension of the suspension of the admission of mining petitions in the area of ​​the Nanay River, located in the district of Alto Nanay, province of Maynas, department of Loreto

2. Members of local monitoring organizations recognized by the Loreto Regional Government and members of community monitoring committees recognized by SERNANP.

Annexes

Annex 1. Registry of mining dredges by river in the Loreto region for the periods 2017–2024 and 2025–2026 (through June)

Annex 2. Registry of mining dredges in the Loreto region for the period 2017–2026 (June)

Acknowledgments

We thank the organizations DAR (Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales), FCDS Perú (Fundación para la Conservación y Desarrollo Sostenible), and OMI (Observatorio de Minería Ilegal) for their contributions and comments on this report.

This report is part of a series focused on gold mining in the Peruvian Amazon, resulting from a strategic collaboration between the organizations Amazon Conservation and Conservación Amazónica (ACCA), with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation.

 

Citation

Pacsi R, Novoa S, Rivera G, Arana M, Finer M, Santana A. (2026). Gold mining expansion in the northern Peruvian Amazon (Loreto region). MAAP:247

MAAP #246: Illegal gold mining in protected areas in the Juruena River region, Mato Grosso (Brazilian Amazon)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Base Map. Illegal mining, Juruena National Park and Igarapés do Juruena State Park. Data: ICV.

The Brazilian state of Mato Grosso plays a pivotal role along the southeastern frontier of the Amazon, located at a critical transition zone between the Amazon, Cerrado, and Pantanal biomes. This unique location allows the state to serve as a shield against the encroachment of deforestation into the Amazon rainforest’s interior from the more impacted biomes.

Recent monitoring, however, indicates increasing deforestation in Mato Grosso (INPE and MapBiomas), particularly due to agricultural and mining expansion.

Regarding the threat from mining specifically, the sector in the state is governed by a legal framework, but challenges related to governance, transparency, and the oversight of mining activities persist (Amazon Mining Watch). In addition, recent legislative changes (such as Supplementary Law No. 788/2024, which addresses the relocation of legal reserves for mining purposes) have sparked debates concerning the easing of environmental protections on private properties and the indirect impact on public lands.

In part due to this weakened legal framework, the Juruena River basin, located in the northern tip of Mato Grosso, faces a critical situation regarding the expansion of illegal small-scale gold mining (OPAN, 2026). Mining in this region has been ongoing since the 1970s, when colonization incentive projects and road construction facilitated access to the area, attracting miners from various parts of the country. Since then, mining has played a major role in the regional economy, developing predominantly without effective government oversight.

Mining-related regulations have existed in the region since the 1990s (OPAN, 2021), and various environmental and law enforcement agencies have carried out successive operations to combat illegal mining from 2006 to 2024 (specifically, in 2006, 2008, 2017, 2020, 2021, 2023, and 2024).

Over the last two decades, and intensifying in recent years, the expansion of small-scale mining has encroached upon the two key conservation units in the Juruena River region: Juruena National Park and Igarapés do Juruena State Park (see Base Map).

This illegal activity is not only occurring in both national and state-level protected areas, but also operating outside the scope of concessions granted by the National Mining Agency

Both areas, however, are situated in a region facing intense formalized mining pressure, with a predominance of applications in the initial request stage in the immediate vicinity (see Figure A1), indicating a growing risk of mining expansion and intensifying indirect impacts on these protected areas.

Figure A1: Active mining processes. Source: National Mining Agency (ANM, June 2026)

Protected Areas Threatened

The scenario described above has created major mining-related impacts in the Juruena River basin, including deforestation, siltation, and mercury contamination, thereby compromising biodiversity and the food security of local communities.

This report details the evidence of this encroachment, analyzing the pressures exerted on Juruena’s protected areas between July 2025 and April 2026, as well as the challenges regarding enforcement and the region’s territorial integrity.

Juruena National Park

The illegal gold mining activity in Juruena National Park is concentrated in the southwestern part of the protected area (Figure B1).

Figure B1. Area affected by artisanal mining in Juruena National Park. Source: Planet.

The specific area affected by illegal mining deforestation in Juruena National Park showed a major increase between 2025 and 2026 (Figure B2). In August 2025, the impacted area was 10.5 hectares (left panel), increasing to 79.5 hectares by April 2026 (right panel).

Figure B2. Mining deforestation in Juruena National Park (2025-26). Data: (Skysat)

In addition to the deforestation described above, we also detected mining camps, equipment, and access roads (Figure B3), indicating the establishment of the basic infrastructure to support extraction activities.

Figure B3. Mining camps and equipment in Juruena National Park. Data: Planet (Skysat)

The analysis presented above focused on the most recent gold mining deforestation in Juruena National Park, from August 2025 to April 2026. Additional data from the Amazon Mining Watch platform provides more historical context of the mining activity in the park since 2018 (Figure B4). According to the platform, the cumulative area affected by mining within the conservation unit increased from 240 hectares in 2018 to 730 hectares by June 2026, highlighting the continuous expansion of the activity over recent years.

Figure B4: Amazon Mining Watch results for Juruena National Park.
Figure B5. Embargo area in the Juruena National Park. Data: (ICMBio)

We noted a record of environmental enforcement action regarding the illegal mining activity in Juruena National Park (ICMBio 2026).

In April 2025, an embargo was issued for a 17.4-hectare area affected by mining operations (Figure B5).

According to the enforcement record, the sanction was imposed due to the operation of an activity utilizing environmental resources—deemed actually or potentially polluting—without the required license from the competent environmental agency.

The measure aimed to halt the ongoing activity, prevent the expansion of environmental impacts, and ensure the protection of Juruena National Park’s natural resources.

According to information provided by IBAMA/ICMBio, 15 operations targeting illegal mining within the boundaries of Juruena National Park have been carried out since 2010. The most recent one took place in June 2026. The agency also noted that illicit mining activities intensified starting in 2020.

In total, the operations resulted in approximately 11 notices of violation, 35 asset seizure records, 37 embargo orders, 32 records of the destruction or rendering unusable of seized items, 3 demolition orders, and 1 custody order.

However, this entire history of enforcement—and, more recently, the issuance of violation notices and imposition of stop-work orders—has not prevented the continuation and expansion of illegal mining in this area of ​​Juruena National Park.

This situation highlights the chronic nature of the problem and, above all, underscores the importance of maintaining monitoring and enforcement efforts and taking swift action to counter the resurgence of these illegal activities in the region.

Igarapés do Juruena State Park

The illegal gold mining deforestation is concentrated in the south-central region of Igarapés do Juruena State Park (Figure C1).

Figure C1. Gold mining in Igarapés do Juruena State Park. Data: Planet (Skyat)

The specific area affected by illegal mining deforestation in Igarapés do Juruena State Park showed a major increase between 2025 and 2026 (Figure C2). In June 205 the impacted area was 8.6 hectares (left panel), and then increased to 43.7 hectares in March 2026 (right panel).

Figure C2. Increase in mining deforestation in Igarapés do Juruena State Park, 2025-26. Data: Planet (Skysat)

In addition to the deforestation described above, we also detected mining camps, equipment, and access roads (Figure C3), indicating the establishment of the basic infrastructure to support extraction activities.

Figure C3. Mining camps and equipment in Igarapés do Juruena State Park. Data: Planet (Skysat)
Figure C4. Environmental enforcement actions in Igarapés do Juruena State Paek. Data: SEMA-MT

Regarding environmental enforcement actions related to mining activities in Igarapés do Juruena State Park, we identified a violation notice, issued by the Mato Grosso State Secretariat of Environment (SEMA-MT in Portuguese) in August 2020 and addressed to an overlapping rural property in the municipality of Colniza (Figure C4).

Subsequently, in September 2025, records show the issuance of another notice of violation by SEMA-MT due to mineral extraction without an environmental license, resulting in an administrative fine. In March 2026, a formal embargo order was issued for the area in question and recorded in the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR in Portuguese).

This measure mandated the suspension of all activities across a 13.7-hectare area due to the unauthorized clearing of native vegetation within a Legal Reserve Area and the conduct of small-scale mining without an environmental license. The embargo aimed to halt environmental degradation, prevent the expansion of impacts on the conservation unit, and promote the recovery of the affected area.

The sequence of violation notices and administrative measures—initially in 2020 and subsequently in 2025 and 2026—highlights the recurring enforcement actions in the area and the persistent pressure that mining activities exert on the Igarapés do Juruena State Park.

In this context, constant monitoring and rapid field responses are essential to prevent the resurgence and expansion of illegal mining practices.

Policy Implications

The occurrence of illegal mining within strictly protected conservation units indicates limitations in the monitoring and control mechanisms for these areas. This scenario is particularly concerning in the Juruena River region, where the expansion of gold mining has encroached upon two key protected areas (Juruena National Park and Igarapés do Juruena State Park), causing major impacts such as deforestation and mercury contamination.

The National System of Nature Conservation Units (SNUC in Portuguese, established by Law No. 9.985/2000), stipulates that “Full Protection” categories—such as Ecological Stations, Biological Reserves, National Parks, Natural Monuments, and Wildlife Refuges—permit only the indirect use of natural resources (for example, research, tourism, and environmental education). Consequently, the continuation of small-scale mining activities in these areas violates the provisions of the Federal Constitution and the SNUC framework, while compromising the ecological integrity of these territories.

Data from Amazon Mining Watch indicates that mining deforestation identified within Conservation Units in the Juruena region is taking place outside authorized mining concessions, strongly suggesting illegality. Although legal instruments exist to regulate mining and restrict natural resource use in Full Protection Conservation Units, the occurrence of small-scale mining outside areas authorized by the National Mining Agency highlights weaknesses in the mechanisms for control, oversight, and monitoring of territorial protection measures.

Given this scenario, it is essential to strengthen oversight and monitoring mechanisms for Conservation Units. Adopting an integrated geospatial information platform—combining satellite-based alert systems with up-to-date data on mining concessions and the boundaries of protected areas (such as Conservation Units and Indigenous Territories)—could facilitate more effective monitoring and response by public authorities.

In this context, improvements to the Mining Registry platform—managed by the National Mining Agency (ANM)—could represent an important step forward in transparency and territorial oversight regarding mining activity in the Juruena region, as well as in other areas of Mato Grosso facing pressure from small-scale mining. Key improvements could include consolidating data from the mining registry (Cadastro Mineiro), the Mining Geographic Information System (SIGMINE), and the Geological Survey of Brazil (SGB) geographic portal. This would enable, for instance, the integration of mining and geological data layers within a single mapping environment, alongside more comprehensive details on mining applications, such as their procedural history. Other potential enhancements include the ability to issue official certificates—once the mining registry and SIGMINE are integrated—and the automated cross-referencing of mining concession polygons with protected areas and Indigenous territories, thereby facilitating the identification of overlaps, inconsistencies, and potential irregularities. Peru’s GeoCatmin system could serve as a reference for implementing these improvements.

Beyond strengthening state oversight capabilities, such an integrated public tool would expand access to information for civil society and research institutions, contributing to environmental governance, the prevention of illegal activities, and a more agile response to pressures on areas of high socio-environmental importance.

Given the recurring nature of small-scale mining practices and the severe environmental impacts they cause, it is crucial that authorities intensify monitoring, enforcement, and suppression measures, ensuring the effective protection of the Juruena region’s conservation units and the preservation of its biodiversity.

Methodology

The organization Amazon Conservation generated the baseline mining deforestation alerts in Juruena National Park and Igarapés do Juruena State Park for the period from June 2025 to April 2026, based on early warning forest loss alerts from the University of Maryland and analysis with high-resolution satellite imagery from Planet.

The Brazilian organization Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV) then led the verification of these alerts, delineation of affected areas, and characterization of infrastructure associated with illegal mining based on the visual interpretation of very-high-resolution satellite imagery from Planet (SkySat, 50 cm). The analysis considered elements characteristic of artisanal mining activity, such as access roads, camps, machinery, and other mining support structures.

ICV also analyzed the GeoPortal of the Mato Grosso State Secretariat of Environment (SEMA-MT) to identify enforcement actions targeting areas affected by mining within Igarapés do Juruena State Park.

Finally, for Juruena National Park, ICV analyzed platforms and databases belonging to the federal agencies responsible for the unit’s management and enforcement, including the Geoservices Platform of the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio) and the Pamgia portal of the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama). They examined records of enforcement actions related to mining activity in the study area, such as notices of violation, embargoes, and other administrative measures applied by the competent authorities.

References

  1. ANM. AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO (ANM). Dados geoespaciais de processos minerários – SIGMINE. Disponível em: https://geo.anm.gov.br/portal/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=6a8f5ccc4b6a4c2bba79759aa952d908. Acesso em: 24 jun. 2026. 
  2. BRASIL. Lei nº 9.985, de 18 de julho de 2000. Dispõe sobre o Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação da Natureza. Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9985.htm. Acesso em: 15 jun. 2026.
  3. BRASIL. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. Acesso em: 15 jun. 2026.
  4. ICMBio. INSTITUTO CHICO MENDES DE CONSERVAÇÃO DA BIODIVERSIDADE. 2026. Dados geoespaciais – Autos de infração (shapefile). Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/icmbio/pt-br/dados-icmbio/dados_geoespaciais/mapa-tematico-e-dados-geoestatisticos-das-unidades-de-conservacao-federais/autos_infracao_icmbio_shp.zip. Acesso em: 02 jun. 2026. 
  5. EARTH GENOME. Amazon Mining Watch. 2022. Disponível em: https://amazonminingwatch.org/. Acesso em: 15 jun. 2026.
  6. OPAN. OPERAÇÃO AMAZÔNIA NATIVA. 2026. Boletim de pressões e ameaças às terras indígenas na bacia do rio Juruena. Cuiabá: OPAN. Disponível em: https://amazonianativa.org.br/pub/boletim-de-pressoes-e-ameacas-as-terras-indigenas-na-bacia-do-rio-juruena-2/. Acesso em: 29 jun. 2026. 
  7. OPAN. OPERAÇÃO AMAZÔNIA NATIVA. 2021. Processos minerários na bacia do rio Juruena: implicações para os povos indígenas e a conservação da biodiversidade. Cuiabá: OPAN. Disponível em: https://amazonianativa.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/OPAN_RT_Processos-minerarios-Juruena-v4.pdf. Acesso em: 25 jun. 2026.
  8. SEMA. Secretaria de Estado de Meio Ambiente de Mato Grosso. 2026. Geoportal – Autos de Infração e Embargos. Disponível em: https://geoportal.sema.mt.gov.br/. Acesso em: 13 mai. 2026.

Acknowledgements

This report was produced in collaboration with the Brazilian organization Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV), and with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation.

MAAP #245: Illegal gold mining in Puré River National Park (Colombian Amazon)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Figure 1. Illegal mining zone in Río Puré National Park. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

The Puré River flows through the heart of Río Puré National Park in the southeastern Colombian Amazon and then crosses into the northwestern Brazilian Amazon (Figure 1).

In addition to its extraordinary biodiversity and high carbon stocks, this protected area is home to Indigenous communities, including Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation (specifically, the Yurí and Passé). Their presence has been confirmed by the Colombian State (Resolution 244 of 2024), and their high vulnerability is widely recognized internationally.

In MAAP #228, published in May 2025, we reported the presence of more than 50 mining dredges along the course of the Puré River within the National Park.

Here, we warn that this illegal gold mining is now expanding outwards and causing substantial mining deforestation along the Puré River (see Figure 2).

Specifically, we present a novel monthly analysis of mining-related deforestation from January 2024 to the present (May 2026) along the impacted stretch of the Puré River, near the border with Brazil.

This analysis captures its emergence in mid-2024 and subsequent escalation in 2025, which led to two major binational operations involving the governments of Colombia and Brazil.

We also show that the gold mining deforestation has again intensified in 2026.

In total, we report the accumulated gold mining deforestation of 506 hectares in Puré River National Park between June 2024 and May 2026.

Gold mining deforestation along the Puré River

Figure 2. Illegal mining critical zones. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Figure 2 illustrates the gold mining deforestation along the impacted section of the Puré River (adjacent to Brazil) from its onset in 2024 to the present (2026).

We identified four critical zones where the mining deforestation has been most concentrated.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Monthly analysis of gold mining deforestation

In June 2024, we first detected a small area (<5 hectares) of mining-induced deforestation along the Pure River. This monthly impacted area progressively increased throughout the rest of the year (peaking at 16 hectares in December), reaching a cumulative total of 38 hectares for the initial year of 2024 (Figure 3a).

In early 2025, we documented a major increase, with mining deforestation doubling compared to that recorded in December 2024 (Figure 3b).

In response to this escalating situation, a binational operation was conducted in late May 2025 along the border between Colombia and Brazil (see Figure 2). This operation was coordinated among Colombian entities—the Attorney General’s Office (via its Directorate for Specialized Crimes against the Environment), the Colombian Aerospace Force, and the Colombian National Army—and Brazilian entities—the Ministry of Defense, the Brazilian Army, the Federal Police, and ICMBio.

The mining deforestation subsequently declined in June and July 2025, followed by slight increases in August and September. November, however, once again experienced higher levels of mining deforestation (55 hectares).

In response, a second binational operation took place in mid-November in the same border area. Similarly, the mining deforestation subsequently declined in December 2025 and January 2026, but then started to rise again in the following months.

Starting in February 2026, mining deforestation continued to rise once again, peaking in March and reaching 177 hectares through May (Figure 3c).

Figure 3. Monthly mining deforestation along the Puré River (2024-26). Data. ACA/MAAP.

Critical Zones

As noted above, we have identified four critical zones where the gold mining deforestation has been most concentrated along the Puré River (see Figure 2).

Zooms 1–4 show the expansion of mining deforestation across these four critical zones between February 2024 and May 2026, using high-resolution (~3-meter) Planet satellite imagery.

Zoom 1 highlights the area along the Colombia-Brazil border where the two binational operations noted above were conducted in June and November 2025. We recorded 109 hectares of mining deforestation in this zone since 2024, including 16 hectares most recently in 2026.

Zoom 2 shows the second critical area, where we recorded mining deforestation of 126 hectares since 2024, including 46 hectares in 2026.

Zoom 3 shows the third critical area, where we documented mining deforestation of 121 hectares since 2024, including 30 hectares in 2026.

Zoom 4 shows the fourth critical zone, where we recorded mining deforestation of 60 hectares since 2024, including 41 hectares in 2026.

Policy Implications

All of the gold mining deforestation presented in this report is taking place within Puré River National Park, a strict protected area where land use is not designated for mining operations of any kind. Thus, we have documented over 500 hectares of illegal gold mining deforestation in the park since 2024.

The expansion of this illegal gold mining along the Puré River poses a direct threat to the indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation (the Yurí and Passé), who rely on the natural resources of the park for their survival. The presence of mining dredges, camps, and supply routes increases the risk of encounters, disease transmission, and forced displacement for these highly vulnerable groups.

In addition to the deforestation noted in the report, the illegal gold mining also causes mercury contamination of impacted water bodies (most notably, the Puré River) and its fish and other aquatic populations that make up the river food web. These environmental impacts subsequently translate into social consequences and human rights violations for indigenous peoples—including those living in isolation—by compromising human health, food security, and the productive capacity of their lands and resources.

It is important to note that Colombia instituted a total ban on mercury in 2023, building off an initial ban issued in 2013. This prohibition covers the import and export of mercury to and from the national territory. Despite the ban within Colombia, mercury is still heavily used for illegal gold mining in border zones, such as those examined in this report.

Colombia’s challenge, therefore, lies in strengthening sustained efforts to build a mining prevention strategy, while also continuing to develop operational response capabilities and coordinate actions across the border region with Brazil.

It is essential to carry out these measures in coordination with the Brazilian government, given that supplies, dredges, and mining infrastructure are provided by business operators from neighboring municipalities in Brazil—specifically Japurá (the urban center closest to this area), Maraã, and Jutaí. Furthermore, the river routes used to transport supplies and machinery also serve to move the gold extracted in these zones—from the Puré-Purué river corridor, across the Japurá and Tefé rivers, and finally to the city of Manaus.

As our findings indicate, binational law enforcement operations appear effective in the short term, yet illegal gold mining inevitably returns relatively quickly (within months). The challenge lies in implementing long-term strategies in a region that is remote from within Colombian territory, but more accessible from the Brazilian side.

Finally, we note that Colombia has activated protection mechanisms (established in 2018) for the Puré River National Park in response to risk reports. Additionally, the Ministry of the Interior issued an Early Warning (#1635), mandating a coordinated institutional response among the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Foreign Affairs; however, this coordination has lacked effectiveness. Although the system aims to guarantee the territorial integrity and isolation of the Yurí and Passé peoples through health contingency protocols, collaboration with neighboring indigenous groups, and coordination with local governments—while also relying on binational security operations with Brazil—the problem remains unresolved.

Overall, the appropriate legal tools are in place, yet the capacity to resolve the current situation hinges on the national government allocating funding and demonstrating the political will to implement measures on the ground, moving beyond legal formalities to an operational presence that effectively dismantles the illegal mining infrastructure along the border.

Acknowledgments

We extend special thanks to the management of Río Puré National Park for their collaboration on this analysis and report.

This report was produced in collaboration with the Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS), the Amazon Conservation Team (ACT), and the Amazon Alliance for Reducing the Impacts of Gold Mining (AARIMO), with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation.

MAAP #244: Amazon Deforestation & Fire Hotspots 2025

Posted on by Matt Finer
Base Map. Deforestation and fire hotspots across the Amazon in 2025. Data: UMD/GLAD, Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Continuing our annual series, we present a detailed look at the major 2025 Amazon forest loss hotspots and trends, based on the annual data recently released by the University of Maryland and featured on Global Forest Watch. As in other reports of the series, we take this global dataset and analyze it specifically for the Amazon.

This dataset, which serves as a consistent source across all nine countries of the Amazon, distinguishes forest loss from fire and non-fire causes. We use the non-fire forest loss as a proxy for human-caused deforestation, although it also includes some natural loss. In addition, we apply a filter to focus just on primary forest loss.

With this context, we are able to identify the primary forest loss hotspots from fire and non-fire (deforestation proxy) causes across the Amazon in 2025 (see Base Map). 

The non-fire (proxy for deforestation) hotspots were largely due to agriculture and gold mining across the Amazon. These hotspots were concentrated in the:

  • Soy frontiers of southeast Brazil (Area A; see MAAP #161) and southern Bolivia (Area B; MAAP #179),
    .
  • Along major roads in Brazil, such as the Trans-Amazonian Highway (Area C) and BR-364 (Area D). There is also agricultural expansion along an expansive road network in northern Brazil (Area K).
    .
  • Agricultural areas in central Peru (Area E), including lands occupied by Mennonite colonies (MAAP #222),
    .
  • Arc of deforestation in northwest Colombia (Area F) associated with roads, land grabbing (and associated cattle pastures), and coca cultivation (MAAP #224),
    .
  • Gold mining areas in southern and central Peru (Area G; MAAP #233, MAAP #241), northern Ecuador (Area H)  (MAAP #230, MAAP #227, MAAP #219), northeast Amazon (Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname – for example, Area I), and Indigenous territories in Brazil (for example, Area J; MAAP #239).

 

The fire hotspots were concentrated in the soy and cattle frontiers of the southeast Brazilian Amazon and southeast Bolivian Amazon (including the important ecosystem of the Chiquitano dry forests), and also northeast Bolivia. This fire data may be interpreted as forest degradation, in contrast to the more permanent impacts of deforestation.

Amazon Primary Forest Loss, 2002-2025

In 2025, the major story was that fires were down from the record-breaking year of 2024 (Graph 1). Fires were still historically high, however (1.5 million hectares), marking the 3rd-highest since 2002 (behind only the peak fire seasons of 2016 and 2024).

Non-fire forest loss was also down from 2024 (Graph 1). While still just above 1 million hectares, it was the lowest total over the past 10 years and the 5th-lowest since 2002.

Cumulatively, we estimate the non-fire forest loss of 34.8 million hectares of primary forest since 2002, about the size of Germany or the U.S. state of Montana. An additional 12.2 million hectares have been impacted by fires.

Note that Graph 1 is interactive: The reader can click items in the legend (Non-fire and Fire-caused forest loss), and on the circles for each year to visualize the data point.

Amazon Primary Forest Loss, 2025

In 2025, the majority of non-fire primary forest loss occurred in Brazil (55%), followed by Bolivia (20%), Peru (14%), and Colombia (6%) as the clear top four (Graph 2a; Annex 1).

Notably, Brazil had the lowest annual loss on record since 2002, at around 560,475 hectares. 

Bolivia‘s non-fire primary forest loss (200,000 ha) was still historically high (4th highest on record), but lower than the previous peak three years of 2022-24.

Peru’s non-fire primary forest loss was the 5th highest on record (147,480 ha), and the highest over the past 5 years.

Colombia’s non-fire primary forest loss (66,310 ha) was the second lowest since the FARC peace agreement in 2016.

The vast majority (97%) of fire-caused primary forest loss occurred in just two countries: Brazil and Bolivia. Peru added 2% (26,580 ha). All three countries’ fire impact was much lower than last year’s record-breaking fire season.

Note that Graph 2a is interactive: The reader can click the bars for each country for non-fire forest loss (purple bars) and fire forest loss (orange bars). To see the data for the countries with less forest loss, click on the “Log” option in the upper right (or see Annex 1, further below).

Amazon Primary Forest Loss Rate, 2025

Standardizing for area, we show that Bolivia has the highest non-fire primary forest loss rate, followed by Peru, Colombia, then Brazil (Graph 2b).

Bolivia also has, by far, the highest fire-caused primary forest loss rate, followed by Brazil, and more distantly, Peru.

Note that Graph 2b is interactive: The reader can click the bars for each country for non-fire forest loss (purple bars) and fire forest loss (orange bars).

Amazon Deforestation 2025

In a novel analysis, we directly estimate Amazonian deforestation for the first time. As noted above, the primary forest loss data described above is a good proxy for deforestation, but also includes loss associated with natural events, such as landslides, windstorms, and meandering rivers.

Using the “WRI Google Drivers of Tree Cover Loss” dataset, we estimate the primary forest loss directly caused by agriculture, mining, and infrastructure. That is, directly estimate human-caused deforestation.

In 2025, we estimate the deforestation of 736,484 hectares across the Amazon (Graph 3). The vast majority (94.6%) of this deforestation came from agriculture (both permanent and shifting). An additional 5.3% came from hard commodities, mostly gold mining. The remaining 0.1% was caused by roads and infrastructure.

Over half (55.2%) of this deforestation occurred in Brazil, followed by Peru (16.8%), Bolivia (13.8%), and Colombia (8.5%).

Peru had the most mining deforestation, followed by Brazil, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela. However, we note that Amazon Mining Watch indicates that Brazil had higher mining deforestation than Peru in 2025.

Note that Graph 3 is interactive: The reader can click on the bars for each country. To see the data for the countries with less forest loss, click on the “Log” option in the upper right

Amazon Deforestation 2025 in Protected Areas & Indigenous Territories

Of the 2025 Amazon deforestation noted above, nearly 132,000 hectares (18%) occurred in protected areas and Indigenous territories (Graph 4). This may be considered a general estimate for illegal deforestation.

Agriculture accounted for 89% of this deforestation, and mining for the remaining 11%.

Brazil had the most deforestation in protected areas and Indigenous territories (33%), followed by Bolivia (25%), Peru (20%), Colombia (10%), Venezuela (6%), and Ecuador (4%).

Specifically for gold mining, Brazil had the most deforestation in protected areas and Indigenous territories, followed by Peru and Venezuela.

Note that Graph 4 is interactive: The reader can click items in the legend (Agriculture and Mining, by designation), and on the bars to visualize the data for each country.

Annex 1

Note that Annex 1 is interactive: The reader can click on the countries in the legend, and on the circles for each year to visualize the data point. To see the data for the countries with less forest loss, click on the “Log” option in the upper right.

Policy Implications

Following the record-breaking fire season of 2024, fire impact in 2025 was still historically high (3rd highest on record) but much reduced from the previous year’s peak. As detailed in MAAP #229, the 2024 fire season was associated with a strong El Niño event, creating extremely dry conditions across the Amazon. In contrast, 2025 was associated with the moister conditions of La Niña. This correlation has major implications for the predicted upcoming super El Niño season and will be the subject of an upcoming report.

Instead of fires, the major story in 2025 was relatively positive: the lowest non-fire primary forest loss over the past 10 years, and the 5th lowest on record.

However, in 2025 an additional 1 million hectares of primary forest was lost, bringing the cumulative total lost to 34.8 million hectares since 2002, the size of Germany or Montana.

As in previous years, the countries with the highest primary forest loss were Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, respectively. 

Notably, Brazil had the lowest annual loss on record since 2002, and Colombia was the second lowest since the FARC peace agreement in 2016. In contrast, Bolivia and Peru were both relatively high, but with different trends: Bolivia was lower than the previous peak years, while Peru was the highest over the past 5 years.

Standardizing for area, Bolivia had the highest primary forest loss rate, followed by Peru, Colombia, and then Brazil.

In terms of spatial patterns, non-fire primary forest loss hotspots were detected in all countries. Major agricultural deforestation areas occurred in southeast Brazil, southern Bolivia, central Peru, and northwest Colombia. Major mining areas were detected in southern and central Peru, northern Ecuador, the northeast Amazon (Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname), and Indigenous territories in Brazil.

Finally, in a novel analysis, we directly estimate Amazonian deforestation for the first time using a new dataset from WRI and Google. In 2025, we estimate the deforestation of 736,484 hectares across the Amazon. The vast majority (94.6%) of this deforestation came from agriculture (both permanent and shifting). An additional 5.3% came from hard commodities, mostly gold mining. The remaining 0.1% was caused by roads and infrastructure.

Over half (55.2%) of this deforestation occurred in Brazil, followed by Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Peru had the most mining deforestation, followed by Brazil, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela.

While agriculture accounts for the greatest impact in terms of total number of hectares deforested, much of this impact occurs in expanding deforestation zones and along roads. Key examples include expanding deforestation along the major roads of the eastern and southern Brazilian Amazon, expanding soy deforestation in the southern Bolivian Amazon, expanding deforestation by Mennonite colonies in the central Peruvian Amazon, and the arc of deforestation in the northwest Colombian Amazon. 

Gold mining, on the other hand, has the greatest impact in terms of targeting sensitive areas. In contrast to agricultural deforestation following roads, gold mining, particularly illegal gold mining, often targets the most remote and intact areas, such as protected areas and Indigenous territories. Key examples include the southern Peruvian Amazon, northern Ecuadorian Amazon, border between the Colombian and Brazilian Amazon, Indigenous territories of the Brazilian Amazon, and the northeast Amazon (Venezuela, Suriname, and Guyana).

It is important to note that the data presented here may differ from national data presented by governments. This difference may be due to methodology (we focus on impact on primary forests), spatial resolution (30 meters in our case), and Amazon boundaries (we employ a hybrid boundary designed for maximum inclusion of both watershed and biogeography). Due to these potential differences among sources, it is best to focus on the convergence of overall trends and patterns, and not overly focus on the absolute numerical difference.

Methodology

The analysis was based on 30-meter resolution annual forest loss data produced by the University of Maryland and also presented by Global Forest Watch.

This data was complemented with the Global Forest Loss due to fire dataset that is unique in terms of being consistent across the Amazon (in contrast to country specific estimates) and distinguishes forest loss caused directly by fire (note that virtually all Amazon fires are human-caused). The values included were ‘medium’ and ‘high’ confidence levels (code 3-4). This fire data may be interpreted as forest degradation, in contrast to the more permanent impacts of deforestation.

The remaining forest loss serves as a likely close proxy for deforestation, with the only remaining exception being natural events such as landslides, wind storms, and meandering rivers. The values used to estimate this category were ‘low’ certainty of forest loss due to fire (code 2), and forest loss due to other ‘non-fire’ drivers (code 1).

For the baseline, it was defined to establish areas with >30% tree canopy density in 2000. Importantly, we applied a filter to calculate only primary forest loss by intersecting the forest cover loss data with the additional dataset “primary humid tropical forests” as of 2001 (Turubanova et al 2018). For more details on this part of the methodology, see the Technical Blog from Global Forest Watch (Goldman and Weisse 2019).

Our geographic range for the Amazon is a hybrid designed for maximum inclusion: biogeographic boundary (as defined by RAISG) for all countries, except for Bolivia and Peru, where we use the watershed boundary, and Brazil, where we use the Legal Amazon boundary.

Protected areas and Indigenous territory data from RAISG and official sources. In case of an overlap, data was included in the protected areas category. Note that Suriname does not have titled Indigenous territories.

To identify the deforestation hotspots, we conducted a kernel density estimate. This type of analysis calculates the magnitude per unit area of a particular phenomenon, in this case, forest cover loss. We conducted this analysis using the Kernel Density tool from the Spatial Analyst Tool Box of ArcGIS. We used the following parameters:

Search Radius: 15000 layer units (meters)
Kernel Density Function: Quartic kernel function
Cell Size in the map: 50 x 50 meters (0.25 hectares)
Everything else was left to the default setting.

For the Base Map, we used the following concentration percentages: High: 3-14%; Very High: >14%. These percentages correspond to the concentration of forest loss pixels, with a pixel size of 50 x 50 meters (0.25 hectares).

Using the “WRI Google Drivers of Tree Cover Loss” dataset, we then estimated human-caused deforestation. The main challenge was analyzing this 1 km resolution dataset in relation to the 30 m resolution annual forest loss dataset described above.

Building upon the annual forest loss by confidence level )—from which fire-related loss was excluded based on confidence levels 3 and 4—a second layer, designated “Forest Loss Non-Fire” (confidence levels 1 and 2), was generated; onto this layer, the cumulative “Drivers” layer (2001–2025) was overlaid to analyze which underlying causes were associated with the recorded loss.

The result was an artificial scale 30 m resolution; it should be noted here that the spatial correlation is not exact. Since Driver’s original data has a resolution of 1 km—which encompasses multiple 30-meter pixels—this value has been replicated (downscaled). Through layer merging, a layer was obtained containing forest loss pixel values ​​accompanied by a confidence level and an assigned driver—meaning the probable primary cause of the loss has been identified.

To estimate human-caused deforestation, we focused on just four of the drivers: agriculture (both permanent and shifting), hard commodities, and roads & infrastructure. In other words, we did not include Natural forest loss, Wildfires, or Logging.

Acknowledgements

We thank colleagues from the following organizations for helpful comments on the report: Conservación Amazónica – ACEAA in Bolivia, Conservación Amazónica – ACCA in Peru, and  Fundación EcoCiencia in Ecuador.

This work was supported by Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).

 

Citation

Finer M, Ariñez A, Bodin B, Santana A (2026) Amazon Deforestation & Fire Hotspots 2025. MAAP: 244.

​MAAP #243: Gold Mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon: Southern Sector – Zamora Chinchipe Province

Posted on by Matt Finer
Base Map 1. Mining deforestation in Ecuador. Data: AMW, Amazon Conservation/MAAP, RAISG

This is the fourth in a series of reports detailing the expansion of gold mining deforestation in the Ecuadorian Amazon.

In previous reports, we analysed mining activity in the northern (MAAP #227), central (MAAP #230), and southern (MAAP #238) sectors of the country, respectively (see Base Map 1).

Here, our analysis continues the study of the southern sector, focusing on mining deforestation in the Zamora Chinchipe province.

Zamora Chinchipe, located in the southernmost tip of the Ecuadorian Amazon, is one of the country’s most ecologically significant regions due to its location within the transitional zone between the Andean mountain range and the Amazonian lowlands. Due to its high biodiversity and important ecosystems, the province is home to several priority conservation areas—including Podocarpus National Park, Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve, Maycú Nature Reserve, and Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest (see Base Map 2)—which collectively form a key ecological connectivity corridor for emblematic species such as the jaguar and spectacled bear (Jewel, 2020).

This area, however, faces growing threats associated with the expansion of extractive activities. For example, MAAP #167 first reported mining deforestation in the Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest.

Given its high potential for mineral extraction, Zamora Chinchipe has become a province of strategic national interest. According to reporting by Mongabay, gold mining has emerged as one of its primary economic drivers, operating at multiple scales ranging from large-scale industrial projects to small-scale activities. The impacts associated with this activity include deforestation and mercury contamination.

Since 2023, Earth Genome, in collaboration with Amazon Conservation and the Pulitzer Center, has been developing an online geospatial viewer known as Amazon Mining Watch (see MAAP #226). This virtual tool automates the analysis of satellite imagery using machine learning to identify areas of gold mining deforestation across the Amazon annually since 2018. It now also features quarterly updates, representing a breakthrough that will enable the systematic, near-real-time detection of gold mining deforestation across the region.

Base Map 1 presents the location of recent mining deforestation across the Ecuadorian Amazon, based on the latest data from Amazon Mining Watch

Dynamics of Mining Activity in Zamora Chinchipe

Base Graph.Data: MapBiomas, EcoCiencia.

The Base Graph  illustrates the cumulative mining deforestation in the Zamora Chinchipe province between 1995 and 2024.

Mining impacted just 5 hectares in our 1995 baseline, before gradually reaching 1,000 hectares in 2009-2010.

Starting around 2016, we documented a notable spike in annual mining activity, reaching 2,000 hectares in 2017, then 3,000 hectares in 2019, 5,o00 hectares in 2021, and ultimately reaching a total of 6,802 hectares by 2024.

This is equivalent to 16,808 acres.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case Studies

We conducted satellite monitoring to identify and quantify the impacts of gold mining deforestation across four case studies in Zamora Chinchipe, analyzing the dynamics of how the mining footprint expanded during the 2021–2025 period (see Base Map 2).

These cases encompass four key conservation areas, including two national protected areas (Podocarpus National Park and Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve), one protective forest (Upper Nangaritza River Basin Protective Forest), and one private conservation area (Maycú Nature Reserve).

They also include two of the province’s strategic river systems: the Nunpatakaime and Nangaritza rivers.

In total, across the four case studies, we recorded 195 hectares impacted by mining activity during the 2021–2025 period.

Base Map 2. Satellite Monitoring Area in Zamora Chinchipe. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP, EcoCiencia, Planet.

Case 1:  Nangaritza River

Graph 1. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP; EcoCiencia

The case study is situated on the banks of the Nangaritza River, specifically in the village of Las Orquídeas, located in the northwestern sector of the Maycu Nature Reserve.

The impact of mining expansion is one of the primary environmental threats in this area.

We identified a total of 78 hectares affected by mining activity between 2021 and 2025, with a spike starting in 2024 (Graph 1).

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 1. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet

Figure 1 indicates that, of the total area affected by mining (78 ha), only 5 hectares are located within mining concessions.

Moreover, 21.2 hectares are located inside the Maycú Natural Reserve.

As indicated in Base Map 2, this area is located around the southern tip of the reserve.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Panel 1 shows the notable mining expansion between July 2021 (left panel) and December 2025 (right panel) along the Nangaritza River.

Panel 1. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet

Case 2: Numpatakaime River

Graph 2. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP, EcoCiencia

This case study is situated along the banks of the Nunpatakaime River, located within the Upper Nangaritza River Basin Protective Forest—a conservation area that safeguards extensive tracts of humid tropical forest characterized by their high biodiversity and excellent state of conservation.

Graph 2 indicates the rapid mining expansion between 2024 (7 hectares) and 2025 (60 hectares).

 

,

 

 

 

 

Figure 2. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet

Figure 2 shows that of the total mining area (60 ha), only 5 hectares are located within mining concessions.

Moreover, 44 hectares of mining deforestation are located within the Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest.

As indicated in Base Map 2, this case study is located in the eastern part of the protective forest.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Panel 2 shows the rapid expansion of mining activity between September 2024 (left) and December 2025 (right).

Panel 2. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet

Case 3: Podocarpus​ National Park

Graph 3. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia

This case study is situated along the banks of the Loyola River, located in the high-mountain zone of Podocarpus National Park.

Graph 3 indicates that, with a baseline of 12 hectares in 2023, the mining impact jumped to 28 hectares in 2024 and then 44 hectares in 2025.

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 3. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia, Planet

Mining activity is taking place within Podocarpus National Park (Figure 3), where the exploitation of mineral resources is prohibited by law.

As indicated in Base Map 2, this area is within the core of the national park.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Panel 3 shows the mining expansion in the national park between September 2023 (left panel) and April 2025 (right panel). The panel contrasts the loss of forest cover, as well as the impact on the Loyola River.

Panel 3. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet

Case 4: ​Cerro Plateado​ Biological Reserve

Graph 4. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia

This case is situated within the buffer zone of the Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve, a core zone of high ecological significance in southern Ecuador.

This protected area plays a strategic role as a biodiversity corridor connecting Podocarpus National Park, the Maycú Nature Reserve, and the Upper Nangaritza River Protective Forest (see Base Map 2).

Graph 4 indicates an increase from a baseline mining impact of 4 hectares in 2024 to 13 hectares in 2025.

 

 

Figure 4. Data: ACA/MAAP, EcoCiencia, Planet

Figure 4 illustrates that most of the detected mining activity (12 hectares) is being conducted outside the areas authorised mining areas.

Notably, we also detected the initial invasion (1.59 hectares) of Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Panel 4 illustrates the expansion of mining activity between September 2023 (left panel) and December 2025 (right panel).

Panel 4. Datos: EcoCiencia, Planet
Figure 4 Zoom . Datos: EcoCiencia

Additionally, we obtained a more detailed view from aerial photographs captured by a drone in April 2026.

\With this enhanced imagery, we identified key minging features such as sediment ponds, removal of vegetation cover, eroded soils, and the presence of abandoned camps, among other impacts associated with mining activity (see Figure 4 Zoom).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Public Policy Recommendations

1. Standardisation of the mining cycle (and closing new mining fronts)

Photo 1. Mining activity. Source: EcoCiencia

The cases analysed in Zamora Chinchipe reveal a recurring operational pattern characterised by the opening of mining fronts, their temporary abandonment, a shift toward new areas of exploitation, and a subsequent return to previously impacted zones. This dynamic—common in small-scale and medium-scale mining—generates cumulative environmental impacts and liabilities, and hinders effective oversight by the competent authority.

The Ecuadorian legal framework establishes clear obligations regarding the planning, execution, and closure of mining activities. The ‘Organic Law for the Strengthening of the Strategic Mining and Energy Sectors’ stipulates that all mining activity must be carried out in accordance with approved technical and environmental plans—including environmental management and closure plans—starting from the initial phases of the project (Arts. 4, 7, and 9). Complementarily, the Organic Environmental Code (COA) enshrines the principles of prevention, progressive control, and comprehensive reparation for environmental damage, even when activities are conducted on an intermittent basis (Arts. 9, 171, and 291). 

However, in practice, environmental management instruments are often applied in a fragmented manner, evaluating each mining front as an isolated event and without considering the logic of abandonment and return.

In this context, it is recommended to establish standardised and mandatory technical protocols that comprehensively regulate the phases of opening, temporary suspension, abandonment, and reactivation of mining fronts. These protocols should apply regardless of the scale of the activity and serve as a complement to the respective sanctioning processes.

Additionally, it is recommended to condition the authorisation for opening new mining fronts upon the technical and verifiable compliance with progressive closure and remediation processes at previously worked fronts. This measure would serve to prevent the creation of environmental liabilities, reduce incentives for informal abandonment, and align mining practices with current legal obligations.

2. Incorporation of real-time monitoring technologies (early warning system)

Photo 2. Podocarpus National Park—threatened protected area in need of early warning system. Source: EcoCiencia

While the ‘Organic Law for the Strengthening of the Strategic Mining and Energy Sectors’ empowers the State to exercise permanent control and oversight over mining activities (Arts. 3, 4, and 9), in vast and difficult-to-access territories—such as Zamora Chinchipe—traditional control mechanisms prove insufficient to monitor the cycles of abandonment and return.

In this regard, it is recommended that technological monitoring tools—such as georeferencing systems, satellite imagery, and digital reporting platforms—be mandatorily incorporated as part of the mining management and control instruments of the regulatory and oversight body. These tools would enable the identification of periodic changes in land use, the opening of new mining fronts, and the reactivation of previously disturbed areas.

The adoption of these systems would strengthen the preventive approach to environmental control, facilitate decision-making based on technical evidence, and contribute to compliance with the control obligations established in the Organic Law for the Strengthening of the Strategic Mining and Energy Sectors, the Organic Law for the Strengthening of Protected Areas, and the COA.

3. Integration of technical oversight with local governments

The discontinuous nature of mining activity in Zamora Chinchipe necessitates a control model that moves beyond centralised oversight and relies on territorial actors. The Constitution of the Republic recognizes the right to citizen participation in public management (Art. 95)—a principle further elaborated in Ecuadorian environmental regulations.

Within this framework, it is recommended to coordinate the actions of decentralised autonomous governments with local territorial surveillance mechanisms. Such coordination would facilitate the early detection of unauthorized activities, enhance transparency throughout the mining cycle, and ensure that the return to previously impacted areas is carried out under appropriate technical and environmental conditions.

The integration of these actors would contribute to territorializing mining policy, reducing oversight gaps, and strengthening coherence between mining planning and environmental management in the province.

4. Inclusion of technological tools in judicial proceedings

The Organic Law for the Strengthening of Protected Areas (LOFAP) provides for the intervention of the National Police and the Armed Forces to protect protected areas where criminal groups are present, with the aim of neutralizing the threat and restoring conditions of normalcy. Within this framework, it stipulates that oversight in protected areas that are difficult to access—such as Podocarpus National Park and the Cerro Plateado Biological Reserve—shall be carried out through surveillance technology.

Accordingly, its Regulations (RLOFAP) establish that, in these areas, territorial control shall be strengthened through the use of technological tools—such as drones, remote sensors, georeferencing systems, camera traps, or other mechanisms—that ensure continuous and effective monitoring, subject to prior authorization from the competent authority. 

Based on this regulatory framework, the incorporation of technological components into judicial processes is recommended, such that these mechanisms form an integral part of proceedings in both administrative and criminal spheres.

A highly valuable technological component included in this list of technological tools is satellite monitoring reports. Therefore, it is recommended that they be integrated into judicial proceedings and administrative procedures, serving as elements of conviction, evidence, and proof. To this end, it is important to promote any regulatory initiative that emphasizes the importance of employing technology in environmental oversight and the prevention of illicit activities.

 

Acknowledgments

This report is part of a series focused on the Ecuadorian Amazon, produced through a strategic collaboration between the organizations Fundación EcoCiencia and Amazon Conservation, with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).

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MAAP #242 Illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory (northern Brazilian Amazon)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Photo 1. Gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory. Photo credit: Lucas Silva/Platô/ISA

Yanomami Indigenous Territory, located in the northern Brazilian Amazon (along the border with Venezuela), is one of the territories most impacted by gold mining in the Amazon (MAAP #226).

This report details the results of geospatial monitoring of illegal gold mining activity in Yanomami Indigenous Territory, based on data collected up to December 2025. This territory is located in the northern Brazilian Amazon, along the border with Venezuela.

This monitoring effort, based on the analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery and data from collaborative monitoring carried out by the Yanomami and Ye’kwana communities, takes place in a context of operational transition in the territory, marked by the current government’s efforts to remove illegal occupants and the persistence of certain mining hotspots (see Note 1 below).

In recent years, this territory has faced an escalation of illegal mining that peaked in 2022, resulting in an unprecedented humanitarian and health crisis. Current data produced by the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental (see below for details) reveals that the total area impacted by mining reached 5,564 hectares in 2025.

However, time series analysis demonstrates a critical inflection point: after the peak in 2022, the annual increase in newly impacted mining areas showed major and successive decreases in the years 2023 through 2025. Comparatively, while the accumulated area up to 2023 represents the vast majority of the impact (around 5,500 ha), there has been a documented increase of 129 hectares in 2024 and 2025 (83.95 ha and 45.2 ha, respectively).

This recent slowdown in the rate of mining expansion is a direct result of the command and control operations initiated by the Brazilian government in 2023, shortly after the official recognition of the public health emergency (see Note 2). The data, however, also serves as a warning: although the mining expansion has slowed, the continued detection in both 2024 and 2025 confirms that mining activity has not been completely eradicated. 

Monthly monitoring indicates that illegal mining continues to exert pressure on the territory, miners are adapting to enforcement operations and maintain mining nodes of resistance that require continuity and improvement of territorial protection and monitoring strategies.

Analysis of illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory 

Methodology

Photo 2. Gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory. Photo credit: Lucas Silva/Platô/ISA

The data presented in this report is based on monitoring led by the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental (ISA). This analysis is carried out monthly based on the visual interpretation of satellite images from Planet (monthly mosaics) and the European Space Agency’s Sentinel 2. Mining impact polygons were then generated by incorporating: 1) recent mining deforestation, 2) active mining areas with bare soil, 3) recently abandoned areas with initial vegetation growth (grasses covering gravel pits), and 4) tailings ponds. 

Every month, the impacted regions are revisited to refine the mapping and check for possible misinterpretations. The analysis takes into account not only the spectral response of the objects but also the context. Therefore, all mapping is carried out considering the location of the communities and their cultivated areas, among other information about the Yanomami territory such as airstrips and health posts, which ensures differentiation between the removal of forest cover for traditional agricultural management and deforestation associated with mineral or other types of exploitation.

The systematic remote monitoring of Yanomami Indigenous Territory began in 2018, experimenting with different methodologies. Beginning in 2020, the refinement of impacted areas began using Planet mosaics (3 m spatial resolution). For this reason, 2020 is used as the initial year of detailed analysis.

In the Notes section, we also compare this ISA-led monitoring data with information obtained from Amazon Mining Watch.

In addition to remote monitoring, since 2023 a collaborative monitoring tool has been implemented to record events that pose risks to communities and people in the Yanomami Indigenous Territory. The ‘Wãnori’ Alert System receives and qualifies reports, aiming to strengthen communication between indigenous communities, their organizations, and the Public Authorities. Through a free application (ODK Collect), an alert monitor can report an adverse health event, environmental or territorial threat, using an offline form composed of geographic coordinates and a description of the problem in audio and/or photo. The system uses the form/application as its primary tool for receiving complaints, but it continues to receive information from other sources, such as WhatsApp messages, letters, and radio broadcasts, incorporating this information into a single flow. All alerts are compiled into weekly bulletins and sent to Brazilian authorities.

Results

By December 2025, the total area impacted by illegal mining in the Yanomami Indigenous Territory was mapped at 5,564 hectares (see Note 3 for comparison with Amazon Mining Watch). As seen in Graph 1 (with 2020 baseline at 400 ha), the annual mining impact increased in 2021 (just over 1,000 ha) and peaked in 2022 (nearly 1,800 ha), followed by major decreases in 2023 (330 ha), 2024 (84 ha), and 2025 (45 ha), respectively. This reduction was a result of the intervention of the Brazilian government, which initiated a process of removing illegal miners from the territory in 2023, after recognizing the humanitarian crisis caused by illegal mining among the Yanomami and Ye’kwana peoples.

Graph 1 – Annual increase in the area affected by illegal mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory.

The monitoring documented 45 hectares (across 121 polygons) of new mining deforestation within Yanomami Indigenous Territory in 2025. The vast majority (90%) of the polygons were small mining expansions of less than 1 hectare. This recent mining impact was mostly distributed across six areas: 1) Ericó; 2) Cabeceira do Aracaju; 3) Hokomawaë; 4) Parima-Parafuri; 5) Surucucus/Feijão Queimado; 6) Couto Magalhães (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory, highlighting areas with highest impact in 2025.

The two largest polygons (almost 4 hectares) were identified in Parima (Area 5) and Surucucus, near the Feijão Queimado airstrip (Area 6).

Figure 2 – Comparison of images from January 2025 and November 2025 near the Feijão Queimado airstrip. New deforestation is noticeable in the upper part of image 2.
Figure 3 – Comparison between January 2025 and November 2025 in the Parima region.

The distribution of the new mining areas also indicates a trend towards fragmentation of activity, in contrast to the previous concentration around airstrips (such as Capixaba, Jeremias, Malária, Mucuim). With the exception of the Couto Magalhães river region (Area 6 in Figure 1), where the opening of new areas near old scars continued (Figure 4), the other centers of greater concentration, such as Alto Catrimani, Médio Uraricoera and Homoxi, appear to be relatively neutralized.

Figure 4. – Mapping of illegal mining in the Couto Magalhães River (Papiu and Kayanau regions)

In addition to decentralization, there is also a shift in activity to areas closer to the border with Venezuela (possible leakage or spillover effect), as is the case with the mapped areas in Parafuri-Parima, Hokomawë, and Cabeceira do Aracaçá (Areas 2-4 in Figure 1). It is known that part of this phenomenon is explained by the possibility of “circumventing” inspection by using logistical hubs located in Venezuelan territory, such as the airstrips in Dicão and Simada Ocho.

In 2025, the Yanomami Indigenous Territory’s alert system recorded at least five alerts regarding the movement of clandestine aircraft in the Auaris region. In most cases, the aircraft flew in the direction of Hokomawë, towards the Gaúcho Animal airstrip, located at the mouth of the Auaris River, or towards the airstrip located at the headwaters of the Aracaçá River (supposedly the Gongo airstrip). See Figure 5, which zooms in on Area 2 of Figure 1.

Figure 5 – Mapping of illegal mining at the headwaters of the Aracaçá River, near the Gongo airstrip and the border with Venezuela.

With respect to the ‘Wãnori’ Alert System, in 2025, it recorded a total of 66 territorial alerts, of which the vast majority (83%) were invasion alerts (Graph 2), which include information on the movement of clandestine aircraft, boats, barges, and other vehicles. There were also records of attacks and the entry of firearms. Cases of missing persons were resolved, without being actually associated with violence in the illegal mining areas.

Graph 2 – Territorial alerts in 2025 by alert type

Figure 6 illustrates the spatial distribution of the alerts, again highlighting the concentration in the north of the territory, near the border with Venezuela.

Figure 6 – Heat map of territorial alerts for 2024 and 2025

The area with the highest number of alerts, Apiaú  (Chart 3), was also among the regions that registered airspace intrusion alerts (see Annex 1 for photo evidence), possibly associated with illegal mining on the Couto Magalhães River. 

Alto Catrimani also had airspace alerts. In this case, the connection between this activity and illegal mining in the headwaters of the Orinoco River, in Venezuelan territory, is notable; this is one of the areas with the highest levels of illegal mining activity in recent years.

Other areas with airspace intrusion alerts include Auaris and Xitei (see Annex 2 for photo evidence). It should also be noted that, even though the Taboca airstrip is located in Venezuela, it supports the remaining fragments of illegal mining in the Alto Catrimani and Xitei regions, such as the mining operation located near the Pixahanapi community .It is worth noting that in the case of the Xitei mining operation (see Annex 3 for community alert), the warnings reinforce the residents’ concern regarding the entry of ammunition and firearms brought by the miners with the aim of recruiting young people and threatening leaders who oppose mineral exploration in the region. Since 2021, Xitei has been marked by violent conflicts associated with mining, and 2025 was no different. In 2025 alone, it is estimated that at least five people died due to these conflicts.

Graph 3 – Territorial alerts in 2025 by region

In addition to airspace violations, the alert system also recorded many instances of illegal incursions along the rivers of Yanomami Indigenous Territory, namel the Uraricoera, Catrimani, Apiaú, and Ajarani. In some cases, the river traffic was associated with the operation of barges and dredges, in others simply for the transport of cassiterite, or the entry of supplies to replenish the camps.

The Lower Catrimani region has reported the most instances of river invasion. From April to December 2025, nine alerts were issued regarding the presence of barges, dredges, and suspicious boats (Figure 7).

Figure 7 – Boat with supplies for illegal mining in the Lower Catrimani region and a mining dredge operating near the Yanomami community in the same region.

From Apiaú, reports have emerged of an alleged trail for ATVs that would serve to supply the mining operations located upstream and bypass the site where the new National Indigenous Foundation (Funai) base is being installed. The trail would connect existing secondary roads outside the territory and reach the Ingarana stream, a tributary of the Apiaú River (Figure 8).

Figure 8 – Map of the Apiaú region showing the location of the alleged portage.

Finally, another noteworthy region is Ericó, an area accessible via the Uraricaá River, where significant signs of deforestation associated with mining were observed in 2025. During the period from 2018 to 2022, there were records of dredges operating on the Uraricaá River; however, there were no clear signs of land-based mining in the region. With the intensification of operations in other parts of the territory, however, there appears to have been a spillover into this basin, which, being further from the main areas of surveillance, ended up becoming vulnerable. See Figure 9, which zooms in on Area 1 of Figure 1.

Figure 9 – Mapping of illegal mining in the Uraricaá River

Annex

Annex 1. Aircraft registration in service of the mining operation in Apiaú

Annex 2.Illegal mining plane registered in Xitei

Annex 3. Video sent to the Alert System, which records the presence of illegal miners operating at night, near the Pixahanapi community, Xitei.

Policy Implications & Recommendations

Analysis of the 2025 data indicates a significant inflection point in the dynamics of illegal mining. Although the total impacted area amounts to 5,564 hectares, there has been a substantial and successive decrease in the annual expansion of newly degraded areas since the peak in 2022. In 2025, only 45.2 hectares of new areas were recorded, distributed across 121 polygons, most of which are less than 1 hectare.

However, miners’ ability to adapt to the government operations is observed, by adopting some fragmentation and decentralization strategies, moving to areas closer to the border with Venezuela to utilize logistical distribution hubs outside the limits of inspection. Furthermore, the persistence of some extremely resilient mining nodes is noted, as is the case with the mining in the Couto Magalhães River.

With this in mind, to consolidate the results of land clearing operations and address the reentry of criminal activity within the territory, the following actions are recommended:

  • All enforcement agencies should maintain operations to combat illegal mining in the remaining areas, with the complete destruction of machinery used in mineral extraction and the application of the respective administrative sanctions;
  • To ensure continuous remote monitoring of Yanomami territory as well as rapid responses to new alerts from security forces;
  • To guarantee the maintenance of the physical structures and the minimum staff for the continuous operation of the existing Protection Posts (Ajarani, Xexena, Walopali, Serra da Estrutura and Pakilapi);
  • Finalize the construction of the Apiaú and Kayanau Protection Posts;
  • Install new Protection Posts on strategic rivers that serve as routes for illegal mining, specifically on the Uraricaá and Catrimani rivers;
  • Implement more efficient river barriers on the Uraricoera, Mucajaí, Uraricaá, and Catrimani rivers.
  • To promote regular State enforcement agencies’ patrols on the Uraricoera, Mucajaí, Ajarani, Apiaú, Uraricaá, Catrimani, Parima and Couto Magalhães rivers.
  • Enhanced airspace control and strict enforcement of the Brazilian Aeronautical Code.
  • Disabling all clandestine airstrips and seized aircraft within Yanomami territory (Integrated Territory of Yanomami).
  • To promote regular inspection actions on highways, gas stations, airports, and ports located around Yanomami territory. 
  • Support from the federal government for the implementation of the Indigenous Surveillance Plan, integrating information from the communities’ Alert System with state action;
  • Implement a strict sanitary and territorial protection cordon around the territory of the isolated groups, led by the Indigenous Peoples’ National Foundation (FUNAI) and the Health District (Distrito Sanitário) with support from the National Forces;
  • The FUNAI or the Government House (Casa de Governo) should lead the development of a plan to encourage voluntary disarmament in sensitive regions.
  • The Brazilian government should foster spaces for governance and dialogue, with members of the government, indigenous associations, and technical partners from civil society, to monitor the implementation of territorial protection actions.
  • The Brazilian government should develop, translate, and distribute regular newsletters to communities about territorial protection actions and their progress.
  • The national government should coordinate with the Venezuelan government joint actions to combat the logistical “hubs” located just across the border, which serve as refuge for illegal miners and escape routes.

Notes

1. Operational transition refers to the changes in the model, regularity, and intensity of enforcement actions taken following the change in government. https://g1.globo.com/rr/roraima/noticia/2024/02/29/casa-de-governo-com-foco-na-crise-yanomami-e-instalada-em-rr-com-orcamento-de-r-1-bilhao.ghtml

2. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2023/decreto/D11405.htm

3. For comparison, Amazon Mining Watch has detected 2,470 hectares in Yanomami Indigenous Territory between 2018 and 2025. This data also shows a peak in 2022 (increase of 850 ha), followed by declines in 2023 (250 ha) and 2024 (80 ha). AMW did not detect any new mining in 2025. Importantly, the overall detected spatial patterns are similar, with both monitoring systems highlighting the concentration in the northern part of the territory.

4. Protection bases are control points managed by Funai that provide support for operations by other enforcement agencies, such as Ibama and the Federal Police.

5. The River Barriers function as control points and nautical blockades managed by Funai, with support from Ibama and the Federal Police, to prevent logistical access by wildcat miners and intruders to the rivers of the Yanomami Indigenous Territory.

6. This should involve regulatory agencies alongside environmental enforcement and command-and-control bodies, such as the National Civil Aviation Agency – ANAC (for airfield inspections), the National Petroleum Agency – ANP (for fuel station inspections), and the National Land Transport Agency – ANTT (for road and highway inspections).

7. https://acervo.socioambiental.org/acervo/documentos/urihi-noamatima-thepe-plano-de-vigilancia-indigena-da-ti-yanomami

Acknowledgments 

This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and regional partners, with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. In this case, we thank our partner Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) for leading this report